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I. INTRODUCTION
In the Fourth Century AD, Cicero recorded the interaction between
tyrannous Dionysius II of Syracuse and his courtier Damocles, who was
granted the unique opportunity to live like a king after openly coveting
Dionysius' position.' Damocles enjoyed the finest foods and service in
the land while seated on the king's throne and at his table, until he no-
ticed that Dionysius had had a sword suspended over Damocles' head by
a strand of horse's hair from the ceiling throughout the feast. Known in
common parlance as the "Sword of Damocles," though it actually was
Dionysius' sword, this scenario invokes images of the fragility of power.
It also could represent the coercive measures of the Security Council
dangling over all States currently seated at the table of disarmament and
arms control which are not permanent members of the United Nations
Security Council, in the case of significant non-compliance with any
disarmament or arms control norms. States seated there enjoy the im-
pression of sovereign equality, having taken up the seat of their own
accord at the commencement or during the course of the feast, though
doom lies in store if they show any sign of retreating or wanting to re-
treat from that table. Such is the Security Council's prerogative in taking
steps to maintain international peace and security as it deems appropri-
ate, within certain limits.
This Article provides the first comprehensive legal analysis of the
Security Council's coercive disarmament and arms control measures in-
volving weapons of mass destruction (WMD).2 In the process of
1. See CICERO, TUSCULAN DISPUTATIONS V:61-62 (J.E. King trans., 1960). Please
note that this Dionysius is different from the Dionysus in Greek mythology; hence the refer-
ence to "Dionysian" in the title does not mean reckless or undisciplined, but rather refers to
this incident between Dionysius and Damocles.
2. By "disarmament," this Article does not mean the removal of all arms, but rather the
reduction of arms to a particular level. See FRANCIS 0. WILCOX & CARL M. MARCY, PROPOS-
ALS FOR CHANGES IN THE UNITED NATIONS 217 (1955). By "arms control," this Article means
the regulation of arms in any manner that does not necessarily include the actual reduction of
those arms. See Dimitris Bourantonis & Marios Evriviades, New Directions in Disarmament,
in THE UNITED NATIONS IN THE NEW WORLD ORDER: THE WORLD ORGANIZATION AT FIFTY
154, 155-56 (Dimitris Bourantonis & Jarrod Wiener eds., 1995). The U.N. Charter does not
mention "arms control" because that term was not coined until after the signing of the Charter.
See Jost Delbriick, Arms Control, in UNITED NATIONS: LAW, POLICIES AND PRACTICE 39, 39
(Riidiger Wolfrum ed., 1995). WMD are commonly defined as nuclear, chemical, and biologi-
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providing this legal analysis, it presents a fresh perspective on a variety
of widely held beliefs about disarmament and arms control law,3 as well
as about U.N. law. For example, a considerable number of commentators
assert that the Security Council cannot impose disarmament and arms
control obligations on States without their express consent.4 These com-
mentators are not without solid legitimate support, given how the
International Court of Justice (ICJ) declared the following in its 1986
Nicaragua decision:
[I]n international law there are no rules, other than such rules as
may be accepted by the State concerned, by treaty or otherwise,
whereby the level of armaments of a sovereign State can be lim-
ited, and this principle is valid for all States without exception!
Despite this opinion of the ICJ and various commentators, coercion ap-
pears to be one of the three pillars upon which the goal of nuclear
cal agents and the means to deliver them. See, e.g., NEWTON R. BOWLES, THE DIPLOMACY OF
HOPE: THE UNITED NATIONS SINCE THE COLD WAR 162 (2004). Some caution is warranted
for lumping all means of delivery under this definition, as these agents need not be delivered
by intercontinental ballistic missiles, but can be delivered by such simple means as shells and
suitcases. See S. NEIL MACFARLANE & YUEN FOONG KHONG, HUMAN SECURITY AND THE
UN: A CRITICAL HISTORY 122 (2006). The Soviet Union attempted to expand the scope of
WMD in 1979 by including radiological weapons, "particle-beam weapons, infrasonic acous-
tic radiation weapons, and electromagnetic weapons operating at certain radio frequency
radiations that could have injurious effects on human organs,' although the West argued that
including the prohibition of these potential weapons, which had not yet become operational,
would make any treaty on this topic too vague to be effective or verifiable. JAMES S. SUTTER-
LIN, THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE MAINTENANCE OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY: A
CHALLENGE TO BE MET 105 (2003). The definition of WMD does not appear to have evolved
to incorporate the types of weapons that the Soviet Union mentioned in 1979.
3. WMD proliferation is commonly considered to be a branch of disarmament and
arms control. See RAMESH THAKUR, THE UNITED NATIONS, PEACE AND SECURITY: FROM
COLLECTIVE SECURITY TO THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT 176-78 (2006); Milagros Alva-
rez-Verdugo, Comparing U.S. and E.U. Strategies Against Weapons of Mass Destruction:
Some Legal Consequences, I I ANN. SURV. OF INT'L & COMP. L. 119, 119 (2005). Therefore,
when this Article refers to "disarmament and arms control" or "disarmament and arms control
law," it includes "WMD non-proliferation," unless it specifies otherwise.
4. See, e.g., WILCOX & MARCY, supra note 2, at 182; Bourantonis & Evriviades, supra
note 2, at 156; JORGE CASTAR4EDA, LEGAL EFFECTS OF UNITED NATIONS RESOLUTIONS 58-60
(Alba Amoia trans., 1969); Erwin Dahinden, The Future ofArms Control Law: Towards a New
Regulatory Approach and New Regulatory Techniques, 10 J. CONFLICT & SECURITY L. 263,
272 (2005); Guido den Dekker, The Effectiveness of International Supervision in Arms Con-
trol Law, 9 J. CONFLICT & SECURITY L. 315, 317 (2004); Jozef Goldblat, The Role of the
United Nations in Arms Control: An Assessment, in THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE MAINTE-
NANCE OF INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY 369 (U.N. Institute for Training & Research
ed., 1987).
5. Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 135 (June 27)
(emphasis added).
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non-proliferation rests. Although there are many ways in which the
regulation of arms can be seen as coercive,7 this Article will focus on just
one: the coercive measures taken by the Security Council to remove,
limit, and otherwise regulate arms through its distinct powers provided
by the U.N. Charter in Articles 25 and 103 and in Chapter VII, inter alia.
This notion goes against commentators' assertions that the Security
Council, in particular, cannot impose disarmament and arms control ob-
ligations. 8 These assertions inappropriately discount the tremendous
discretion given to the Security Council in reaching decisions designed
to maintain international peace and security. Indeed, commentators in
the 1950s and 1960s, such as Hans Kelsen and Quincy Wright, noted the
link between collective security and the limiting of armaments. This new
perspective on disarmament and arms control law, within the U.N. legal
context, touches on the very core of these bodies of law, and provides a
clearer view of how they operate together.
This Article is divided into four parts. This brief introduction and a
conclusion constitute Parts I and IV, respectively. Part II relies on many
classical and contemporary legal philosophers to construct a theoretical
framework that can be used to understand what is meant by "coercion"
in the disarmament and arms control context and to determine whether it
is even possible for the Security Council to adopt coercive WMD disar-
mament and arms control measures. With this framework in mind, Part
III contains the bulk of this Article's analysis and systematically explores
the various ways in which the Security Council has imposed coercive
WMD disarmament and arms control measures on States. The legal im-
plications of each imposition are addressed as they arise within each set
of Security Council resolutions.
Three disclaimers are appropriate for this Article. First, the limited
number of cases in which the Security Council has imposed disarma-
ment and arms control obligations on States does not allow one to
conclude definitively that the Security Council has particular patterns of
behaviour in this area. Second, this Article focuses on the obligations on
the target States to abide by certain WMD norms that they were not
obliged to abide by before the Security Council's imposition. Third, the
qualitative methodology adopted in the Article limits its ability to say
6. THAKUR, supra note 3, at 161 (noting that the other two pillars are norms and trea-
ties).
7. Other coercive arms control measures can be found within treaty law and the super-
visory bodies established by multilateral disarmament treaties and peace treaties inasmuch as
they often impose disarmament obligations on the weaker State, and within quasi-coercive
measures taken under general international law. These topics are beyond the scope of this
Article.
8. See supra note 4.
[Vol. 29:197
Dionysian Disarmament
whether there is a definitive causal link between the obligations that the
Security Council imposes and any tangible results on the ground. What
is more important than causality here is the notion that the Security
Council's practice of imposing WMD disarmament and arms control
obligations expands what constitutes "collective security" beyond the
traditional definition, which ranges from responding to breaches of the
peace to responding to the mere possession of certain weapons.9 Such an
expansion is not unlike those observed with grave breaches of human
rights and international humanitarian law that have broadened the scope
of acts that can trigger a collective security response under Chapter VII.' °
II. COERCION IN THEORY AND PRACTICE
Inasmuch as this Article looks at the coercive disarmament and arms
control measures that the Security Council takes in maintaining interna-
tional peace and security, it is important to define what coercion is and
whether disarmament and arms control measures can, in fact, be coercive.
A. Defining Coercion
Coercion is one of those nebulous terms in international law that of-
ten is used but rarely defined. A know-it-when-you-see-it type approach
to coercion has led to confusing standards in international legal instru-
ments in which coercion is a component." An aversion to defining
coercion is natural, given that, as Grant Lamond asserts, "coerciveness is
in fact highly complex-there are many different ways in which prac-
tices such as law may be coercive.' ', 2 The following paragraphs provide a
brief analysis of exactly which types of coercion this Article has as its
focus.
9. See MV. NAIDU, COLLECTIVE SECURITY AND THE UNITED NATIONS 17 (1975)
(reflecting the traditional conception of collective security in terms of "actual or potential
breach[es] ... of security"). But see id. at 92-93 (noting that, since its early days, the ambigu-
ity of the "collective security" concept has permitted expansive readings that have "been used
to rationalize aggressive alliances, to identify regional alliances, to support bloc antagonisms
of the Cold War, to describe economic and diplomatic sanctions, to define pacific settlement
methods, to explain the security scheme envisaged in the UN Charter and to justify the so-
called UN peacekeeping methods").
10. Vera Gowlland-Debbas, The Limits of Unilateral Enforcement of Community Objec-
tives in the Framework of UN Peace Maintenance, II EUR. J. INT'L L. 361, 365 (2000).
II. See generally James D. Fry, Coercion, Causation, and the Fictional Elements of
Indirect State Responsibility, 40 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 611 (2007) (discussing the confu-
sion caused by an unclear definition of "coercion" in the Draft Articles on State
Responsibility).
12. Grant Lamond, The Coerciveness of Law, 20 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 39, 40
(2000).
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In this Article, coercion is defined as a means beyond persuasion that
"agents (coercers) can use to get other agents (coercees) to do or not do
something," or is "a reason for why coercees sometimes do or refrain
from doing something," where the coercee's freedom has been somewhat
diminished.'3 In the U.N. context generally, coercion takes the form of
express or implicit threats of military action, and, of course, actual mili-
tary action. In the Security Council context, however, every form of
pressure can be seen as rising to the level of coercion, given the Security
Council's unique ability and broad discretion to authorize, and legiti-
mately threaten the authorization of, collective security measures. Such a
broad definition for coercion in this context seems consistent with how
past commentators have defined the term as including "all forms of pres-
sure resisted by a receiving State as well as pressure not resisted (either
because of an ability to undertake resistance or a conscious decision to
forego resistance).' 4 Although there are numerous usages of the term,
including "violence, compulsion, punishment, force, [and] interfer-
ence," 5 this Article refers to coercion more in the sense of compulsion
that St. Thomas Aquinas, Immanuel Kant, and especially John Stuart
Mill envisioned, which involves involuntariness without necessarily in-
volving the use of force, even though the ability to authorize the use of
force must be present, 6 as is the case with the Security Council. Al-
though Hans Kelsen spoke of coercion primarily as a physical force,
17
some of his writings indicate a definition of coercion with a lower
threshold, similar to the one proposed above: "[Sanctions] are coercive in
so far as they are to be taken even against the will of the subject to whom
they are applied, if necessary by the employment of force"' 8 The key part
of that quote is "against the will of the subject" and "if necessary." Con-
13. Scott Anderson, Coercion, in STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY, Feb.
2006, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/coercion (last visited August 29, 2007).
14. See Rex J. Zedalis, On the Lawfulness of Forceful Remedies for Violations of Arms
Control Agreements: "Star Wars" and Other Glimpses at the Future, 18 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. &
POL. 73, 88-89 (1985); Rex J. Zedalis, Some Thoughts on the United Nations Charter and the
Use of Military Force Against Economic Coercion, 17 TULSA L.J. 487, 491-97 (1982). But see
Christopher C. Joyner, The Transnational Boycott as Economic Coercion in International
Law: Policy, Place, and Practice, 17 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 205, 240-42 (1984) (adopting a
more narrow definition of coercion).
15. See Anderson, supra note 13.
16. See id.
17. See, e.g., HANS KELSEN, PURE THEORY OF LAW 1-69 (Max Knight, trans., 1967);
HANS KELSEN, LAW AND PEACE IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 48-81 (1952); HANS KELSEN,
INTRODUCTION TO THE PROBLEMS OF LEGAL THEORY 108 (Bonnie Litschewski Paulson &
Stanley Paulson trans., 1992) (1932). See also Charles Leben, Hans Kelsen and the Advance-
ment of International Law, 9 EUR. J. INT'L L. 287, 288 (1998); Clemens Japloner, Kelsen and
his Circle: The Viennese Years, 9 EUR. J. INT'L L. 368, 372 (1998).
18. Hans Kelsen, Sanctions in International Law Under the Charter of the United Na-
tions, 31 IOWA L. REV. 499, 499 (1946).
[Vol. 29:197
Dionysian Disarmament
temporary philosophical discussions on coercion, starting with Robert
Nozick in 1969, focus almost exclusively on one agent compelling an-
other agent through conditional threats, though no use of force actually
is applied.'9 As Joshua Meltzer asserts, "any form of coercion reduces
the normative quality of State consent. 20 In sum, coercive action can be
as simple as a shift from persuasion to pressure in trying to compel an-
other State to act or refrain from acting,2' with the main difference
between persuasuion and pressure being roughly the reliance on logical
reasoning in the former.
B. Forms of Coercion
As to the forms of coercion that exist, one ought not to just think of
physical force in compelling a target to act or refrain from acting. In-
deed, there are forms of coercion that are comparable to physical force
in compelling behavior.2 For example, as Frangois Rigaux points out,
followers of certain religions may face the coercive sanction of excom-
munication if they fail to adhere to ecclesiastical law.23 This example is
useful in criticizing Kelsen's characterization of international law as
primitive on account of there being no monopoly of physical coercion in
one body, because such traditional organizations as the Roman Catholic
Church can be sophisticated (and effective) normative systems that apply
sanctions of a non-physical nature.2 Rigaux adds that the ability to re-
scind membership of bad actors in the United Nations or membership in
association with the European Convention of Human Rights are exam-
ples of cases in which coercion does not involve physical force. Other
examples include economic measures, which some commentators assertcan iseto te lvel f . 26
can rise to the level of coercion, and especially when the Security
19. See Anderson, supra note 13 (citing ROBERT NOZICK, COERCION, IN PHILOSOPHY,
SCIENCE, AND METHOD: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF ERNEST NAGEL 440, 441-45 (Sidney Morgen-
besser et al. eds., 1969)).
20. Joshua Meltzer, State Sovereignty and the Legitimacy of the WTO, 26 U. PA. J.
INT'L ECON. L. 693, 707 (2005).
21. See GuiDO DEN DEKKER, THE LAW OF ARMS CONTROL 130 (2001) ("Only in cases
of complete failure of these attempts [to comply with warning that their acts violate the treaty
that] supervision will result in coercive action, substituting persuasion by pressure.").
22. Franqois Rigaux, Hans Kelsen on International Law, 9 EUR. J. INT'L L. 325, 342
(1998) ("Even assuming that coercion forms part of the constitutive elements of a legal order,
one cannot deny the existence of other forms of constraint than physical coercion.").
23. See id. at 338.
24. Danilo Zolo, Hans Kelsen: International Peace through International Law, 9 EUR.
J. INT'L L. 306, 314 (1998). Professional sports organizations are another type of organization
that would fit this description. Id. at 314-15.
25. See Rigaux, supra note 22, at 338.
26. See, e.g., Comment, The Use of Nonviolent Coercion: A Study in Legality Under
Article 2(4) of the Charter of the United Nations, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 983 (1974) (discussing a
hierarchy of coercion, including military force, intermediate coercion (unfriendly measures
Winter 2008]
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Council is involved because it has broad powers to authorize the use of
force when such non-military measures are violated. The means of
coercion are somewhat irrelevant, as Max Weber asserted, 27 as long as a
sufficient amount of pressure is applied to the target State.
Coercion can take many forms in the context of disarmament and
arms control. When both sides in negotiations have matching interests in
disarmament and arms control, there is no need for so-called carrots or
sticks, as the carrots are inherent in the arms control or disarmament
agreement itself." Where inherent mutual benefit is lacking, incentives
and penalties, short of war, are necessary to induce compliance. These
incentives can take the form of various domestic enforcement measures
that can rise to the level of coercion in the aggregate. Such measures
could include, among others, the suspension of benefits to another State
(either military assistance or foreign aid), various fines and penalties un-
der domestic law and export controls, deregistration of corporations
(either subsidiaries or parents), extradition of key individuals to provide
evidence or to imprison, the revocation of nationality when nationals fail
to return for an investigation, and intelligence sharing and mutual assis-
tance in stopping the exportation of WMD-related goods and services.2 9
Key examples of the application of such pressure to agree to certain
WMD non-proliferation norms are evident in the efforts of Western
States to pressure North Korea, through the Agreed Framework and re-
cent Six-Party Talks, and Iran into giving up their nuclear weapons
programs.
Where negotiations are impossible with a target State in trying to
convince them to abide by such norms, then the application of what is
known as "pure coercion" might be necessary. Pure coercion is the use
of military force to physically remove the threat.30 This is the type of co-
ercion that the Security Council used in disarming Iraq during the 1991
Gulf War and beyond. The Security Council has been reluctant to use
short of war), and economic and political coercion); Eiichi Fukatsu, Coercion and the Theory
of Sanctions in International Law, in THE STRUCTURE AND PROCESS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW:
ESSAYS IN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY DOCTRINE AND THEORY 1187, 1193-99 (R. St.J. Macdonald &
Douglas M. Johnston eds., 1983).
27. MAX WEBER, ON LAW IN ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 34-35 (G. Roth & C. Wittich
eds., 1968) (asserting that even the statutes of voluntary associations possibly can constitute
coercion).
28. Christophe Carle, Arms Control in Reluctant Installments: Iraq and North Korea,
Arms Control and Disarmament Cluster 1999-2000, OCCASIONAL PAPER SERIES No. 9, 3
(2000).
29. See Julie Dahlitz, Extra-Territoriality and Weapons Proliferation, 14 AUSTL. Y.B.
INT'L L. 179, 202 (1992); Richard L. Williamson, Jr., Hard Law, Soft Law, and Non-Law in
MultilateralArms Control: Some Compliance Hypotheses, 4 CHI. J. INT'L L. 59, 64 (2003).
30. See Steven Greffenius & Jungil Gill, Pure Coercion vs. Carrot-and-Stick Offers in
Crisis Bargaining, 29 J. PEACE RES. 39 (1992).
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pure coercion against North Korea and Iran, instead preferring to let car-
rots and the threat of sticks try to convince them to abide by international
WMD non-proliferation norms. South Korea, the United States, and Ja-
pan promised billions of dollars worth of nuclear power-generating
equipment and food aid in exchange for guarantees that North Korea will
not develop nuclear weapons or continue production of plutonium.'
There are many indications that this soft approach with regard to North
Korea has not been working,32 although only time will tell. Western pow-
ers seem to be trying to reach a similar arrangement with Iran.33
Regardless of the eventual outcome, these measures give the reader a
sense of the types of non-military coercive measures that States can
adopt in pushing a target State to conform its behaviour in a particular
way.
C. Coercion and International Organizations
The ability to take coercive measures has been a common part of in-
ternational organizations for centuries. Between 1306 and 1800, starting
with the earliest plans of Pierre Dubois for world peace through a strong
international organization, approximately one half of such plans involved
coercion by those organizations of their Member States, and nine-tenths
envisioned an international organization maintaining the status quo.34 In
particular, Harrop Freeman identifies common structures and purposes in
plans for international organizations dating back to 1600:
There is a strong family resemblance in all these plans: a league
proposed by and for the victors in a war, a status quo created or
to be created by force of arms, collective coercion to maintain
this status quo, a non-universal league, a league dealing with
"sovereigns" or "sovereign nations" rather than with people."
This is roughly the same model that the U.N. Charter framers followed.
Article 53(2) makes clear that it was a league of the victors, referencing
"enemy State" during the Second World War. Chapter VII establishes a
collective coercion arrangement maintaining the status quo by military
31. Carle, supra note 28, at 6-7.
32. See, e.g., Choe Sang-Hun, North Korea Lashes Out At South Korea's President,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 2, 2008, at A17 (reporting how North Korea is blaming Washington for the
impasse in the nuclear talks, while at the same time threatening to turn South Korea into
"ashes").
33. See Steven Lee Myers, Talks Stumble on Enriching Nuclear Fuel for Iranians, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 22, 2006, at Al.
34. See HARROP FREEMAN, COERCION OF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 2
(1944) (citing JACOB TER MEULEN, DER GEDANKE DER INTERNATIONALEN ORGANIZATION IN
SEINER ENTWICKLUNG 1306-1800 (1917)).
35. See id. at 3.
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and non-military means. The entire Charter makes it clear that it is ex-
plicitly an arrangement between sovereign States, despite the fact that
the preamble begins with "We the peoples...."
As a general rule, the United Nations operates mainly in the realm of
persuasion, not coercion.36 Indeed, the United Nations was designed to
foster inter-State cooperation in solving common problems.37 However,
the primary exception to this general rule is with certain Security Coun-
cil resolutions that impose obligations on States. As one commentator
notes, Security Council coercion is a case of "forced order maintained by
threat of sanctions. '3 The Security Council adopts coercive measures
when it imposes obligations on States through its decisions, which are
binding on States under Articles 25 and 103, and through Security Coun-
cil authorization of non-military or military measures to enforce those
obligations under Chapter VI. 39 Security Council decisions can also be
coercive in that they send key information to bad actors that their actions
are unacceptable to the international community.40 This required com-
munication thus provides a type of psychological and moral coercion
that Eiichi Fukatsu discusses,4' and which might not be present if a State
chose to impose its will through unilateral action, even if the multilateral
and unilateral reasoning and results are identical. Moreover, the criticism
and condemnation that comes from the Security Council through its
resolutions can be a type of strong social coercion. Commentators have
acknowledged that these less traditional types of coercion are applicable
43in the context of the Security Council trying to regulate arms.
The Security Council's coercive powers fundamentally derive from
the consent that U.N. Member States gave it when they joined the United
Nations and from the principle of pacta sunt servanda.i U.N. Charter
Article 25 provides, "The Members of the United Nations agree to ac-
36. QUINCY WRIGHT, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE UNITED NATIONS 77 (1960).
37. See L. GOODRICH ET AL., CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: COMMENTARY AND
DOCUMENTS 35 (1969).
38. Shigeyoshi Ozaki, International Law and Coercion, 27 JAPANESE ANN. INT'L L. 12,
20(1984).
39. All of these coercive measures are considered "sanctions." See Christopher C. Joy-
ner, Collective Sanctions as Peaceful Coercion: Lessons from the United Nations Experience,
16 AUSTL. Y.B INT'L L. 241, 242 (1995) ("The term 'sanctions' under international law gener-
ally refers to coercive measures taken by one State or in concert by several States, which are
intended to convince or compel another State to desist from engaging in acts violating interna-
tional law.").
40. See Alexander Thompson, Coercion Through lOs: The Security Council and the
Logic of Information Transmission, 60 INT'L ORG. 1, 2 (2006).
41. Fukatsu, supra note 26, at 1190.
42. See id. at 1188.
43. See THAKUR, supra note 3, at 168.
44. Joyner, supra note 39, at 260.
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cept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance
with the present Charter."4'5 In cases in which Security Council decisions
conflict with other State obligations, U.N. Charter Article 103 makes it
clear that Security Council decisions trump: "In the event of a conflict
between the obligations of the Members of the United Nations under the
present Charter and their obligations under any other international
agreement, their obligations under the present Charter shall prevail.
'46
The ICJ has confirmed the supremacy of Security Council resolutionsS 41
over conflicting treaty obligations. In particular, in the Lockerbie case,
the ICJ declared that Security Council resolutions trump conflicting
treaty obligations.
U.N. Charter Articles 41 and 42 also provide the Security Council
with a wide array of coercive options to enforce these obligations, and
give the Security Council maximum discretion to choose the appropriate
measures:
Article 41. The Security Council may decide what measures not
involving the use of armed force are to be employed to give ef-
fect to its decisions, and it may call upon the Members of the
United Nations to apply such measures. These may include
complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of
rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of com-
munication, and the severance of diplomatic relations.
Article 42. Should the Security Council consider that measures
provided for in Article 41 would be inadequate or have proved to
be inadequate, it may take such action by air, sea, or land forces
as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace
and security. Such action may include demonstrations, blockade,
and other operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members of
the United Nations.49
Although Article 42 makes it clear that the Security Council must at least
contemplate non-military force before military force, the Security Coun-
cil can authorize a wide range of measures.
45. See also Judith G. Gardam, Legal Restraints on Security Council Military Enforce-
ment Action, 17 MICH. J. INT'L L. 285, 313 (1996) (seeing the ability of the Security Council
to override IHL provisions as inherent in U.N. Charter Articles 103 and 25).
46. U.N. Charter art. 103.
47. See Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 IC.J. 14, 440 (June
27); Questions of Interpretation and Application of 1971 Montreal Convention Arising from
Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libya v. U.S.), 1992 L.C.J. 114, 138, 140 (separate opinions of
Judges Lachs and Shahabuddeen).
48. See Questions of Interpretation and Application of 1971 Montreal Convention Aris-
ing from Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libya v. U.S.) 1992 I.C.J. 114, 124.
49. U.N. Charter arts. 41-42 (emphasis added).
winter 2008]
Michigan Journal of International Law
Critics could raise the issue that the Security Council does not have
sufficient powers to physically coerce compliance with its pronounce-
ments to warrant classification as coercive. Indeed, U.N. Charter Article
43, which allows for a U.N. military force, has never been implemented,
thus requiring the Security Council to rely on States to enforce its pro-
nouncements. 50 However, this arrangement does not mean that the
Security Council does not have coercive powers. As Weber asserted,
"This apparatus [of coercion] must also possess such power that there is
in fact a significant probability that the norm will be respected because
of the possibility of recourse to such legal coercion."5' Therefore, the
possibility of recourse to coercion is sufficient for a system to be consid-
ered as coercive.
For law to be coercive, all that is needed is for an entity to have the
right to authorize coercive measures, not that there must be legal institu-
tions-such as an army and police-to enforce those decisions.5 After
all, States need not have their own enforcement apparatus, but instead
can use private entities to enforce their domestic laws, without this prac-
tice diminishing the State's ability to create and enforce law. Without
going so far as to say that Security Council resolutions are law, the same
is true with the Security Council. The Security Council's decisions can
be coercive, even if it must rely on States to enforce those decisions, be-
cause of its right to create obligations through its decisions and to
authorize enforcement of those decisions through U.N. Charter Article
25 and Chapter VII.
With these broad powers in mind, it seems natural to conclude that
the Security Council is constitutionally well equipped to respond to the
threats of WMD terrorism and WMD proliferation that continue to esca-
late in modem times, especially in cases in which there appear to be no
chances for a negotiated settlement.53 It would be unwise for the Security
Council to rely simply on its coercive powers without regard to pre-
existing norms or legality, which might cause a new set of issues involv-
ing legitimacy and perhaps even claims of global tyranny." However, in
50. U.N. Charter art. 43.
51. WEBER, supra note 27, at 314.
52. See Lamond, supra note 12, at 39-40.
53. See, e.g., Michael J. Glennon, Why the Security Council Failed, FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
May/June 2003, at 16 (asserting that the use of force "may, regrettably, sometimes emerge as
the only and therefore the best way to deal with WMD proliferation").
54. See THAKUR, supra note 3, at 176; Harald Mulller, Dealing with WMD Crises: The
Role of the United Nations in Compliance Politics, in ARMS CONTROL AFrER IRAQ: NORMA-
TIVE AND OPERATIONAL CHALLENGES 114, 123 (Waheguru Pal Singh Sidhu & Ramesh
Thakur eds., 2006) (asserting that the Security Council needs to take into consideration the
interests of the international community generally in deciding matters involving WMD or else
have its credibility and impartiality challenged); THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF ARMS CON-
TROL AND DISARMAMENT: PROCEEDINGS OF THE SYMPOSIUM GENEVA, 28 FEBRUARY-2
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the end, even if States do not cooperate with the obligations that the Se-
curity Council imposes, the Security Council has fulfilled its role in
attempting to counter those types of threats with the tools that States
have given it.5
III. THE SECURITY COUNCIL'S COERCIVE WMD DISARMAMENT
AND ARMS CONTROL MEASURES
Part 1I provided the theoretical basis for thinking about the notion of
coercion. Part HI now focuses on the Security Council's coercive meas-
ures taken through its resolutions in relation to the disarmament and
control of WMD. These resolutions include:
" Resolutions 255 and 984, which provided assurances to non-
nuclear weapon States that enabled their cooperation in the
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)
6
negotiations in 1968 and in the negotiations to extend the
NPT indefinitely in 1995;1
7
" Resolution 487, which called upon Israel "to place its nuclear
facilities under the safeguards of the International Atomic En-
ergy Agency" (IAEA) even though its Safeguards Agreement
was extremely limited and Israel was not a party to the NPT;58
" Resolutions 582, 598, 612, and 620, dealing with Iraq's use of
chemical weapons against Iran during the Iran-Iraq War of the
1980s;59
" Resolution 687 and related resolutions, which required Iraq to
submit to an extensive WMD destruction and inspection re-
gime;
60
MARCH 1991 224 (Julie Dahlitz & Detlev Dicke eds., 1991) (expressing the desire for Security
Council involvement in enforcing compliance with arms control norms coupled with the
worry that too much Security Council involvement would disenfranchise a preponderance of
States).
55. See SVEN BERNHARD GAREIS & JOHANNES VARWICK, THE UNITED NATIONS: AN
INTRODUCTION 117 (Lindsay P. Cohn trans., 2005) (2003).
56. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, July 1, 1968,
http://www.un.org/events/npt2005/npttreaty.html.
57. S.C. Res. 255, U.N. Doc. S/RES/255 (June 19, 1968); S.C. Res. 984, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/984 (Apr. 11, 1995).
58. S.C. Res. 487,$ 5, U.N. Doc. S/RES/487 (June 19, 1981).
59. S.C. Res. 582, U.N. Doc. S/RES/582 (Feb. 24, 1986); S.C. Res. 598, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/598 (July 20, 1987); S.C. Res. 612, U.N. Doc. S/RES/612 (May 9, 1988); S.C. Res.
620, U.N. Doc. SIRES/620 (Aug. 26, 1988).
60. S.C. Res. 687, U.N. Doc. S/RES/687 (Apr. 3, 1991).
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" Resolution 825, which called upon North Korea to "honour its
non-proliferation obligations under the [NTP] and comply
with its safeguards agreement with the IAEA ... ;
" Resolution 1172, which called upon India and Pakistan to
abide by the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT)62 with
regard to future nuclear tests, after they both tested numerous
nuclear devices in 1998;63
" Resolution 1540, which imposed certain WMD obligations on
all States in the context of WMD terrorism;4
" Resolutions 1695 and 1718, which required North Korea to
abide by the NPT and the IAEA Safeguards Agreement, even
though it had withdrawn from these instruments; 65 and
* Resolutions 1696 and 1737, which called upon Iran to abide
by its Additional Protocol with the IAEA, even though Iran
had not yet ratified it.
66
An in-depth analysis of the resolutions mentioned above shows how
the Security Council imposes disarmament and arms control obligations
in at least five ways. Listed in descending order of coerciveness, they
* require States to join disarmament and arms control treaties;
" require States to abide by certain disarmament and arms con-
trol treaty provisions that are not already binding on those
States;
* require States to abide by disarmament and arms control
treaty provisions that the Security Council has modified;
* require States to abide by certain disarmament and arms con-
trol obligations not contained in treaties; and
* recall pre-existing disarmament and arms control treaty obli-
gations on States.
61. S.C. Res. 825,12, U.N. Doc. S/RES/825 (May 11, 1993).
62. Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, opened for signature, Sept. 24, 1996, S.
TREATY Doc. No. 105-28, 35 I.L.M. 1439 (not in force).
63. S.C. Res. 1172, U.N. Doc. S/RES/I 172 (June 6, 1998).
64. S.C. Res. 1540, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1540 (Apr. 28, 2004).
65. S.C. Res. 1695, 6, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1695 (July 15, 2006); S.C. Res. 1718, 4,
U.N. Doc. S/RES/1718 (Oct. 14, 2006).
66. S.C. Res. 1696, 6, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1696 (July 31, 2006); S.C. Res. 1737, 8,
U.N. Doc. S/RES/1737 (Dec. 23, 2006).
[Vol. 29:197
Dionysian Disarmament
Each method of imposing obligations raises unique legal issues. These
issues are explored below as they arise in the context of analyzing the
Security Council resolutions.
The Security Council's activities in the field of disarmament and
arms control stem from its statutory powers provided by the U.N. Char-
ter. The Charter gives both the Security Council and the General
Assembly a role in disarmament and arms control. However, it would be
inaccurate to assert that the United Nations' main goal has been disar-
mament from its founding. Indeed, neither disarmament nor arms
control are mentioned in the preamble or purposes and principles of the
Charter. Article 11(1) provides the first reference to the General Assem-
bly's role in disarmament. It states,
The General Assembly may consider the general principles of
co-operation in the maintenance of international peace and secu-
rity, including the principles governing disarmament and the
regulation of armaments, and may make recommendations with
regard to such principles to the Members or to the Security
Council or to both.68
Despite such references to disarmament, the secondary importance of
disarmament to collective security is made abundantly clear in the U.N.
Charter, which refers to "possible disarmament" in the future in Article
47.69
Since the General Assembly was seen as the world's "town meet-
ing," at least by such delegates as U.S. Senator Arthur H. Vandenberg,
the U.N. Charter's framers considered it advantageous to give the Gen-
eral Assembly the ability to consider these broad "principles governing
disarmament and the regulation of armaments."70 Whereas the powers
given to the General Assembly are permissive-the General Assembly
"may"-and quite vague, the powers given to the Security Council are
obligatory. Article 26 states,
In order to promote the establishment and maintenance of inter-
national peace and security with the least diversion for
armaments of the world's human and economic resources, the
Security Council shall be responsible for formulating, with the
assistance of the Military Staff Committee referred to in Article
67. KATHERINE SAVAGE, THE STORY OF THE UNITED NATIONS 86 (1962).
68. U.N. Charter art. 11, para. I.
69. U.N. Charter art. 47, para. I (emphasis added). See also CLARK M. EICHELBERGER,
UN: THE FIRST TEN YEARS 45 (1955).
70. Geoffrey Goodwin, The General Assembly of the United Nations, in THE EVOLU-
TION OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 42, 44 (Evan Luard ed., 1966) (quoting U.N.
Charter, art. 11, para. 1).
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47, plans to be submitted to the Members of the United Nations
for the establishment of a system for the regulation of arma-
ments.7'
There is no mention in the U.N. Charter of how the Security Council and
the General Assembly are to coordinate their activities in the realm of
disarmament and arms control. While the Security Council and the Gen-
eral Assembly seemed to have somewhat of a symbiotic relationship in
this area during a large portion of the Cold War, the U.N. Charter clearly
designates that the Security Council is to have the lead. Indeed, Article
11(1) places the General Assembly's activities regarding disarmament
and the regulation of armaments within its powers over the "maintenance
of international peace and security," which are subordinate to the Secu-
rity Council, as laid out in Article 24(l).72 Therefore, the U.N. Charter is
designed to give the Security Council the lead on disarmament and arms
control matters.
However, this language requiring the Security Council to create
"plans ... for the establishment of a system for the regulation of arma-
ments ' 73 is not as clear a disarmament and arms control mandate as one
might have hoped for following the Second World War. Furthermore, the
Security Council ostensibly has yet to act under the authorization pro-videdby Aricle 74
vided by Article 26, perhaps because the assistance from the Military
Staff Committee never materialized. It is important to note that the Secu-
rity Council is not limited, nor has it ever been limited, to using its
Article 26 powers in responding to the threat to international peace and
security that comes from WMD, as some commentators have asserted.75
On the contrary, as the language of Article 26-read in combination with
Article 11-indicates, such regulations fit under the Security Council's
responsibility to maintain international peace and security, which pro-
76vides strong powers to the Security Council. Indeed, the Security
Council is free to use its Chapter VI and Chapter VII powers to respond
to threats to international and security, which can include the imposition
of obligations relating to armaments.77 Given the magnitude of the WMD
threat, it is not surprising that the Security Council largely has skipped
71. U.N. Charter art. 26 (emphasis added).
72. U.N. Charter art. 24, para. 1.
73. U.N. Charter art. 26.
74. A.J.R. Groom & Jean-Frangois Guilhaudis, UNSSODS: The Quest for Structure and
Norms, in GLOBAL ISSUES IN THE UNITED NATIONS' FRAMEWORK 116-17 (Paul Taylor &
A.J.R. Groom eds., 1989); GORAN LyStN, THE INTERNATIONAL REGULATION OF ARMA-
MENTS: THE LAW OF DISARMAMENT 29 (1990).
75. See WILCOX & MARCY, supra note 2, at 182.
76. Richard Butler, The Evolving Role of the UN and Disarmament, in THE FUTURE OF
DISARMAMENT 176, 178 (United Nations ed., 1998).
77. See HANS KELSEN, THE LAW OF THE UNITED NATIONS 105 (1950).
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over its Chapter VI powers in this context and has gone right for its coer-
cive powers under Chapter VII. With these coercive powers and the
Security Council's tendency to react to crises as they arise, as opposed to
taking preventive measures such as formulating plans for alleviating po-
tential tensions in the future, it also is not surprising that Article 26 has
remained in its vestigial state.
As noted above, Part III studies the particular resolutions that the
Security Council has adopted that impose specific disarmament and arms
control obligations. Part III first focuses on Security Council resolutions
adopted during the Cold War, and then focuses on resolutions adopted
after the Cold War. The Security Council has picked up its pace in adopt-
ing coercive measures in the field of disarmament and arms control
following the end of the Cold War. Nonetheless, the resolutions adopted
during the Cold War go against the general notion that the United States
and the Soviet Union were unable to cooperate within the Security
Council in this realm during this time period." Commentators who assert
otherwise not only downplay the significance of these resolutions, but
also overlook the fact that some of the greatest advances in arms control
occurred at the height of U.S.-Soviet tension, thus contradicting the
widely held belief that political detente must precede a reduction in
79arms.
Before delving into the analysis of these resolutions, it is important
to note that this Part discusses resolutions in chronological order.
A. Resolutions 255 and 984: Establishing Security Assurances
Resolution 255 is the first instance of the Security Council imposing
disarmament- or arms control-related obligations on an entity through
one of its resolutions. Interestingly, the first entity targeted by such a
Security Council imposition was the Security Council itself. States that
made specific, unilateral security assurances at the time of Resolution
255 also may be bound to uphold these assurances under the principle of
international estoppel. Before discussing the potential legal obligations
of the Security Council and permanent members that made unilateral
security assurances, the following Section provides a brief analysis of
Resolution 255.
78. ANDREW BOYD, FIFTrEEN MEN ON A POWDER KEG: A HISTORY OF THE UN SECU-
RITY COUNCIL 82-83 (1971); see also UNITED NATIONS, THE UNITED NATIONS AT FORTY: A
FOUNDATION TO BUILD ON 75 (1985).
79. See Rolf Ek~us, The Iraqi Experience and the Future of Nuclear Nonproliferation,
WASH. Q., Autumn 1992, at 67, 67.
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1. The Positive Security Assurances of Resolution 255
Resolution 255 is unique from the other resolutions discussed in this
Part because the obligation does not arise from a decision that binds a
State through Article 25. Indeed, Resolution 255 does not refer to Chap-
ter VII. Its third preambular paragraph states: "Bearing in mind that any
aggression accompanied by the use of nuclear weapons would endanger
the peace and security of all States."8 ° This is far from an implication that
international peace and security had been threatened by the underlying
events. Nor do any of the signals within the three operative paragraphs
support the notion that the Security Council had decided anything that
could be binding on States under Article 25. Rather, Resolution 255 is
the result of non-nuclear-weapon States seeking security assurances
from the nuclear-weapon States before agreeing to the terms of the
NPT. 
8
Even before the NPT negotiations began, non-nuclear-weapon States
were pushing hard for adequate security assurances from the nuclear-
weapon States.82 During the NPT negotiations, non-nuclear-weapon
States believed that they were vulnerable to nuclear attack from States
falling outside of the NPT regime-in particular, communist China-if
they relinquished their ability to develop their nuclear-weapon capabili-
ties.83 Moreover, the NPT on its face reflected a considerable imbalance
between the rights and obligations of the non-nuclear-weapon States, at
least vis-a-vis those of the nuclear-weapon States,84 as well as somewhat
legitimized possession of nuclear weapons by nuclear-weapon States by
failing to provide tangible disarmament obligations for those States. 5
Despite the best efforts of the non-nuclear-weapon States to get some
security assurances during the NPT negotiations from nuclear-weapon
States that would appear clearly within the NPT, the United States, the
United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union were determined to address this
issue in the United Nations and not within the NPT itself. 6 As a result,
80. S.C. Res. 255, supra note 57, pmbl. 3.
81. Id. 1[ 1-3.
82. See THOMAS GRAHAM, JR., DISARMAMENT SKETCHES: THREE DECADES OF ARMS
CONTROL AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 283 (2002).
83. See BOYD, supra note 78, at 336.
84. See Bourantonis & Evriviades, supra note 2, at 161.
85. THAKUR, supra note 3, at 171. See id. (arguing that the NPT created a significant
amount of fear and uncertainty concerning potential proliferation by allowing non-nuclear-
weapon States to develop and use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes). Furthermore, the
NPT does not prescribe a way of handling those States not party to the NPT regime). See id. at
171.
86. Jean du Preez, Security Assurances Against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear
Weapons: Is Progress Possible at the NPT Prepcon?, JAMES MARTIN CENTER FOR NONPRO-




these three States made a joint request of the Security Council on June
12, 1968, to meet in order to decide whether to give security assurances
to non-nuclear weapon States of the nascent NPT regime.87 At that meet-
ing, these States presented a draft resolution that was designed to
reassure non-nuclear-weapon States that the Security Council would
come to their aid if attacked or threatened with attack by nuclear weap-
ons.'8 This draft resolution eventually became Resolution 255.
Resolution 255 provides only positive security assurances to the
non-nuclear-weapon States. Positive assurances involve the promise
from a nuclear-weapon State that it will come to the aid of a non-
nuclear-weapon State party to the NPT that finds itself the victim of a
nuclear attack. 9 Paragraph 1 of Resolution 255
[r]ecognizes that aggression with nuclear weapons or the threat
of such aggression against a non-nuclear-weapon State would
create a situation in which the Security Council, and above all its
nuclear-weapon State permanent members, would have to act
immediately in accordance with their obligations under the
United Nations Charter. .... o
This provision essentially re-emphasizes the Security Council's -and
especially its permanent members'-intentions to act immediately under
the powers provided by the U.N. Charter in the case of a use or threat-
ened use of nuclear weapons. Such immediate acts on the Security
Council level could include both military and non-military sanctions un-
der Articles 41 and 42 of the U.N. Charter. For the individual permanent
members, such acts could include immediate efforts to get the Security
Council involved, as well as to participate in a collective self-defense
response under Article 51 during the time it takes the Security Council to
take action. Paragraph two of Resolution 255
[w]elcomes the intention expressed by certain States that they
will provide or support immediate assistance, in accordance with
the Charter, to any non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty
on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons that is a victim of
an act or an object of a threat of aggression in which nuclear
weapons are used .... 9
This paragraph refers to more concrete measures that certain permanent
members of the Security Council were prepared to take in response to
87. See BOYD, supra note 78, at 335-36.
88. Id.
89. Bourantonis & Evriviades, supra note 2, at 161.
90. S.C. Res. 255, supra note 57, 1.
91. S.C. Res. 255, supra note 57, 2.
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the use or threatened use of nuclear weapons against a non-nuclear-
weapon State.
To learn exactly what these States indicated as their intentions, one
must look to the statements made by the United States, the United King-
dom, and the Soviet Union on June 17, 1968, in combination with this
resolution. In fact, these three statements were the same, the most rele-
vant parts being a declaration in the fifth paragraph and a reaffirmation
in the sixth of each statement:
Aggression with nuclear weapons or the threat of such aggres-
sion against a non-nuclear-weapon State would qualitatively
create a qualitatively new situation in which the nuclear-weapon
States which are permanent members of the United Nations Se-
curity Council would have to act immediately through the
Security Council to take the measures necessary to counter such
aggression or remove the threat of aggression in accordance with
the United Nations Charter, which calls for taking "effective col-
lective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the
peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other
breaches of the peace." Therefore, any State which commits ag-
gression accompanied by the use of nuclear weapons or
threatens such aggression must be aware that its actions will be
countered effectively by measures to be taken in accordance
with the United Nations Charter to suppress the aggression or
remove the threat of aggression ....
[That particular State] reaffirms its intention, as a permanent
member of the United Nations Security Council, to seek imme-
diate Security Council action to provide assistance, in
accordance with the Charter, to any non-nuclear weapon State,
party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weap-
ons, that is a victim of an act of aggression or an object of a
threat of aggression in which nuclear weapons are used.92
According to these statements, these assurances were to come into force
at the same time that the Security Council resolution concerning safe-
guards for non-nuclear States would come into force. 93 Notably, these
assurances are no more than the assurance provided in paragraph 1 of
Resolution 255 that they will act immediately through the Security
Council to counter the aggression or to remove the threat of aggression.9'
92. See generally U.N. SCOR, 23rd Sess., 1430th mtg. at 5-8, U.N. Doc. S/PV.1430
(June 17, 1968) [hereinafter U.N. Doc. S/PV.1430].
93. See generally id.
94. S.C. Res. 255, supra note 57, 911.
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Essentially, the assurance is that they will try to get the Security Council
to act, though if it is unable to act-either because of another State's
veto or because the draft resolution lacks a sufficient number of affirma-
tive votes to pass-then their obligation will have been met. This is not a
strong assurance for the non-nuclear-weapon States, though it is some-
thing, since the U.N. Charter does not otherwise oblige permanent
members to act immediately in response to a threat or an attack.
Critics question the significance of Resolution 255. Jozef Goldblat
has asserted that the security assurances under Resolution 255 were
empty because they did no more than reaffirm the obligation of U.N.
Member States to assist States that find themselves the victims of ag-
gression.95 However, there is no such obligation under the U.N. Charter.
Article 51 recognizes the "inherent right of individual and collective
self-defence" in responding to an armed attack, although this does not
create a positive obligation on Member States to come to the aid of other
States if attacked.96 Article 48 requires Member States to carry out the
Security Council's decisions in maintaining international peace and se-
curity, although only at the Security Council's express authorization of
their involvement.97 Therefore, Goldblat places too much significance in
the language "in accordance with the U.N. Charter," thus inappropriately
robbing Resolution 255 of what little legal significance it actually pro-
vides victim States.
2. The Positive Security Assurances of Resolution 984
The same positive security assurances were reasserted in Resolution
984 as appeared in Resolution 255, although Resolution 984 was spon-
sored by all five permanent members of the Security Council, while
Resolution 255 was jointly sponsored by the United States, the United
Kingdom, and the Soviet Union.98 NPT Article X(2) provides: "Twenty-
five years after the entry into force of the Treaty, a conference shall be
convened to decide whether the Treaty shall continue in force indefi-
nitely, or shall be extended for an additional fixed period or periods. This
decision shall be taken by a majority of the Parties to the Treaty."9 Since
the NPT entered into force on March 5, 1970, it became necessary in
95. See Jozef Goldblat, NPT and the Security of NNWS, No First Use of Nuclear
Weapons, Working Paper for the Pugwash Meeting No. 279, Nov. 15-17, 2002, available at
http://www.pugwash.org/reports/nw/goldblat.htm (last visited Sept. 10, 2007) (asserting that
the positive assurances of Resolution 255 "were clearly insufficient, as they merely reaffirmed
the duty of U.N. Members to provide assistance to a country which has been aggressed, irre-
spective of the type of weapon used in aggression").
96. U.N. Charter art. 51.
97. U.N. Charter art. 48.
98. U.N. SCOR, 50th Sess., 3514th mtg, U.N. Doc. S/PV.3514 (Apr. II, 1995).
99. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, supra note 56, art. X(2).
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1995 for the nuclear-weapon States to begin canvassing non-nuclear-
weapon States for their support, just as they did when the NPT was be-
ing negotiated in 1968. Resolution 984 is similar to Resolution 255 in
that it attempts to soften the difficulties that non-nuclear-weapon States
might have with the NPT.
Resolution 984 primarily repeats much of Resolution 255 and other
arrangements provided for in the U.N. Charter. The second operative
paragraph of Resolution 984 repeats the essence of the first operative
paragraph of Resolution 255, which deals with the positive security as-
surance that the nuclear-weapon States and the Security Council will
"act immediately in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Char-
ter of the United Nations, in the event that such States are the victim of
an act of, or object of a threat of, aggression in which nuclear weapons
are used .. . ."'0o The fifth and ninth operative paragraphs of Resolution
984 essentially repeat the third operative paragraph of Resolution 255,
which reaffirms Article 51 and the ability of States to take individual or
collective self-defense measures if an armed attack occurs. Resolution
984 is somewhat more detailed in specifying that the assistance from
States can include "technical, medical, scientific, or humanitarian assis-
tance,"'0 ' although this addition is relatively meaningless inasmuch as
States always are free to assist other States in such a dire situation as a
nuclear attack. The third paragraph of Resolution 984 repeats the essence
of U.N. Charter Article 35(1), and, in part
[r]ecognizes further that, in case of aggression with nuclear
weapons or the threat of such aggression against a non-nuclear-
weapon State Party to the [NPT], any State may bring the matter
immediately to the attention of the Security Council to enable
the Council to take urgent action to provide assistance, in accor-
dance with the Charter, to the State victim of an act of, or object
of a threat of, such aggression .... '0'
Some might see this portion of the third paragraph as creating a new
right for all States to bring the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons to
the attention of the Security Council, although it is unclear how this is
any different from the power provided to all U.N. Member States under
Article 35(1) to bring any situation that is likely to endanger the mainte-
nance of international peace and security to the attention of the Security
Council. °3
100. S.C. Res. 984, supra note 57, 1 2.
101. Id 11 5, 9.
102. Id. 3.
103. See U.N. Charter art. 35, para. 1.
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Resolution 984 provides new obligations in the second portion of
paragraph 3, which
recognizes also that the nuclear-weapon State permanent mem-
bers of the Security Council will bring the matter immediately to
the attention of the Council and seek Council action to provide,
in accordance with the Charter, the necessary assistance to the
State victim .... 104
This paragraph is a new obligation on the permanent members of the
Security Council because nowhere within the U.N. Charter are perma-
nent members required to bring any situation to the attention of the
Security Council-other than when they take measures in the exercise of
the right of self-defense under Article 51-or to seek Security Council
action on any particular issue. Even though Article 39 requires the Secu-
rity Council to "determine the existence of any threat to the peace,
breach of the peace, or act of aggression,"'0' Articles 41 and 42 are per-
missive in saying what types of actions the Security Council "may"
take.'06Article 51 provides that States may act in self-defense "if an
armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the
Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international
peace and security,"' but nothing in the U.N. Charter requires the Secu-
rity Council to take such action. Therefore, this is not an insignificant
obligation on the permanent members of the Security Council to bring
the situation to the attention of the Security Council and to seek Security
Council action. As discussed in Section III(A)(3) below, both France and
Russia are under the same obligation due to unilateral declarations that
were referred to in Resolution 984. '08
3. Negative Security Assurances of the Unilateral Statements
Both Resolution 255 and Resolution 984 lack any explicit reference
to negative security assurances. For such assurances, non-nuclear-
weapon States must look to the statements of the permanent members of
the Security Council that were incorporated into Resolution 984 by
104. S.C. Res. 984, supra note 57, 3.
105. U.N. Charter art. 39.
106. U.N. Charter arts. 41-42.
107. U.N. Charter art. 51.
108. Letter dated 6 April 1995 from the Permanent Representative of France to the
United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General, U.N. SCOR, 50th Sess., U.N. Doc.
S/1995/264 (Apr. 6, 1995) [hereinafter Letter from the Permanent Representative of France];
Letter dated 6 April 1995 from the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the
United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General, U.N. SCOR, 50th Sess., U.N. Doc.
Sf19951261 (Apr. 6, 1995) [hereinafter Letter from the Permanent Representative of the Rus-
sian Federation]. Such redundancy does not affect their obligations under Resolution 984.
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reference.'°9 A review of these statements makes it clear that the United
States, the United Kingdom, France, and Russia all worked together in
coming up with a common negative security assurance:
[The particular State] will not use nuclear weapons against non-
nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty on the Non-
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, except in the case of an inva-
sion or any other attack on [the particular State], its territory, its
armed forces or other troops, its allies or on a State towards
which it has a security commitment, carried out or sustained by
such a non-nuclear-weapon State in association or alliance with
a nuclear-weapon State.' °
The only variations are that the United States and United Kingdom left
out the comma before "except," Russia failed to capitalize "Parties" in
"State Parties," the United Kingdom referred to "its dependent territo-
ries" instead of "its territory," the United States referred to "its
territories," France referred to "or against its allies" instead of just "its
allies," and the United States added an extra comma after "its allies."
Needless to say, these variations are relatively insignificant. China's
statement was much shorter in terms of providing a negative security
assurance: "China undertakes not to be the first to use nuclear weapons
at any time or under any circumstances," which can be seen as a no-first-
use policy."' As is explained in greater depth in Section III(A)(4) below,
none of these statements contain a statement that is sufficiently uncondi-
tional or that shows an intent to be bound. Thus, these negative security
assurances are not legally binding. Although the bulk of the positive se-
curity assurances within these statements also are not legally binding,
small portions of two of them are.
109. S.C. Res. 984, supra note 57, 1.
110. Letter from the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation, supra note
108; accord Letter dated 6 April 1995 from the Permanent Representative of the United King-
dom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-
General, U.N. SCOR, 50th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/1995/262 (Apr. 6, 1995) [hereinafter Letter
from the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom]; Letter dated 6 April 1995 from
the Chargd d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of the United States of America to the
United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General, U.N. SCOR, 50th Sess., U.N. Doc.
S/1995/263 (Apr. 6, 1995) [hereinafter Letter from the Charg6 d'affaires]; Letter from the
Permanent Representative of France, supra note 108.
111. See Letter dated 6 April 1995 from the Permanent Representative of China to the
United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General, U.N. SCOR, 50th Sess. at 2, U.N. Doc.
S/1995/265 (Apr. 6, 1995) [hereinafter Letter from the Permanent Representative of China].
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4. International Estoppel and Security Assurances
In order for the principle of international estoppel to apply to any
given situation, the entity being estopped must have voluntarily and pub-
licly made an unambiguous statement that another entity detrimentally
relies on in good faith." 2 The 1974 ICJ Nuclear Tests case is useful in
understanding how this principle can work in practice. In 1973, New
Zealand and Australia brought cases against France relating to its testing
of nuclear devices in the South Pacific. After the claims had been
brought, the French President declared that France would no longer test
nuclear devices there. The ICJ said that such a declaration created inter-
national legal obligations on the State, as the following excerpt
illustrates:
It is well recognized that declarations made by way of unilateral
acts, concerning legal or factual situations, may have the effect
of creating legal obligations. Declarations of this kind may be,
and often are, very specific. When it is the intention of the State
making the declaration that it should become bound according to
its terms, that intention confers on the declaration the character
of a legal undertaking, the State being thenceforth legally re-
quired to follow a course of conduct consistent with the
declaration. An undertaking of this kind, if given publicly, and
with an intent to be bound, even though not made within the
context of international negotiations, is binding. In these circum-
stances, nothing in the nature of a quid pro quo, nor any
subsequent acceptance of the declaration, nor even any reply or
reaction from other States, is required for the declaration to take
effect, since such a requirement would be inconsistent with the
strictly unilateral nature of the juridical act by which the pro-
nouncement by the State was made .... When States make
statements by which their freedom of action is to be limited, a
restrictive interpretation is called for."3
Thus, for a unilateral statement to be legally binding under the principle
of international estoppel, it must be (1) made in public, (2) with the in-
tention of being bound and without conditions.
The remainder of this Section reviews these two elements, Resolu-
tions 255 and 984, and the relevant unilateral statements of the
permanent members of the Security Council. The public nature of these
112. See IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 646 (Oxford
University Press 5th ed. 1998) (1966).
113. Nuclear Tests (N.Z. v. Fr.), 1974 I.C.J. 457, 472-73 (Dec. 20); Nuclear Tests (Austl.
v. Fr.), 1974 I.C.J. 253, 267 (Dec. 20).
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resolutions and statements containing the security assurances of the Se-
curity Council and its permanent members easily fulfills the public
element for international estoppel. The fact that the statements were in-
corporated by reference into the resolutions, as opposed to being made
entirely outside of the United Nations context, shows the desire of the
assurers to give those receiving the assurance added security that they
meant what they were saying.
With regard to the intention to be bound, the Security Council's in-
tent to be bound derives from the lack of equivocation in both Resolution
255 and 984. Whereas States are legally bound to decisions of the Secu-
rity Council under Article 25, the Security Council will be bound by its
pronouncements that use obligatory language such as "shall," "will," and
"would," and that are sufficiently clear on their face to warrant good-
faith reliance by States. Concerning the Security Council's security as-
surance in Resolution 255, the first operative paragraph's obligatory
language, "would create a situation in which the Security Council ...
would have to act immediately," reflects such an intent to be bound and
contains no conditions.' 4 This conclusion would have been different had
the Security Council used such optional language as "could have to" or
"might have to." The very design of these resolutions was to elicit the
reliance of the non-nuclear-weapon States on these assurances so that
they would agree to the NPT and to the indeterminate extension of the
NPT. It would seem considerably disingenuous for the Security Council
or anyone else to assert after the fact that the Security Council was not
creating a binding obligation. Admittedly, the exact actions that the Se-
curity Council was to take were not spelled out, although this should not
be seen as a condition for action, but rather a prudent attempt to preserve
the discretion of the Security Council in deciding how to tailor its re-
sponse to the hypothetical nuclear attack envisioned in the resolution.
The permanent members of the Security Council also made unilat-
eral security assurances to the non-nuclear-weapon States in trying to
convince them to agree to the NPT and to extend the NPT indefinitely,
so it too would seem somewhat disingenuous for them to now claim that
they were not actually giving any real assurances at all. As is common
with legal matters, the devil proves to be in the details, so to speak. In-
deed, one must look at the exact wording that the permanent members
used in their statements to see if they showed a genuine, unconditional
intent to be bound. One could try to summize that the permanent mem-
bers actually provided no such assurances by the language of paragraph
114. Operative Paragraph 2 of Resolution 984 has the obligatory "will act immediately"
in place of Resolution 255's "would have to act immediately," although the legal significance
of having established an intention to be bound is the same.
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2 of Resolution 255 and paragraph 7 of Resolution 984, which state that
the permanent members had expressed "the intention ... that they will
provide or support immediate assistance ... " with "intention" raising
considerable red flags. Nonetheless, a thorough review of their state-
ments indicates that at least Russia and France provided a sufficiently
clear and unconditional intent to be bound for them to be estopped from
later claiming that they had absolutely no obligations, although the bulk
of their so-called assurances would not be legally binding. The positive
security assurances of the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and the
United States contain an intent to be bound to "act immediately through
the Security Council" to respond to the aggression or threat of aggres-
sion, although they did not show an intention to be bound to have any
particular results flow from that initial commitment to move within the
Security Council. 
6
As noted above in Section II(A)(3), the United States, the United
Kingdom, France, and Russia all made essentially the same negative se-
curity assurances in connection with Resolution 984. These statements,
however, contain considerable conditions: the assurances apply except
where there has been an invasion or other attack on the State, its allies,
or a State that it had a security arrangement with, and when the attack
was carried out with the aggressor having an association or alliance with
a nuclear-weapon State."7 These conditions seem sufficiently large to
absolve these States of any legally binding obligations under these
statements except in the smallest of circumstances, even though each
statement used obligatory language "will." Noticeably, China's statement
was the only one that unconditionally stated the following: "China un-
dertakes not to be the first to use nuclear weapons at any time or under
any circumstances.""' China somewhat redundantly asserted in the para-
graph that directly followed that "China undertakes not to use or threaten
to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States or nuclear-
weapon-free zones at any time or under any circumstances." " 9 Both of
these statements by China would not appear to be legally binding due to
the phrases "China undertakes not to ... ," which is considerably differ-
ent from China assuring that it flatly would not be the first to use nuclear
weapons. No other part of China's statement seems to show an intent to
115. S.C. Res. 255, supra note 57, j 2; S.C. Res. 984, supra note 57, 17.
116. See generally U.N. Doe. S/PV.1430, supra note 92, at 2-5.
117. Letter from the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation, supra note
108, at 3; Letter from the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom, supra note 110,
at 3 (adding that the beneficiary of the assurance must not be "in material breach of its own
non-proliferation obligations under the [NPT]"); Letter from the Chargd d'affaires, supra note
110, at 2; Letter from the Permanent Representative of France, supra note 108.
118. Letter from the Permanent Representative of China, supra note I ll.
119. Id.
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be bound or lacks conditions, whether as a positive or as a negative secu-
rity assurance.
Concerning the positive security assurances from the other perma-
nent members of the Security Council, only Russia and France showed
an intent to be bound by unconditional assurances on a small portion of
the assurances that they provided, which would indicate that they will be
estopped from claiming that they do not have such legal obligations.
Russia refrains from saying that it will act immediately beyond bringing
the matter to the attention of the Security Council." 0 As noted already,
Resolution 984 already obliged the permanent members to bring such
matters to the attention of the Security Council. With regard to other ac-
tions, Russia merely says that it "will seek to ensure that they provide, in
accordance with the Charter, necessary assistance to the State that is a
victim of such an act of aggression or that is threatened by such aggres-
sion."" ' "Seeking to ensure" is different from "ensuring," and would
indicate an unwillingness to be legally bound to carry out that particular
task. Nonetheless, as already mentioned, being bound to bring the matter
to the attention of the Security Council is a new obligation, and is not an
insignificant development. France makes the same assurance as Rus-
sia-although France uses the word "pledges"-that it "will
immediately inform the Security Council." However, France goes a step
further than Russia by saying that it will "act within the Council to en-
sure that the latter takes immediate steps to provide, in accordance with
the Charter, necessary assistance to any State which is the victim of such
an act or threat of aggression,'" 22 as opposed to merely seeking to ensure
that the Security Council provides the necessary assistance. Thus, Russia
and France might be held responsible under these unilateral statements if
they fail to immediately report the use or threatened use of a nuclear
weapon to the Security Council, with France being obliged to take some
acts within the Security Council that would constitute ensuring that it
gives the necessary assistance to the victim State, whether that means
proposing a draft resolution or calling for an emergency meeting of the
Security Council.
The other permanent members of the Security Council seem to cre-
ate no legally binding obligations through their unilateral assurances to
the non-nuclear-weapon States. The United Kingdom refrains from as-
serting that it will bring the matter to the Security Council, as Russia and
France assured, but it does assert that it will "seek immediate Security
120. Letter from the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation, supra note
108, at 2 ("[T]he nuclear Powers which are permanent members of the Security Council will
immediately bring the matter to the attention of the Council... .
121. Id.
122. Letter from the Permanent Representative of France, supra note 108, at 3.
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Council action to provide assistance ,23 which is roughly as vague as
Russia's "seek to ensure." The United States' statement seems closest to
what Resolution 984 assures the non-nuclear-weapon States, that the
"nuclear-weapon-State permanent members of the United Nations Secu-
rity Council would have to act immediately through the Security Council
... to take the measures necessary to counter such aggression or to re-
move the threat of aggression," and that the United States has the
"intention to provide or support immediate assistance, in accordance
with the Charter, to any non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the [NPT]
that is a victim" of the use or threat of use of a nuclear weapon.'24 The
"intention to provide or support immediate assistance" does not mean
"promises to provide or support immediate assistance," which would
appear to enable the United States to avoid the creation of a legally bind-
ing obligation. All of this technical analysis aside, the principle of
international estoppel opens up the possibility that both the Security
Council and the permanent members that make certain security assur-
ances will be held responsible if they fail to live up to these
commitments.
5. Legal Issues
Resolutions 255 and 984 raise several interesting legal issues, three
of which are discussed below.
a. The Legal Nature of these Assurances
An issue arises over the legal status of these resolutions and unilat-
eral statements. Some commentators have asserted that these security
assurances have become an integral part of the commitments of the nu-
clear-weapon States party to the NPT. 25 It makes sense to read the NPT
along with the security assurances provided to non-nuclear-weapon
States provided in these Security Council resolutions and unilateral
statements discussed above, because it is there-and not in the NPT-
that non-nuclear-weapon States have the positive assurance that nuclear-
weapon States and the Security Council will come to their aid if attacked
or threatened with an attack with a nuclear weapon. However, it is inac-
curate to assert that these assurances actually are legally part of the NPT
as they clearly fall under different legal categories, such as the U.N. legal
regime for the Security Council assurances, as opposed to the treaty re-
gime of the NPT. Moreover, the unilateral statements of the permanent
123. Letter from the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom, supra note 110,
at 4.
124. Letter from the Chargd d'affaires, supra note 110, at 2-3.
125. Bourantonis & Evriviades, supra note 2, at 161.
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members may be binding under international principles of equity. This is
so even though all of these assurances were particularly important to the
successful entry into force of the NPT and to its successful extension
indefinitely in 1995.
b. Binding Permanent Members of the Security Council
Perhaps a more interesting legal issue is whether permanent mem-
bers of the Security Council can be bound by Security Council
resolutions. The United Nations seems to have been designed so that no
actions can be taken against the interests of the permanent members of
the Security Council due to their veto power over all substantive matters
under U.N. Charter Article 27(3).126 Still, this does not mean that the
permanent members cannot vote for a resolution that imposes certain
obligations on themselves just as it imposes obligations on other States.
After all, Article 25 requires all States-not just non-permanent mem-
bers-to "accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council."'27
If this is indeed the case, why then would the permanent members of
the Security Council consent to have their options limited in the future in
such a sensitive area as disarmament and arms control, with the possibil-
ity of legal repercussions arising for such obligations? Indeed, it is
rational for these powerful States to bind themselves in order to reassure
other powerful States and the rest of the international community that
they will not be dominated, thus lowering the costs of maintaining inter-
national peace and security.'28 Such self-binding measures as those
contained in Resolutions 255 and 984, along with their accompanying
unilateral statements from the permanent members of the Security
Council, are a strong example of what Eric Myjer calls the "juridifica-
tion" of arms control norms, which is "the process whereby States are
willing to bind themselves, either legally or politically, via arrangements
of a legal nature . . The placing of disarmament and arms control
obligations on other States, as discussed throughout the remainder of this
Section, would also be an example of this type of juridification. Before
moving on to discuss these examples of juridification of arms control
norms, it is interesting to note that the self-binding of permanent mem-
bers referred to in this Section undermines the notion that some
commentators have that the permanent members lack real commitment
126. U.N. Charter art. 27, para. 3.
127. U.N. Charter art. 25.
128. See Thompson, supra note 40, at 4 (citing G. JOHN IKENBERRY, AFTER VICTORY:
INSTITUTIONS, STRATEGIC RESTRAINT, AND THE REBUILDING OF ORDER AFTER MAJOR WARS
(2001)).
129. Eric P.J. Myjer, The Law of Arms-Control and International Supervision, 3 LEIDEN
J. INT'L L. (SPECIAL ISSUE) 99, 99 (1990).
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to WMD non-proliferation because they have been unwilling to commit
themselves to disarmament. '3 Obviously more can be done by perma-
nent members of the Security Council promoting WMD disarmament
among themselves, although any legally binding obligation is better than
none at all from the perspective of trying to promote disarmament.
c. Binding the Security Council
As noted above, paragraph 1 of Resolution 255 and paragraph 2 of
Resolution 984 oblige the Security Council to take immediate action if a
non-nuclear-weapon State is ever attacked or threatened with attack by
nuclear weapons. The question arises whether international organiza-
tions and their organs can have such obligations placed upon them. The
ICJ advisory opinion concerning the Interpretation of the Agreement of
25 March 1951 between the World Health Organization (WHO) and
Egypt made it clear that international organizations-in particular, the
United Nations-are subjects of international law and can be bound by
general rules of international law.' Logically, if such entities have obli-
gations, then they must also have the possibility of violating those
obligations, and face the consequences-responsibility or accountabil-
ity-that subsequently flow from such violations.
The International Law Commission (ILC) currently is in the process
of formulating the norms of responsibility of international organiza-
tions.3 2 One noteworthy issue that has arisen from the ILC's work is the
question of what law is applicable to an international organization with
respect to determining its responsibility or accountability.' Here, how-
ever, this particular issue is moot, since the source of the obligation is
specific-a Security Council resolution binding the Security Council
itself. If the Security Council fails to take such action, it seems only right
to hold the Security Council accountable, perhaps for as much as the
amount of the resulting damages from that failure. This admittedly is
130. John B. Rhinelander, Limitations and Safeguards in Arms Control Agreements, in
LAW AND FORCE IN THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ORDER 247, 254-55 (Lori Fisler Damrosch &
David J. Scheffer eds., 1991).
131. Interpretation of the Agreement of 25 March 1951 Between the WHO and Egypt,
Advisory Opinion, 1980 1.C.J. 73, 89-90 (Dec. 20).
132. See generally Special Rapporteur, First Report on Responsibility of International
Organizations, delivered to the International Law Commission, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/532 (Mar.
26, 2003); Special Rapporteur, Second Report on Responsibility of International Organiza-
tions, delivered to the International Law Commission, U.N. Doc. AICN.4/541 (Apr. 2, 2004);
Special Rapporteur, Third Report on Responsibility of International Organizations, at 3-9,
delivered to the International Law Commission, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/553 (May 13, 2005) [here-
inafter Third Report]; Special Rapporteur, Fourth Report on Responsibility of International
Organizations, delivered to the International Law Commission, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/564 (Feb.
28, 2006).
133. See Third Report, supra note 132.
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still quite a theoretical concept, since there currently is no effective way
for a State to hold the Security Council to these obligations. Even if the
United Nations expressly allows itself to be sued, as did the U.N. ad-
ministration in East Timor, it would be quite difficult to determine
exactly how the United Nations' acts-or failures to act-give rise to
certain levels of accountability. 4 Nonetheless, these practical difficulties
do not change the fact that the Security Council may incur responsibility
for violations of these obligations.
B. Resolution 487 and Israel's Attack of Iraq
The second example of the Security Council's imposition of disar-
mament and arms control obligations is Resolution 487, which involved
Israel's 1981 attack on Iraq's nuclear complex at Tuwaitha (also known
as Osirak)' 35 Interestingly, Iraq alleged in a Security Council meeting
directly following this 1981 attack that Israel had tried to destroy that
same complex on September 27, 1980, and that it warned the Security




Israel conceded that it was responsible for this 1981 attack, although it
claimed that it was an act of self-preservation due to the fear of nuclear
obliteration by a nuclear-armed Iraq. 37 Israel claimed that Iraq was de-
veloping nuclear weapons in an underground laboratory under the
nuclear reactor there. IAEA Director-General Sigvard Eklund asserted
before the Security Council that the IAEA inspectorate had been satis-
fied with Iraq's accounting for all nuclear material through its safeguards
inspections and that it had been aware of a vault under the reactor at that
complex, but that it was for maintenance purposes and could not have
been the site for producing plutonium and other weaponization efforts.'38
Eklund noted that Israel's attack on the Osirak nuclear complex could be
classified as an attack on the IAEA's safeguards system, and he charac-
terized it as a "matter of grave concern to IAEA."'3 9
134. See Carla Bongiorno, A Culture of Impunity: Applying International Human Rights
Law to the United Nations in East imor, 33 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REv. 623 (2002) (high-
lighting the difficulty of determining the UN's obligations under international human rights
law).
135. S.C. Res. 487, supra note 58.
136. U.N. SCOR, 36th Sess., 2280th mtg. at 3, 7, U.N. Doc. S/PV.2280 (June 12, 1981).
137. Id. at 8-12; see also CHRISTINE GRAY, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF
FORCE 133 (2d ed. 2004) (discussing Israel's claim of anticipatory self-defense).
138. U.N. SCOR, 36th Sess., 2288th mtg. at 2-3, U.N. Doc. S/PV.2288 and Corr. I (June
19, 1981); see also GRAY, supra note 137, at 133 (citing the IAEA's statement that there was
no evidence that Iraq planned to use the nuclear reactors for developing nuclear weapons).




On the same day as those statements by the IAEA Director-General,
June 19, 1981, the Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution
487, which "[s]trongly condemn[ed] the military attack by Israel in clear
violation of the Charter of the United Nations and the norms of interna-
tional conduct .... ."'40 In addition, the Security Council "[c]all[ed] upon
Israel urgently to place its nuclear facilities under the safeguards of the
International Atomic Energy Agency ... ",14 Calling upon Israel ur-
gently to place its nuclear facilities under IAEA supervision was seen as
an essential element in managing the threat coming from Israel, 4 2 as the
Security Council had concluded that Israel's armed attack "constituted a
serious threat to the IAEA safeguards system and the nuclear non-
proliferation system.' 43
1. The Significance of "Calls Upon"
Resolution 487 raises the question of the legal significance of "calls
upon" in creating obligations on States. Unfortunately, there is no defini-
tive answer as to whether the phrase signals mandatory action for States
under Article 25. In fact, there are approximately equal numbers of
commentators who indicate that it requires mandatory action'" and who
indicate that it is merely recommendatory.145 Another group falls in
140. S.C. Res. 487, supra note 58, 1.
141. Id. 5. For a discussion of the significance of "calls upon," see Section III(B)(I),
infra. But see W. Thomas Mallison & Sally V. Mallison, The Israeli Aerial Attack of June 7,
1981, Upon the Iraqi Nuclear Reactor: Aggression or Self-Defense?, 15 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L
L. 417, 440 (1982) (stating that the Security Council did not impose mandatory sanctions on
Israel).
142. U.N. SCOR, 36th Sess., 2288th mtg. at 13, U.N. Doc. S/PV.2288 and Corr. 1 (June
19, 1981) (noting a statement by Uganda's representative that this was why it supported the
resolution, although it wished that the Security Council had invoked the provisions of Chapter
VII).
143. See id. at 15. But see id. at 13 (reporting that the German Democratic Republic read
this Resolution as not requiring Israel to stop nuclear collaboration); id. at 14 (noting that
Tunisia seemed to interpret this resolution as not requiring Israel to stop its nuclear weapon
development).
144. See, e.g., Derek Gilman, Comment, The Gulf War and the United Nations Charter:
Did the Security Council Fulfill its Original Mission?, 24 CONN. L. REV. 1131, 1153 (1992);
Jean-Philippe Lavoyer, Jus in Bello: Occupation Law and the War in Iraq, 98 AM. Soc'v
INT'L L. PROC. 121, 123 (2004); Reuven Young, Defining Terrorism: The Evolution of Terror-
ism as a Legal Concept in International Law and its Influence on Definitions in Domestic
Legislation, 29 B.C. INT'L & COMp. L. REV. 23, 43 n. 115 (confusing "calls upon all States" at
the beginning of Resolution 1373 paragraph 3 with "all States shall").
145. See, e.g., Michael Byers, Policing the High Seas: The Proliferation Security Initia-
tive, 98 AM. J. INT'L L. 526, 532 (2004); Paul C. Szasz, The Security Council Starts
Legislating, 96 AM. J. INT'L L. 901, 902 (2002); SYDNEY D. BAILEY, THE PROCEDURE OF THE
UN SECURITY COUNCIL 204-05 (1975); Stefan Talmon, The Security Council as World Legis-
lature, 99 AM. J. INT'L L. 175, 186 (2005). See also U.N. SCOR, 59th Sess., 4956th mtg. at 3,
U.N. Doc. S/PV.4956 (Apr. 28, 2004) (reporting that Pakistan asserted that legally binding
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between, seeing the phrase as entirely ambiguous. 46 Obviously, the obli-
gation under the operative paragraph could be clearer. However,
certainly when U.N. Charter Article 33(2) provides that "[t]he Security
Council shall ... call upon the parties to settle their dispute by [peace-
ful] means,' 47 or Article 41 allows the Security Council to "call upon the
Members of the United Nations to apply [measures not involving the use
of armed force],' 48 such Security Council instructions to States are not
merely recommendatory, given the obligations placed on States to peace-
fully settle their disputes under Article 2(3) and to abide by Security
Council Chapter VII decisions under Article 25.
In practice, the meaning of "calls upon" seems closer to having a
mandatory meaning than recommendatory, as reflected in several of the
comments of Council members during debates on particular resolutions.
The United States acknowledged that provisions that start with "calls
upon" create mandatory obligations when U.S. Ambassador John Bolton
included the two paragraphs of Resolution 1696 that start with "calls
upon" (paragraphs 1 and 5) in the list of mandatory obligations of that
resolution for Iran and all U.N. Member States. 4 9 U.S. Ambassador Ale-
jandro Wolff similarly asserted that the three provisions of Resolution
1737 that begin with "calls upon" are among that resolution's require-
ments on Iran and Member States, and concluded as follows:
[Resolution 1737] compels all United Nations Member States to
take all measures necessary to deny Iran equipment, technology,
technical assistance, and financial assistance that would contrib-
ute to Iran's enrichment, reprocessing, heavy water or nuclear-
weapon delivery programmes. It is clear on this and not open to
interpretation. We will insist on absolute adherence to its re-
quirements.50
The United Kingdom similarly asserted that Iran had an obligation to
take the steps required by the IAEA, in accordance with the provision of
the Additional Protocol, before the August 31 deadline established by
obligations arise from Security Council resolutions only when the resolution is a Chapter VII
resolution and the paragraph begins with the word "decides").
146. See, e.g., Louis Henkin, Congress, the President and the United Nations, 3 PACE
Y.B. INT'L L. 1, 14 n.47 (1991); John P. Grant, Beyond the Montreal Convention, 36 CASE W.
RES. J. INT'L L. 453, 470 (2004) ("'Calls upon' is hardly the language of obligation, but it is
not that far short, particularly in a resolution expressly adopted under Chapter VII of the Char-
ter.").
147. U.N. Charter art. 33, para. 2 (emphasis added).
148. U.N. Charter art. 41 (emphasis added).
149. U.N. SCOR, 61st Sess., 5500th mtg. at 3, U.N. Doc. S/PV.5500 (July 31, 2006)
[hereinafter U.N. Doc. S/PV.5500]; U.N. SCOR, 61st Sess., 5612th mtg. at 2, U.N. Doc.
S/PV.5612 (Dec. 23, 2006) [hereinafter U.N. Doc. S/PV.5612].
150. See U.N. Doc. S/PV.5612, supra note 149, at 3-4.
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paragraph 7 of Resolution 1696. This obligation appears to have been
established by paragraph 1 of Resolution 1696, which begins with "calls
upon."'"' Likewise, France asserted that individuals involved in fran's
nuclear and missile programs will be prohibited from traveling due to the
travel restrictions placed upon them by paragraph 10 of Resolution 1737,
which starts with the signal "calls upon."'52 Finally, after the Security
Council adopted Resolution 1737, Japan noted, "In defiance of resolu-
tion 1696 (2006), Iran has refused to take any steps required of it to
comply with the measures set out by the [IAEA] and the Security Coun-
cil ... .""'This requirement to comply with the IAEA measures was
imposed by paragraph 1 of Resolution 1696, which begins with the sig-
nal "calls upon." While the Security Council members may have
intended something other than mandatory action with "calls upon" in
Resolution 487 here, without a clear indication in the verbatim record,
the canon of legal interpretation that says interpretation of the same
terms within legal instruments is the same would suggest that this phrase
signals quasi-mandatory action.
This interpretation of "calls upon" is supported by a close textual
analysis of the phrase. The American Heritage Dictionary of the English
Language has two meanings for "calls upon": "To order; require" and
"To make a demand or a series of demands on." Both definitions support
the assertion that "calls upon" creates obligations. The same is true with
the Spanish word "exhorta," which the key resolutions use as the equiva-
lent to the English "calls upon." This word means "exhorts" in English,
154
which can have a strong compelling component, such as to "force or im-
pel in an indicated direction."'55 The French version uses "demande,"
which can mean "to ask" but can also mean "to require." The Arabic is
the same, using "talaba," which means "to ask" but also means "to de-
mand, order, require, direct."5 6 These phrases likely fall somewhere
between an invitation and an outright demand. Regardless of the ambi-
guity in these words that supposedly are equivalent to "calls upon," what
is clear is that it represents a decision by the Security Council, which is
all that is required for States to be obliged to accept and carry out these
pronouncements under Article 25. Assuming, arguendo, that "calls
upon" constitutes recommendatory language, States would still need to
151. Id. at 5.
152. See id. at 6.
153. Id.
154. COLIN SMITH, COLLINS SPANISH-ENGLISH/ENGLISH-SPANISH DICTIONARY 315 (8th
ed. 2006).
155. WordN.t, http://wordnet.princeton.edu/ (follow "Use WordNet online" hyperlink;
then search "exhort") (last visited Mar. 4, 2008).
156. ROHI BAALBAKI, AL-MAWRID: A MODERN ARABIC-ENGLISH DICTIONARY 728 (11 th
ed. 1999).
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carry out such recommendations based on the principle of good faith
under U.N. Charter Article 2(2) and Article 26 of the Vienna Convention
on the Law of Treaties. 57 The analysis of "calls upon" provided in this
Section is relevant for several of the resolutions discussed below.
2. Imposing Safeguards Agreements on Non-Parties to the NPT
The question arises concerning what it means to place facilities un-
der the IAEA's safeguards in this context. According to the IAEA,
"[s]afeguards are activities by which the IAEA can verify that a State is
living up to its international commitments not to use nuclear pro-
grammes for nuclear-weapons purposes."'' 8 NPT Article 111(1) requires
non-nuclear-weapon States "to accept safeguards, as set forth in an
agreement to be negotiated" at a later date in accordance with the IAEA
Statute.'59 The interesting aspect of Resolution 486 is that Israel has
never been a party to the NPT, even though it became a member of the
IAEA in 1957.' 60 Some safeguards apply to Israel's activities because it
is party to the IAEA statute and has a Safeguards Agreement with the
IAEA that covers some minor facilities.' 6' However, the IAEA has no
treaty-based authority to scrutinize Israel's most significant nuclear ac-
tivities because Israel's Safeguards Agreement does not cover these and
because it is not a party to the NPT 62 As a result, the IAEA has asserted
that Israel is "under no Treaty obligations and [h]as few or no obliga-
tions to the IAEA under safeguards agreements."'63 Although Israel could
accept new agreements allowing the IAEA to implement safeguards with
respect to Israel's declared facilities (based on INFCIRC/66 guidelines
for the IAEA's safeguards system, for example"4), it would still need
157. U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 2; Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 26, May
23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 8 I.L.M. 679.
158. IAEA Factsheets and Frequently Asked Questions, http://www.iaea.org/Publications/
Factsheets/English/sg-overview.html (last visited Mar. 4, 2008).
159. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, supra note 56, art. IH(1).
160, The same is true for India and Pakistan.
161. See Louis Rend Beres, Israel, Iran and Preemption: Choosing the Least Unattrac-
tive Option Under International Law, 14 DICK. J. INT'L L. 187, 200 (1996).
162. Uranium Information Centre [UIC], Safeguards to Prevent Nuclear Proliferation,
Briefing Paper 5 (Oct. 2007), available at www.uic.com.au/nip05.htm; Anthony D'Amato,
Editorial Comment, Israel's Air Strike upon the Iraqi Nuclear Reactor, 77 Am. J. INT'L L.
584, 587 (1983).
163. IAEA, Safeguards in Israel, IAEA InfoLog, Mar. 2005, http://www.iaea.org/blog/
Infolog/?p=3.
164. See IAEA, The Agency's Safeguards System (1965, as Provisionally Extended in




Israel's consent and would not cover special inspections normally cov-
ered by Additional Protocols.
165
Even if Israel placed its nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards, as
required by Resolution 487, the IAEA would have no yardstick against
which to measure Israel's compliance, since the NPT creates the bulk of
the international obligations on States in this realm, such as the obliga-
tions to prevent proliferation, seek nuclear disarmament, and promote
peaceful nuclear energy use, while the IAEA Statute creates the basic
mechanisms through which it can verify compliance with those obliga-
tions.'66As Guido den Dekker points out, the IAEA inspection regime
established under the IAEA Statute cannot begin until after State-parties
to the NPT have made their initial declarations and the IAEA has con-
ducted its initial inspections. 67 Therefore, in order for the Security
Council's pronouncement to have meaning with regard to Israel, the Se-
curity Council would need to impose at least some of the NPT's
obligations on Israel. For example, by requiring Israel to place its facili-
ties under IAEA safeguards, the Security Council must classify Israel as
a non-nuclear-weapon State under the NPT regime, since nuclear-
weapon States do not have an obligation under the IAEA Statute to ac-
cept such safeguards. Moreover, the Security Council imposes the NPT
obligations of non-nuclear-weapon States onto Israel. This interpretation
of Resolution 487 is confirmed by the subsequent General Assembly
resolutions in 1984 and 1985 that noted, in a negative manner, how Israel
had not adhered to the NPT, 68 even though nothing had expressly re-
quired Israel to adhere to the NPT before then. Indeed, without such an
interpretation of Resolution 487, requiring Israel to place its facilities
under IAEA safeguards would have little meaning, again, due to the lack
of a yardstick against which to assess Israel's compliance. Hence, this
arguably is the first example of the Security Council imposing portions
of a disarmament treaty on a State and is something that the Security
Council seems to have been fond of doing since the end of the Cold War.
C. Iraq's Chemical Weapons Use and
Resolutions 582, 598, 612, and 620
The third example of the Security Council getting involved in the
regulation of arms occurred in the 1980s, when Iraq allegedly used
165. Barry Kellman & David S. Gualtieri, Barricading the Nuclear Window-A Legal
Regime to Curtain Nuclear Smuggling, 1996 U. ILL. L. REv. 667, 706 n. 167.
166. IAEA, Safeguards in Israel, supra note 163; DEN DEKKER, supra note 21, at 81.
167. See DEN DEKKER, supra note 21, at 82. However, it is unclear what provisions den
Dekker relies upon in reaching this conclusion.
168. G.A. Res. 39/14, U.N. Doc. A/RES/39/14 (Nov. 16, 1984); G.A. Res. 40/6, U.N.
Doc. A/RES/40/6 (Nov. 1, 1985).
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chemical weapons against Iran during the Iran-Iraq War. Iraq had a long
history of using chemical weapons against Iran-as well as against its
own people-that dated back to August 1983, which was around the
time that it became clear that Iraq was losing the Iran-Iraq War. The larg-
est attack was in February 1986 and affected more than 10,000
Iranians.' 69 Many Iraqi attacks with chemical weapons are undocu-
mented, and even the number of attacks is unknown. 70 The Security
Council became involved at the time of this large February 1986 attack
and adopted Resolution 582 on February 24. In Resolution 582, the Se-
curity Council stated that it deplored the escalation of the conflict
between Iran and Iraq and "the use of chemical weapons contrary to ob-
ligations under the 1925 Geneva Protocol . ,171 Interestingly, the
resolution does not specify which State had used the chemical weapons,
a point discussed further in Part IV below. On July 20, 1987, the Security
Council adopted Resolution 598, in which it found there to have been a
breach of the peace without saying who had breached the peace. 7 2 In that
resolution, the Security Council acted under Articles 39 and 40 of Chap-
ter VII, rather than under all the other resolutions, which did not mention
Chapter VII. The only mention of the alleged violations of the 1925 Ge-
neva Gas Protocol'73 in that resolution was in the fourth preambular
paragraph where it "deplored" the "use of chemical weapons contrary to
obligations under the 1925 Geneva Protocol,' ' 74 although it did not ex-
pressly require compliance with the Protocol.
Nearly ten months later, the Security Council adopted Resolution
612 in response to further alleged Iraqi use of chemical weapons in
March 1988. Resolution 612 "[a]ffirm[ed] the urgent necessity of strict
observance of the Protocol for the [1925 Geneva Gas Protocol]" and
"[c]ondemn[ed] vigorously the continued use of chemical weapons in
the conflict between the Islamic Republic of Iran and Iraq contrary to the
obligations under the Geneva Protocol,"' 75 although this is different from
imposing the obligations of the Protocol on these parties. Such an impo-
sition was unnecessary at that time because both Iran and Iraq already
were parties to that treaty, and these obligations already applied to
169. See Jim Garamone, Iraq and the Use of Chemical Weapons, AM. FORCES PRESS
SERVICE, Jan. 23, 2003, http://www.defenselink.mil/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=29540.
170. Id.
171. S.C. Res. 582, supra note 59, 2.
172. S.C. Res. 598, supra note 59, pmbl. 9.
173. Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other
Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare (1925 Geneva Gas Protocol), June 17,
1925, available at http://fletcher.tufts.edu/multi/texts/BH093.txt.
174. S.C. Res. 598, supra note 59, pmbl. $ 4.
175. S.C. Res. 612, supra note 59, 11-2.
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them. 76 Yet again, the Security Council failed to designate which side
had been responsible for the violation of the Geneva Gas Protocol. In
addition to this resolution, the Secretary-General responded by sending a
group of experts there to investigate the use.'77 Still, Iraq continued to use
chemical weapons against Iran in July 1988. Yet again, the Secretary-
General responded by sending experts-this time on several missions-
to the region to investigate the use, who reported that chemical weapons
had been used against Iran and that such use was intensifying. 'The Se-
curity Council responded by adopting Resolution 620."79 Resolution 620
provided a development because it implied that Iraq was the State that
used chemical weapons when it acknowledged that chemical weapons
had been used against Iranians.' 0 Moreover, the Security Council con-
demned the violations of the Geneva Gas Protocol in much stronger
terms than before,' although it noticeably stopped short of imposing
new obligations on Iraq for these violations. The Security Council's ac-
tions involving the use of chemical weapons in the Iran-Iraq War appear
to have ended there.
This series of resolutions does not appear to impose new obligations
on Iraq, because all of the necessary obligations already applied to it
through its accession to the 1925 Geneva Gas Protocol. Nonetheless,
these resolutions are coercive disarmament and arms control measures
from the Security Council because they reiterate those obligations. The
Security Council's reference to such obligations in its Chapter VII reso-
lutions, such as Resolution 598, brings these pre-existing obligations
within the U.N. legal framework. In other words, if a State breaches a
disarmament or arms control treaty obligation, there likely are a host of
countermeasures under the treaty and under general international law
that the other parties can take to ensure compliance. When the Security
Council requires States to abide by these same obligations, it opens up
another, parallel avenue through which to compel compliance with the
international obligation: by the Security Council imposing sanctions for
violating Article 25, which requires States to accept and carry out the
Security Council's decisions.
176. Iran acceded to the Geneva Gas Protocol on Nov. 5, 1929, and Iraq acceded on Sept.
8, 1931.
177. Some commentators assert that the Security Council used its investigative role dur-
ing the Iran-Iraq War. See Tsutsomu Kono, Role in Addressing WMD Issues: Assessment and
Outlook, in ARMS CONTROL AFrER IRAQ: NORMATIVE AND OPERATIONAL CHALLENGES, supra
note 54, at 83, 103. However, if this were the case, such a role seems to have been minimal.
178. S.C. Res. 620, supra note 59, pmbl. $] 3.
179. Id. $ 2.
180. Id. pmbl. $ 3.
181. Id. 1.
Winter 20081
Michigan Journal of International Law
This begs the question of whether it matters that the Security Coun-
cil brings these obligations within the U.N. legal framework. Resolution
232 of 1966 suggests that there is a particular set of sanctions for violat-
ing Security Council decisions when it states that "failure or refusal by
any of them to implement the present resolution shall constitute a viola-
tion of Article 25 of the United Nations Charter."'82 In reality, there is no
difference between the sanctions the Security Council will apply to a
violation of Article 25 and a sanction in response to a "regular" threat to
international peace and security. Indeed, as Alfred Rubin notes, no provi-
sion in the U.N. Charter specifies the measures to be taken when a State
violates Article 25, and so the moral-political order seems to be left to
decide the appropriate sanctions on its own. 83 This point notwithstand-
ing, incorporation into U.N. law could be significant as treaties typically
allow States to withdraw from their obligations, and when treaties do not
have such a provision, Article 56 of the Vienna Convention on the Law
of Treaties will provide the ability to withdraw, assuming that it can be
established that the treaty parties meant to admit the possibility of with-
drawal and that the right to withdraw can be implied from the treaty's
nature. 84 However, there is no ability to withdraw from Security Council
resolutions, and there is no well established way of interpreting such
resolutions. Therefore, when the Security Council incorporates treaty
obligations into the U.N. legal framework by reiterating them in a Secu-
rity Council resolution, it becomes even clearer that these treaty
obligations bind the parties.
Critics arguing against the significance of reiterating treaty obliga-
tions within Security Council resolutions could try to adopt ad hoc ICJ
Judge Ahmed Sadek El-Kosheri's argument in the Lockerbie case. There,
Judge El-Kosheri asserted in his dissent that States do not have to obey
Security Council decisions that have no basis in the Charter, because Ar-
ticle 25 requires States to obey Council decisions "in accordance with
the present Charter,' 85 and treaty obligations do not have a basis in the
Charter. However, this is a weak argument because nothing in the U.N.
182. S.C. Res. 232, 3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/232 (Dec. 16, 1966).
183. See Alfred P. Rubin, Secession and Self-Determination: A Legal, Moral, and Politi-
cal Analysis, 36 STAN. J. INT'L L. 253, 257 n.17 (2000). Please note, however, that some
commentators have argued persuasively that violators of Security Council-created sanctions
should have the same measures imposed on them under Article 25. See, e.g., Jeremy P. Carver,
Making Financial Sanctions Work: Preconditions for Successful Implementation of Sanctions
by the Implementing State, (Expert Seminar on Targeting UN Financial Sanctions, Paper for
Working Group 1, 1998), available at http://www.seco.admin.ch/themen/00513/00620/00639/
00641/index.html?lang=en.
184. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 157, art. 56.
185. Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention aris-




Charter stops the Security Council from incorporating non-U.N. docu-
ments into its decisions. On the contrary, the Security Council regularly
incorporates non-U.N. documents into its decisions by reference to these
documents, just as Resolutions 255 and 984 incorporated the unilateral
statements of various permanent members of the Security Council. Such
decisions will be adopted in accordance with the U.N. Charter where the
Security Council invokes the correct phrasing contained in Article 39 to
unlock its Chapter VII powers.
D. The 1991 Gulf War and Resolution 687
The 1991 Gulf War was important for international relations and the
United Nations for several reasons. For example, the Gulf War marked
the clear end of the Cold War, in that the Soviet Union relinquished sup-
port of a key client State with the hope of saving its core union.'1 6 This
newfound cooperation from the Soviet Union enabled a return to the
U.N. system as it had been envisaged at its creation, with a strong em-
phasis on collective security coming at the direction of the Security
Council. More important for this Article, the 1991 Gulf War and the sub-
sequent activities by the United Nations Special Commission
(UNSCOM) and the United Nations Monitoring, Verification, and In-
spection Commission (UNMOVIC) discussed in this Section marked the
beginning of a link between the violation of Article 2(4) and the re-
quirement for the violator to disarm so that such a violation does not
occur again. This link is evident in the ways in which the Security Coun-
cil has imposed disarmament and arms control obligations on States that
have threatened international peace and security after the Cold War and
the 1991 Gulf War. Many believed that the end of the Cold War would
have "profound consequences for arms control."'87 These consequences
are dramatically evident in the strength of the Security Council resolu-
tions discussed in this Section, that is, the resolutions involving Iraq's
disarmament, condemnation of India and Pakistan's nuclear tests, Iran's
persistence in enriching uranium for suspected non-peaceful purposes,
North Korea's withdrawal from the NPT, and the Security Council's at-
tempt to frustrate WMD terrorism through Resolution 1540.
Many commentators assert that the Security Council was not in-
volved in imposing disarmament and arms control obligations before the
186. See MARTIN MCCAULEY, RUSSIA, AMERICA AND THE COLD WAR, 1949-1991 81-87
(2d ed. 2004).
187. Ekdus, supra note 79, at 67; Bourantonis & Evriviades, supra note 2, at 155 (believ-
ing that the end of the Cold War would bring a new era of cooperation in disarmament
agreements within the United Nations).
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1991 Gulf War.8 8 The previous Sections somewhat challenged this very
notion, although the Security Council certainly could have been more
involved. Furthermore, it was not necessarily the Iraqi invasion of Ku-
wait that forced the Security Council to get involved with WMD
proliferation issues to a greater extent in the early 1990s, as some com-
mentators have asserted, 9 but rather Iraq's possession of WMD and its
past use of WMD against enemy forces. Iraq's invasion of Kuwait dem-
onstrated clearly to the world how dangerous Iraq could be to the
maintenance of international peace and security, a menace that would be
intolerable if it were to use WMD on a large scale or to lend its WMD to
terrorists. Despite the limited international protests that resulted from
such use during the Iran-Iraq War, those atrocities likely were foremost
in the minds of Coalition commanders and troops before they went into
Iraq in Operation Desert Storm.'9 Whereas the initial objective-and
resolutions-prior to the actual invasion was the ouster of Iraq from
Kuwait and the restoration of the Kuwaiti government, as opposed to
eliminating Iraq's WMD,' 9' the overall objective quickly expanded to
reducing Iraq's ability to threaten its neighbors and to destroying Iraq's
WMD programs once the air campaign began to raise fears of chemical
and biological weapon attacks in the near future.'92 In short, a strong dis-
armament component would be involved in the post-war rebuilding of
Iraq. 193 As the following Section shows, the Security Council lived up to
this expectation through the coercive disarmament measures it adopted
in various resolutions.
1. Cease-Fire Agreement on the Ground
To begin, a thumbnail sketch of the relevant facts of the 1991 Gulf
War might be useful. Iraq invaded Kuwait on August 2, 1990, which led
to a string of Security Council resolutions that climaxed with Resolution
678 and its authorization of Member States to "use all necessary means
to uphold and implement resolution 660 (1990)'94 and all subsequent
188. Ekdus, supra note 79, at 68; see Dorinda G. Dallmeyer, The Future Role of the
United Nations in Disarmament: Learning from the Iraq Experience, in ADAPTING THE
UNITED NATIONS TO A POSTMODERN ERA: LESSONS LEARNED 129, 136 (W. Andy Knight ed.,
2001).
189. EDWARD C. LUCK, UN SECURITY COUNCIL: PRACTICE AND PROMISE 99 (2006).
190. SUTTERLIN, supra note 2, at 105.
191. LUCK, supra note 189, at 99.
192. See William H. Lewis & Christopher C. Joyner, Proliferation of Unconventional
Weapons: The Case for Coercive Arms Control, 10 COMP. STRATEGY 299, 299-301 (1991).
193. See id.
194. S.C. Res. 660, 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/660 (Aug. 2, 1990) (condemning Iraq's inva-
sion of Kuwait and demanding that "Iraq withdraw immediately and unconditionally all its
forces to the positions in which they were located on 1 August 1990..."); S.C. Res. 678, 2,
U.N. Doc. S/RES/678 (Nov. 29, 1990).
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relevant resolutions and to restore international peace and security in the
area" if Iraq did not leave Kuwait by January 15, 1991. Language such
as "all necessary means" within a Chapter VII decision of the Security
Council is commonly interpreted as an authorization to use force.' 9
Iraq did not comply with Resolution 678, and U.S.-led Coalition
forces began Operation Desert Storm on January 17, 1991, to liberate
Kuwait. This successful operation liberated Kuwait on February 27,
pushed on to Baghdad, and captured some 86,000 Iraqi prisoners of war,
all in approximately forty-two days, only the last one hundred hours of
which consisted of actual ground combat.'9 This overwhelming suc-
cess-for the Coalition, that is-set off a cascade of events, including
the unilateral suspension of the fighting by President George H.W. Bush
on February 28, 1991, and the formalization of a ceasefire agreement on
March 3, 1991, between the commander of coalition forces, General
Norman Schwarzkopf, and the deputy chief of staff of the Iraqi Ministry
of Defense, Lieutenant General Sultan Hashim Ahmad al-Jabburi.' 97 This
agreement did not contain any provisions on disarmament, but rather
expressly allowed Iraq to fly military helicopters in the cease-fire zone,
and provided for a demarcation line and the repatriation of prisoners of
war.' Such a concession on allowing Iraq to fly military helicopters is
not only the opposite of a disarmament or arms control measure, but it
was a considerable mistake in retrospect, given that Iraq had requested
the use of its helicopter gunships to help move personnel and materiel
but instead used them to kill 50,000 to 80,000 Kurds and Shias who were
involved in an uprising against the Saddam Hussein regime.'99 One must
look to Resolutions 686 and 687 for any express mention of disarma-
ment or arms control obligations placed on Iraq.
195. See generally James D. Fry, The UN Security Council and the Law of Armed Con-
flict: Amity or Enmity?, 38 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REV. 327, 336-39 (2006) (exploring the
consistencies among the interpretations of varying "necessary means" provisions among reso-
lutions, which generally imply the use of force); see also James D. Fry, Remaining Valid:
Security Council Resolutions, Textualism, and the Invasion of Iraq, 16 TUL. J. INT'L & COMP.
L. 609, 611-12 (2007).
196. David M. Morriss, From War to Peace: A Study of Cease-Fire Agreements and the
Evolving Role of the United Nations, 36 VA. J. INT'L L. 801, 890 (1996).
197. Andru E. Wall, The Legal Case for Invading Iraq and Toppling Hussein, 32 ISR.
Y.B. HUM. RTS. 165, 178-79 (2002); Ben Rooney, Coalition Faces Problem in Knowing When
War is Over, DAILY TELEGRAPH, Sept. 4, 2003, available at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/
news/main/jhtm?xml=/news/2003/04/09/wirq409.xml; Morriss, supra note 196, at 888-97;
Christopher Greenwood, New World Order or Old? The Invasion of Kuwait and the Rule of
Law, 55 MODERN L. REV. 153, 153 (1992).
198. Wall, supra note 197, at 178-79.
199. Norman G. Printer, Jr., Establishing an International Criminal Tribunal for Iraq:
The ime is Now, 36 UWLA L. REV. 27, 38 (2005); KENNETH M. POLLACK, THE THREATEN-
ING STORM: THE CASE FOR INVADING IRAQ 48-51 (2002).
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2. Resolution 686
Security Council Resolution 686, adopted on March 2, 1991, places
eight requirements on Iraq in exchange for terminating the authorization
to use force under Resolution 678. Paragraph 3(d) of Resolution 686
provided that Iraq "[p]rovide all information and assistance in identify-
ing Iraqi mines, booby traps, and other explosives as well as any
chemical and biological weapons and material in Kuwait, in areas of Iraq
where forces of Member States cooperating with Kuwait pursuant to
resolution 678 (1990) are present temporarily, and in the adjacent waters
..,2 Some commentators assert that Iraq complied with these require-
ments, 20' although there is no evidence that Iraq fulfilled these
requirements or even claimed to have fulfilled these requirements. 22 Al-
though paragraph 3(d) obliged Iraq to provide information on the
locations of WMD, mines, and explosives in Kuwait and where Coalition
forces would be in Iraq, an obligation to report is not an obligation to
disarm. Nevertheless, this requirement conceivably could fall under arms
regulation and control, given that knowing the existence and location of
particular weapons is the first step to regulating them.
3. Resolution 687
a. Disarmament Obligations
The new strength in Security Council disarmament and arms control
resolutions in the post-Cold War era began with Resolution 687, which
was the first resolution in which the Security Council adopted measures
requiring the destruction of a State's WMD and WMD programs, and
provided for an extensive inspection and monitoring regime to prevent
the reestablishment of those WMD and WMD programs.0 As illustrated
below, the disarmament of Iraq envisioned in Resolution 687 is not
200. S.C. Res. 686, 3(d), U.N. Doc. S/RES/686 (Mar. 2, 1991). The other seven re-
quirements contained in 1 2, 3 of Resolution 686 involved rescinding the annexation,
accepting liability, releasing detainees, beginning the return of Kuwaiti property, stopping
provocation by its forces, designating leaders to handle cease-fire negotiations, and arranging
the release of prisoners of war. Id. 2, 3.
201. See, e.g., Sean D. Murphy, Assessing the Legality of Invading Iraq, 92 GEO. L.J.
173, 189 (2004).
202. For more information on this matter, see generally Fry, Remaining Valid, supra note
195, at 629-33.
203. PASCAL TEIXEIRA DE SILVA, WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION: THE IRAQI CASE, IN
THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL: FROM THE COLD WAR TO THE 21ST CENTURY 205, 205 (2004);
Dallmeyer, supra note 188, at 129-30.
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unlike the disarmament of Germany after the First World War in terms of
the magnitude and punitive nature of the disarmament measures.2
Part C of Resolution 687 addresses Iraq's disarmament, and requires,
inter alia, the following from Iraq:
" the unconditional "destruction, removal, or rendering harm-
less, under international supervision," of its WMD materials
and facilities, including its ballistic missiles with a range
greater than 150km;
" that Iraq provide detailed reports to the U.N. Secretary-
General and the IAEA Director-General of Iraq's inventories
of such WMD, WMD facilities, and missiles, including their
locations, amounts, and types;
" that Iraq unconditionally "undertake not to use, develop, con-
struct, or acquire" any of the items it is being required to
destroy and report on; and
* that Iraq unconditionally accept urgent on-site inspections to
verify the capabilities mentioned in Iraq's declarations and
other locations chosen by the Special Commission created for
that purpose. °5
All of these demands were significant disarmament commitments for
Iraq and were new obligations inasmuch as they did not exist before this
time in any other legal instrument. Admittedly, the requirement that Iraq
report its inventories of WMD and related capacities is similar to that
required by paragraph 3(d) of Resolution 686, although Iraq was re-
quired to report on WMD throughout all of Iraq in Resolution 687, not
just those in Kuwait and the parts of Iraq where Coalition forces were
located, as was required by Resolution 686. In essence, Resolution 687
required that Iraq give up all of its WMD capabilities or have such capa-
bilities removed, which is quite broad in scope. In paragraph 14,
Resolution 687 goes even further than this by pulling the wider Middle
East into this resolution and stating the goal of establishing a WMD-free
zone for the whole of the Middle East. Resolution 687 was truly a revo-
lutionary resolution from a disarmament and arms control perspective.
b. UNSCOM and UNMOVIC
In addition to Resolution 687 requiring Iraq to surrender its WND and
WMD programs, the resolution called for the U.N. Secretary-General to
204. See MAX HILAIRE, UNITED NATIONS LAW AND THE SECURITY COUNCIL 213
(2005).
205. See S.C. Res. 687, supra note 60, 8-10, 12.
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establish a plan for the UNSCOM, in connection with the IAEA, to con-
duct on-site inspections of Iraq's WMD-related facilities.2" The U.N.
Secretary-General submitted the plan for disarming Iraq of its non-
nuclear WMD on April 18, 1991, pursuant to paragraph 9(b)(i) of Reso-
lution 687, which proposed that UNSCOM be established as soon as
possible in order to begin implementation of Resolution 687, and in par-
ticular the destruction or removal of biological and chemical weapons,
ballistic missiles, and nuclear-weapons capabilities, as well as to provide
future compliance and operations support.2 7 In addition to a staff of
twenty to twenty-five people, UNSCOM would be supplemented by
technical experts to assist with its responsibilities. 28 Resolution 687 did
not require the Security Council's approval before this plan was to come
into effect, and no separate Security Council resolution appears to have
expressly approved of this plan. The U.N. Secretary-General also sub-
mitted the IAEA's plan for disarming Iraq of its nuclear capabilities on
May 17, 1991, which proposed that all nuclear-weapons-usable materials
be removed from Iraq for destruction, since it could not be destroyed in
Iraq, and nuclear-weapon research and production facilities be decom-
missioned. 209 Unlike with the non-nuclear plan called for by paragraph
9(b)(i), paragraph 13 referred to the "plan being approved by the Coun-
cil," which it did on June 17, 1991, through Resolution 699 (a Chapter
VII resolution). Resolution 699 confirmed that UNSCOM and the IAEA
had the authority to act under Part C of Resolution 687 to destroy, re-
move, and render harmless Iraq's WMD and WMD capabilities, 2'0 asked
for bi-annual reports from the Secretary-General,"' and encouraged
maximum assistance "in cash and in kind" from U.N. Member States to
make sure that Part C of Resolution 687 was implemented effectively
and quickly, although it also decided that Iraq was to carry the full finan-
cial burden of implementing Part C.1
12
Although the Security Council did not approve the IAEA's plan until
June 17, UNSCOM and the IAEA apparently began their work disarm-
ing Iraq of its non-nuclear WMD as well as its nuclear WMD in May
1991 (just one month after the Security Council adopted Resolution
206. Id. 9 9(b), 13.
207. The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General, Implementation of para-
graph 9(b)(i) of Security Council Resolution 687 (1991), U.N. Doc. S/2250, 1-2 (Apr. 18,
1991).
208. Id. at 2.
209. Note by the Secretary-General transmitting the IAEA's Plan, U.N. Doc. S/22615, 3-
4 (May 17, 1991).





687). 2'1 UNSCOM's and the IAEA's desire to get to work before getting
the Security Council's approval was not surprising, given that it was to
carry out the disarmament plan provided by the Secretary-General and
the IAEA Director-General "within forty-five days following approval
by the Council .... This short timeframe reflects the unrealistic ex-
pectations of the Security Council when it adopted Resolution 687.
Despite these unrealistic expectations, it is still somewhat troubling from
a legal perspective that UNSCOM and the IAEA began removing Iraq's
nuclear capabilities before receiving express authorization from the Se-
curity Council. When it became clear that Iraq's declarations had been
incomplete and that Iraq was not complying with its obligations to dis-.• • 215
close its WMD and WMD capabilities, it became clear that UNSCOM
would not be able to carry out this plan in the given amount of time, and
so UNSCOM and the IAEA began to focus on identifying the gaps and
finding the undeclared items. Iraq began to be completely uncooperative
in June 1991, when it refused access to two sites suspected of being part
of its nuclear weapons program and even attacked UNSCOM inspectors
to stop them from inspecting and, later, to retrieve confiscated docu-
116ments. Despite Iraq's lack of cooperation, UNSCOM pressed forward
in unearthing Iraq's WMD activities through its reliance on clever tactics
to avoid tipping Iraq off to where it would be headed.27 With the tre-
mendous personnel support from all over the world and technological
capabilities given it by willing Western governments, 28 it took
UNSCOM approximately six months of operations to conclude to the
Security Council that "[t]he elements of misinformation, concealment,
lack of cooperation, and violation of the privileges and immunties of the
213. Note by the Secretary-General transmitting the IAEA's Plan, U.N. Doc. S/22615, at
3 (May 17, 1991). See also Trevor Findlay, Lessons of UNSCOM and UNMOVIC for WMD
Non-Proliferation, Arms Control and Disarmament, in ARMS CONTROL AFTER IRAQ: NORMA-
TIVE AND OPERATIONAL CHALLENGES, supra note 54, at 140, 141-42.
214. S.C. Res. 687, supra note 60, 13.
215. The Secretary-General, Letter Dated 26 June 1991 from the Secretary-General Ad-
dressed to the President of the Security Council, at 2-3, U.N. Doc. S/22739 (June 26, 1991);
The Secretary-General, Letter Dated 28 June 1991 from the Secretary-General Addressed to
the President of the Security Council, at 2, U.N. Doc. S/22743 (June 28, 1991); The Secretary-
General, Letter Dated 12 July 1991 from the Director-General of the International Atomic
Energy Agency Addressed to the Secretary-General, at 9-14, U.N. Doc.S/22788 (July 15,
1991); The Secretary-General, Letter Dated 25 July 1991 from the Director-General of the
International Atomic Energy Agency Addressed to the Secretary-General, at 5-11, U.N. Doc.
S/22837 (July 25, 1991).
216. Findlay, supra note 213, at 142.
217. Kono, supra note 177, at 103; Findlay, supra note 213, at 142-43.
218. Findlay, supra note 213, at 141-42; Dallmeyer, supra note 188, at 131 (discussing
how "the nuclear inspection team which was detained in 1991 in the car park was composed
of thirty-seven people from twenty-two countries including Morocco, Egypt, and Syria, no-
tions previously not at the forefront of arms control verification").
Winter 20081
Michigan Journal of International Law
Special Commission and IAEA have not created any trust in Iraq's inten-
tions. ' '2'9 The Security Council acknowledged the fact that Iraq was non-
compliant with Part C of Resolution 687 and non-compliant with its
safeguards agreement with the IAEA in violation of the NPT in its Reso-
lution 707 of August 15, 1991,220 and again demanded Iraq's compliance
with Resolution 687, including allowing UNSCOM and the IAEA teams
"immediate, unconditional, and unrestricted access to any and all areas,
facilities, equipment, records, and means of transportation which they
wish to inspect .. ..""' These efforts to apply considerable pressure on
Iraq to get it to comply had no discernable impact on Iraq. In an effort to
improve the inspection regime and to apply greater pressure on Iraq, the
Security Council updated the inspection plan with Resolution 715, ena-
bling UNSCOM to inspect all types of facilities and to remove anything
of interest during these inspections, among other powers provided for in
a plan developed by the U.N. Secretary-General.22
Security Council resolutions were relatively silent on UNSCOM's
inspections of Iraq after Resolution 715 until June 1996, when Iraq re-
fused access to UNSCOM yet again, which led the Security Council to
declare in Resolution 1060 that Iraq had violated its disarmament obliga-
tions under Resolution 687 and that it must grant "immediate,
unconditional, and unrestricted access" to the inspectors of all sites. 2 A
similar situation occurred a year later, and the Security Council re-
sponded in the same manner in Resolution 1115, but threatened an
escalation of sanctions, although without a significant impact. Without
these inspections, the Security Council was unable to know how much of
a threat Iraq posed with its chemical and biological weapons, although it
was known that Iraq still had such capabilities.2 The Security Council
repeated these threats four months later in Resolution 1134,226 and actu-
ally imposed greater sanctions in the form of travel bans on Iraqi
officials .2 27
Without Iraq's cooperation, the burden of proving that Iraq did not
have WMD seems to have inappropriately shifted from Iraq to the Secu-
rity Council.228 In an effort to shift the burden back to Iraq, the Security
219. The Secretary-General, Report of the Sixth IAEA Inspection Team, delivered to the
Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/23122 (Oct. 8, 1991).
220. S.C. Res. 707, IT 1-2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/707 (Aug. 15, 1991).
221. Id. T 3(a)-(b).
222. S.C. Res. 715, 11, U.N. Doc. S/RES/715 (Oct. 11, 1991).
223. S.C. Res. 1060, 9 1-2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1060 (June 12, 1996).
224. S.C. Res. 1115, 9 2-6, U.N. Doc. S/RES/ 1115 (June 21, 1997).
225. SUTTERLIN, supra note 2, at 106.
226. S.C. Res. 1134, 1 1-6, U.N. Doc. S/RES/ 1134 (Oct. 23, 1997).
227. S.C. Res. 1137, T4, U.N. Doc. S/RES/ 1137 (Nov. 12, 1997).
228. Kono, supra note 177, at 92-93.
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Council threatened further military action if Iraq refused to comply with
inspectors. Resolution 1154 required Iraq to give "immediate, uncondi-
tional, and unrestricted access to the Special Commission and the IAEA
.... ,29 Resolution 1205 strongly condemned "the decision by Iraq of
31 October 1998 to cease cooperation with the Special Commission as a
flagrant violation of resolution 687 (1991) and other relevant resolu-
tions[,]" and required it to
rescind immediately and unconditionally the decision of 31 Oc-
tober 1998, as well as the decision of 5 August 1998, to suspend
cooperation with the Special Commission and to maintain re-
strictions on the work of the IAEA and that Iraq provide
immediate, complete and unconditional cooperation with the
Special Commission and the IAEA ....
This led to the joint U.S.-U.K. action Operation Desert Fox from De-
cember 16 to 19, 1998, which involved a four-day air campaign that
included as many Cruise missiles as were used during the entire 1991
Gulf War.23' Operation Desert Fox was not expressly authorized by the
Security Council, although it arguably was in response to Iraq's violation
of an earlier Security Council resolution.2 " As one commentator asserts,
Operation Desert Fox was designed to harm Iraq's WMD capabilities,
not to bring Iraq into compliance with Security Council resolutions,233
although the latter likely was a desired result as well.
After nearly two years of inspectors not having access to Iraq, the
Security Council dissolved UNSCOM and replaced it with the
UNMOVIC in Resolution 1284. 34 Unlike Resolution 687, which had
been adopted quickly under somewhat unrealistic expectations, the Secu-
rity Council had the time to craft UNMOVIC in such a way as to
incorporate the lessons it had learned with UNSCOM. Like UNSCOM,
UNMOVIC was a subsidiary organ of the Security Council (accountable
solely to the Security Council) with responsibility in verifying Iraq's
compliance with Resolution 687, although it also had the task of ad-
dressing the unresolved disarmament issues and to identify other sites in
Iraq to include within the monitoring and verification regime, among
other things.235 UNMOVIC was given a stronger ability to avoid the
229. S.C. Res. 1154, T3, U.N. Doc. SIRES/I 154 (Mar. 2, 1998).
230. S.C. Res. 1205, 11 I-2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1205 (Nov. 5, 1998).
231. GRAY, supra note 137, at 266.
232. Sean M. Condron, Justification for Unilateral Action in Response to the Iraqi
Threat: A CriticalAnalysis of Operation Desert Fox, 161 MIL. L. REV. 115, 178 (1999).
233. Kono, supra note 177, at 94.
234. S.C. Res. 1284, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1284 (Dec. 17, 1999).
235. Id. $ 2.
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barriers that Iraq put in its way in that Resolution 1284 required Iraq to
give UNMOVIC teams "immediate, unconditional, and unrestricted ac-
cess to any and all areas, facilities, equipment, records, and means of
transport which they wish to inspect, '' 236 without such limitations as
presidential sites and a requirement of advance notice that had plagued
UNSCOM. In terms of practice, UNMOVIC was an improvement from
UNSCOM in that it learned from UNSCOM's mistakes. 37 Whereas
UNSCOM and UNMOVIC relied heavily on intelligence from certain
States to learn about Iraq's WMD, Hans Blix, the head of UNMOVIC,
made sure that this was one-way intelligence sharing with UNMOVIC
by requiring UNMOVIC staff to be U.N. civil servants subject to the
requirements of U.N. Charter Article 100, which addresses staff inde-
pendence and which greatly improved UNMOVIC's perceived
impartiality and, hence, legitimacy.238 Blix even made sure that his staff
members received the appropriate training to make them sensitive to
Iraqi culture, history, and religion, among other things. 2 Nevertheless,
Iraq refused to cooperate with UNMOVIC until 2002, when the United
States and the United Kingdom again began to increase their military
presence in the Gulf region. During this military build-up, the Security
Council adopted Resolution 1441, which not only deplored Iraq's failure
to comply with its past disarmament obligations and requirements to
report its WMD programs,4 it required, among other things, renewed
commitment to comply with these obligations as well as a renewed obli-
gation on Iraq to allow UNMOVIC to inspect all sites including
Presidential palaces and to suspend Iraq's ground and aerial move-
ment. 4 '
Despite the strengthened mandate of UNMOVIC, several Western
States-in particular, the United States, the United Kingdom, and Spain
(the Coalition States)-believed that Iraq still was successfully conceal-
ing its WMD capabilities from inspectors,242 and believed that Saddam
236. Id. 4.
237. Findlay, supra note 213, at 156 (noting UNSCOM's early practice of dynamiting
chemical weapons in open pits and other practices that led to the exposure of inspectors to
harmful chemical agents).
238. HANS BLIx, DISARMING IRAQ 49 (2004); Kono, supra note 177, at 92-93; BOWLES,
supra note 2, at 162; Lewis & Joyner, supra note 192, at 299-301.
239. BLIX, supra note 238, at 51-52.
240. S.C. Res. 1441, pmbl. $ 1, 6-9, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1441 (Nov. 8, 2002).
241. Id. IT 2-7.
242. Interestingly, the belief that Iraq had been able to conceal its biological weapons
program from inspectors for so long had a significant impact on the negotiations for a protocol
to strengthen the Biological Weapons Convention, although Iraq was later found to have no
biological weapons program. See Patricia Lewis, Why We Got it Wrong: Attempting to Unravel
the Truth of Bioweapons in Iraq, in ARMS CONTROL AFTER IRAQ: NORMATIVE AND OPERA-
TIONAL CHALLENGES, supra note 54, at 160, 160-66.
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Hussein showed no intention of complying with UNMOVIC or the
IAEA, as initial reports had indicated.2'3 However, later reports from
UNMOVIC and the IAEA stated that their monitoring operations were
being implemented smoothly and with the full cooperation of the Iraqi
government, though the inspections still were difficult." Indeed, before
the invasion, Saddam Hussein opened Iraq's doors to inspectors without
any conditions, and asserted that it had made a complete declaration of
its WMD programs.4 5 However, it appeared to be too little too late. In-
deed, the list of unresolved disarmament issues reported to the Security
Council under Resolution 1284 suggested that UNMOVIC was having
considerable problems in Iraq.246 Moreover, inspections did not uncover
WMD, the existence of which largely was taken as a given by the Coali-
tion States. Therefore, the Coalition States decided that there was
sufficient justification for a military invasion to forcefully remove Iraq's
WMD permanently, which these States carried out in March 2003.24 Af-
ter the invasion, the Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution
1483, which called for international verification that Iraq had ceased its
WMD programs.14 As time has told, Iraq had ceased its WMD programs
before the invasion, thus making the main rationale for the invasion
meritless, assuming, arguendo, that it had any merit to begin with.
UNMOVIC suspended inspections with the invasion in 2003. The
Security Council recently terminated UNMOVIC's mandate rmina-
tion of the most intrusive disarmament regime to date was relatively
unceremonious. Although Iraq tried to frustrate UNSCOM's and
UNMOVIC's activities at nearly every step save the very end, these enti-
ties were quite successful in removing Iraq's WMD and WMD
capabilities.2 10 This success can be credited to the Security Council's con-
trol of these entities, which, along with the help of strong leadership of
UNSCOM and UNMOVIC, enabled them to largely avoid the meddling
243. See SUTTERLIN, supra note 2, at 106; GRAY, supra note 137, at 272.
244. Kono, supra note 177, at 104-05; THAKUR, supra note 3, at 168 (claiming that the
UNSCOM and UNMOVIC inspections were a success); BOWLES, supra note 2, at 162 (assert-
ing, among other things, that Hans Blix told the Security Council that UNMOVIC could finish
inspections of Iraq within a few months); GRAY, supra note 137, at 272 (arguing that, after
some initial delays, Iraq began to cooperate more fully in February 2003).
245. BOWLES, supra note 2, at 162; Findlay, supra note 213, at 147-48.
246. Kono, supra note 177, at 94.
247. See generally BOWLES, supra note 2, at 11-12; SUTTERLIN, supra note 2, at 106.
But see GRAY, supra note 137, at 192 (asserting that the United Kingdom's purpose in invad-
ing Iraq in 2003 was to disarm Iraq of its WMD, although the United States' purpose was
regime change).
248. S.C. Res. 1483, 11, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1483 (May 22, 2003).
249. S.C. Res. 1762, 1 , U.N. Doc. S/RES/1762 (June 29, 2007).
250. See SUTTERLIN, supra note 2, at 99 (asserting that Iraq's disarmament was a notable
achievement by the United Nations); Findlay, supra note 213, at 150-51.
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of outside entities such as other States, the IAEA Board of Governors,
and the U.N. Secretariat."' It remains to be seen whether UNSCOM and
UNMOVIC will be useful models for coercive disarmament activities in
the future. Some commentators believe that they will,252 while others do
not. 53 Those in the latter group formed this opinion before the Security
Council adopted strong disarmament resolutions against Iran and North
Korea, as can be seen simply by comparing the dates of publication for
those resolutions and those opinions. In reality, these resolutions have
gone beyond those regarding Iraq in many ways, such as the clear impo-
sition of treaty obligations on these States. Before delving into those
later resolutions, the following Section examines several of the pressing
legal issues that arose from the coercive disarmament and arms control
measures that the Security Council took against Iraq.
4. Legal Issues
The resolutions involved with the WMD disarmament of Iraq raise
the most pressing legal issues of any other resolution discussed in this
Article. The five main legal issues discussed here are: Iraq's acceptance
of Resolution 687, UNSCOM's strength, Security Council delegation of
coercive powers to the U.N. Secretary-General, due process concerns
with Security Council proceedings, and Security Council imposition of
treaty obligations on States.
a. Iraq's Acceptance of Resolution 687
A major question that arises when discussing the coercive disarma-
ment measures under Security Council Resolution 687 is whether Iraq's
acceptance of Resolution 687 constitutes consent, and so renders the
case not one of coercive disarmament. Indeed, Iraq accepted, though
quite begrudgingly, the cease-fire terms of Resolution 687 on April 6,
199 1,2'as required by paragraph 33 of that resolution, which stated
that the cease-fire would become effective "upon official notification by
Iraq to the Secretary-General and to the Security Council of its
acceptance .... ,255
It is important to note that Iraq technically was obliged to accept
Resolution 687 as a member of the United Nations, in accordance with
Article 25, which states that States are bound to "accept and carry out
251. Findlay, supra note 213, at 150-52; Ekrus, supra note 79, at 71.
252. See, e.g., Kono, supra note 177, at 91.
253. See, e.g., SUTTERLIN, supra note 2, at 107.
254. See Identical Letters dated 6 April 1991 from the Permanent Representative of Iraq
to the United Nations addressed respectively to the Secretary-General and the President of the
Security Council, at 7, U.N. Doc. S/22456 (Apr. 6, 1991).
255. S.C. Res. 687, supra note 60, 1 33.
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the decisions of the Security Council,2' 6 thus suggesting that Iraq's ac-
ceptance under paragraph 33 was unnecessary for Resolution 687 to
come into effect. Nonetheless, Iraq's acceptance of the demands of the
coercer (here, the Security Council) does not diminish the coercive na-
ture of those demands, just as an unruly bar patron's decision to leave
the bar under the threat of the bouncer's violence makes the patron's de-
cision to leave no more voluntary than had the bouncer actually used
force to come to the same result.2 7 Indeed, coercion requires only that an
implicit or explicit threat was made.258 In the context of Iraq and Resolu-
tion 687, the subtext was that the pummelling of Iraq by Coalition forces
would continue if Iraq did not accept these terms unconditionally.
b. UNSCOM's Strength
What stands out in Iraq's WMD disarmament saga is the broad au-
thority the Security Council gave UNSCOM and UNMOVIC to inspect
and disarm Iraq. The Security Council initially had considerable assur-
ances that Iraq would cooperate in this endeavor, including Iraq's
express acceptance of the terms of Resolution 687. Once it became clear
that Iraq would not cooperate, however, the Security Council and
UNSCOM were forced to decide how far they were willing to go to
compel Iraq to comply with Resolution 687. What resulted was a gradual
ratchetting up of coercive measures against Iraq based on the coercive
imposition of obligations under Resolution 687. Resolution 1441, of
course, represents the outer limit of what the Security Council was will-
ing to do to disarm Iraq. In Resolution 1441, the Security Council
refrained from expressly authorizing the use of force against Iraq for a
second time. All of these resolutions and efforts to disarm Iraq seem
rather devoid of Iraqi consent. However, Iraq gave its consent to future
Security Council actions when it joined the United Nations, and gave up
an expectation of freedom from interference when it chose to develop
WMD in violation of WMD norms and to invade its neighbor.2 9 The
256. U.N. Charter art. 25; see generally RENATA SONNENFELD, RESOLUTIONS OF THE
UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL 120-44 (1988) (discussing the legal effects of Security
Council resolutions under U.N. Charter article 25); see also U.N. Charter art. 48, para. I ("The
action required to carry out the decisions of the Security Council for the maintenance of inter-
national peace and security shall be taken by all the Members of the United Nations or by
some of them, as the Security Council may determine.").
257. See Anderson, supra note 13.
258. See id.
259. See Miller, supra note 54, at 128 (asserting that Iraq was in trouble with the Secu-
rity Council not for violations of a WMD treaty obligation but for breaching disarmament and
arms control obligations under Resolution 687). However, the Security Council's imposition
of obligations through Resolution 687 stemmed from Iraq's suspected covert development of
nuclear weapons in violation of its NPT obligations prior to Resolution 687, which the Secu-
rity Council confirmed was a violation of the NPT in Resolution 707.
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Security Council was perfectly within its administrative powers, pro-
vided under U.N. Charter Article 29, to establish a subsidiary body
tasked to disarm a target under a Chapter VII mandate.2'
The Security Council's choice to use this power within the disarma-
ment and arms control context marked a shift away from nuclear
regulation to a stronger focus on enforcement in the post-Cold War era.16'
These enforcement decisions are made without consulting-at least
openly-the U.N. Secretary-General or the ICJ as to the existence of an
actual violation,2 62 and are adopted as powerful Chapter VII resolutions
that signal to the target State that military force backs up these decisions.
As explained in Sections 111(F) and Il(G) below, the Security Council's
imposition of stiff disarmament and arms control obligations against Iran
and North Korea in this same manner signals that the Security Council's
emphasis on disarmament and arms control enforcement is a trend that
will stay.
c. Security Council Delegation of Coercive Powers to
the U.N. Secretary-General
Even though the Security Council does not consult the U.N. Secre-
tary-General or the ICJ when determining the existence of a violation of
a WMD norm, the Security Council has seen fit to involve the U.N. Sec-
retary-General in developing plans for the implementation of the
Security Council's coercive disarmament measures. As noted above in
Section III(D)(3)(b), paragraph 9(b)(i) of Resolution 687 required the
U.N. Secretary-General to submit a plan for disarming Iraq of its non-
nuclear WMD, which he submitted on April 18, 1991. This plan pro-
posed a number of items, including the size of the U.N. Secretary-
General's staff and his intensive plan for destroying or removing all of
Iraq's non-nuclear WMD.263 As already noted, Resolution 687 did not
require the Security Council's approval before this plan was to come into
effect, and so the plan came into effect at the moment it was formulated.
This raises an interesting legal issue regarding the Security Council's
ability to delegate to other entities the power to define the contours of its
coercive mandates, while still being binding on U.N. Member States un-
260. See THAKUR, supra note 3, at 168.
261. See Dallmeyer, supra note 188, at 136.
262. See Lewis & Joyner, supra note 192, at 309 (calling for the Security Council and
the U.N. Secretary-General to work in concert to impose coercive arms control measures on
alleged violators of WMD non-proliferation norms); ALLAN GOTLIEB, DISARMAMENT AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW: A STUDY OF THE ROLE OF LAW IN THE DISARMAMENT PROCESS 39
(1965) (discussing a U.S. proposal that the ICJ should have jurisdiction over all disputes con-
cerning the interpretation and application of the disarmament treaty).
263. See Implementation Report, supra note 207.
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der Article 25. The Security Council obviously has the power to create
subsidiary organs under U.N. Charter Articles 7(2) and 29,2" and to pro-
vide them with broad powers to complete their tasks, which conceivably
include the ability to bind States. For example, the Security Council gave
the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY)
and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) the power to
bind States.26' However, here the Security Council gave binding powers
to an entity not its subsidiary, namely, the U.N. Secretary-General. No-
where does the U.N. Charter provide the U.N. Secretary-General with
binding powers, so the question arises whether this in an ultra vires act
by the U.N. Secretary-General.
Resolution 687 is not the first instance in which the Security Council
has delegated considerable powers to the U.N. Secretary-General to de-
termine the contours of Security Council decisions that bind all Member
States. For example, in 1992, three months after the Security Council
established the arms embargo on Somalia, the Security Council estab-
lished the first United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) with
Resolution 751, along with a sanctions committee.266 Resolution 775 in-
creased the size of UNOSOM by 3,500 troops.267 While this force started
as a traditional, neutral peacekeeping operation, it eventually shifted to a
peace enforcement operation that could use force in fulfilling its man-
date and imposing its will on the Somalis.26t Interestingly, in Resolution
794, the Security Council decided that UNOSOM would "proceed at the
discretion of the Secretary-General in the light of his assessment of con-
ditions on the ground .... ,,269 Thus, the Security Council essentially gave
the Secretary-General carte blanche to modify the mandate of
UNOSOM. Moreover, Resolution 794 authorized the "Secretary-General
and Member States cooperating to implement [an offer of a Member
State to help create a secure environment there] to use all necessary
means to establish as soon as possible a secure environment for
264. See THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY 482 (Bruno Simma
ed., 1994).
265. See Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia art.
29(2), 32 I.L.M. 1192, available at http://www.un.org.ictylegaldoc-e/basic/statut/statute-
feb08-e.pdf, adopted by S.C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3217th mtg. at 6, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/827 (May 27, 1993), 32 I.L.M. 1203; Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda, art. 28(2), 33 I.L.M. 1602, available at http://69.94.11.53/ENGLISH/
basicdocs/statute/2007.pdf, adopted by S.C. Res. 955, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3453rd mtg. at
3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (Nov. 8, 1994), 33 I.L.M. 1600.
266. S.C. Res. 751, I 2, 11, U.N. Doc. S/RES/751 (Apr. 24, 1992).
267. See S.C. Res. 775, 3, 5, U.N. Doc. S/RES/775 (Aug. 28, 1992).
268. Winston A. Tubman, The Role of the United Nations with Respect to the Means for
Accomplishing the Maintenance and Restoration of Peace, 26 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 101
(1996).
269. S.C. Res. 794, T 6, U.N. Doc. S/RES/794 (Dec. 3, 1992).
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humanitarian relief operations in Somalia .... Ultimately, this opera-
tion expressly involved the forcible disarmament of combatants. Shortly
after Resolution 794's adoption, the Secretary-General stated that
UNOSOM and the Unified Task Force (UNITAF) would be allowed to
use force to disarm combatants. From the beginning of his discussion of
UNOSOM's "new mandate," the Secretary-General expressed his "firm
view ... [that] the mandate of UNOSOM II must cover the whole terri-
tory of Somalia and include disarmament.""' The Secretary-General not
only gave UNOSOM the mandate to "seize the small arms of all unau-
thorized armed elements and to assist in the registration and security of
such arms.2 72 In case someone questioned whether this allowed coercive
disarmament, the Secretary-General made it clear later in the same re-
port:
To be effective the disarmament process should be enforceable.
Those factions or personnel who fail to comply with timetables
or other modalities of the process would have their weapons and
equipment confiscated and/or destroyed.
The Security Council expressly incorporated this report of the Secretary-
General into UNOSOM II's mandate with Resolution 814. The Security
Council "[d]ecide[d] to expand the size of the UNOSOM force and its
mandate in accordance with the recommendations contained in para-
graphs 56-88 of the report of the Secretary-General of 3 March 1993,
and the provisions of this resolution .... 274 Despite this incorporation of
the Secretary-General's report, the Secretary-General retained his power
to modify the Security Council mandate that UNOSOM II enjoyed,
which was made clear in paragraph 5 of Resolution 837, which
"[r]eaffirm[ed] that the Secretary-General is authorized under resolution
814 (1993) to take all necessary measures ....,,275
These two examples show some practice of the Security Council in
delegating binding powers to the U.N. Secretary-General as if deputizing
the Secretary-General in its enforcement activities. The Security Council
also often delegates its coercive powers to States to implement its resolu-
tions, and the delegation to the U.N. Secretary-General is comparable.
While no provision in the U.N. Charter grants the Secretary-General
270. Id. 1 8, 10.
271. The Secretary-General, Further Report of the Secretary-General Submitted in Pur-
suance of Paragraphs 18 and 19 of Resolution 794 (1992), 57, U.N. Doc. S/25354 (Mar. 3,
1993).
272. Id. I 57(d).
273. Id. 63.
274. S.C. Res. 814, 1 5, U.N. Doc. S/RES/814 (Mar. 26, 1993).
275. S.C. Res. 837, 5, U.N. Doc. S/RES/837 (June 6, 1993).
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binding powers, and no provision allows the Security Council to give the
Secretary-General binding powers, at the same time, no provision re-
strains the Security Council from deputizing the U.N. Secretary-General
in this manner. Thus, delegation arguably is allowable as long as it is
necessary for the Security Council to fulfill its role under the U.N. Char-
ter.
d. Due Process Concerns with Security Council Proceedings
Given the lack of WMD that have been discovered in Iraq after the
2003 invasion, serious questions arise as to what types of due process
safeguards can be put in place in order for the international community
to avoid making such important decisions based on weak evidence. In
general, Security Council decision-making procedures are not known for
their due process safeguards. While the Security Council is to meet in
public, informal consultations generally are held in private, which would
appear to be where most of the actual decision-making occurs.276 Con
cerning the Security Council meetings, U.N. Charter Article 31 provides
non-members of the Security Council the possibility of "participat[ing],
without vote, in the discussion of any question brought before the Secu-
rity Council ... , and Article 32 similarly provides such States the
possibility of "participat[ing], without vote, in the discussion relating to
the dispute . ,,278 Despite this language, States that will be particularly
affected by a resolution have no right to be invited to participate in the
debates.2 79 Even if a State is invited into the proceedings, there is no
guarantee that it will be allowed an opportunity to be heard before the
Security Council votes on the resolution that creates significant obliga-
tions on that State. 80 Indeed, there are two barriers to these provisions
276. See BAILEY, supra note 145, at 53-54, 60-75.
277. U.N. Charter art. 31.
278. U.N. Charter art. 32.
279. The Permanent Representative of India to the United Nations, Letter dated 4 June
1998 from the Permanent Representative of India to the United Nations Addressed to the
President of the Security Council, at 1, U.N. Doc. S/1998/464 (June 4, 1998) (reporting that
India complained, during the debates leading up to the adoption of Resolution 1172, that the
Security Council "disregarded [Article 31] by not giving India an opportunity to participate in
the discussions on this draft," thus showing how the Security Council "is neither open nor
transparent"). But see U.N. SCOR, 2666th mtg. at 2-5, U.N. Doc. S/PV.2666 (Feb. 24, 1986)
(noting that the President of the Security Council made it clear that some States that were not
necessarily welcome during the debates over Iraq's use of chemical weapons against Iran were
nonetheless allowed to participate).
280. U.N. Doc. S/PV.5500, supra note 149, at 2 (reporting that Iran complained that the
President of the Security Council did not allow it to address the Council before the vote for
Resolution 1696, even though it had requested such an opportunity on several occasions, thus
reflecting "the degree of the Council's transparency and fairness that it has adopted a presiden-
tial statement and a resolution without even allowing the views of the concerned party to be
heard").
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providing a considerable degree of protection for target States: first, such
States must be invited by the Security Council, and second, the Security
Council is free to refer to the questions and disputes under its considera-
tion under Articles 31 and 32 as "issues," "concerns," "matters," or any
other euphemism that would relieve the Security Council of having to
decide whether to extend an invitation, or instead assert that the party to
the dispute is not a State at all.28 ' Assuming that such States are liberally
granted the ability to actively participate in Security Council debates,
they neither have the right to a reasoned decision from the Security
Council that can stand up to scrutiny nor the possibility of appeal,282
among other standard due process safeguards.
Nevertheless, critics reasonably could argue that the Security Coun-
cil is becoming more conscious of due process considerations. For
example, the Security Council demonstrated its understanding of the
significance of due process when it established the ICTY and ICTR as
subsidiary bodies and gave accused individuals such rights as the right to
be present for the trial,"' in accordance with Article 14(3)(d) of the In-
ternational Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.284 Although Security
Council Resolutions 1267 and 1373 showed serious deficiencies in terms
of due process, in that they required States to adopt sanctions "without
delay" against suspected terrorists, 285 these deficiencies gradually have
281. But see THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS, supra note 264, at 497, 500-01
(asserting that a State-party to a dispute has the right to participate under Article 31, although
it shows signs of confusing the role of permissive and obligatory language when relying on
Rule 37 of the Provisional Rules of Procedure for support of that right and that Rule merely
states that non-members may be invited to participate by the Security Council, thus putting the
State on a "weak legal foundation").
282. See Request for Indication of Provisional Measures, Concerning Questions of Inter-
pretation and Application of 1971 Montreal Convention Arising from Aerial Incident at
Lockerbie (Libya v. U.S.), Provisional Measures, 1992 I.C.J. 114, 124; see also Frederic L.
Kirgis, Jr., The Security Council's First Fifty Years, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 506, 527 (1995) (claim-
ing that no judicial review is available, and thus the Security Council is left alone to decide
how far to stretch the United Nation's purposes and principles). Please note that this was writ-
ten before the Lockerbie case. But see Thomas M. Franck, The "Powers of Appreciation ":
Who is the Ultimate Guardian of UN Legality?, 86 AM. J. INT'L L. 519, 521-22 (1992) (com-
paring the Lockerbie case with the U.S. Supreme Court case, Marbury v. Madison, and
suggesting that Lockerbie might also establish judicial review on the international level); John
Dugard, Judicial Review of Sanctions, in UNITED NATIONS SANCTIONS AND INTERNATIONAL
LAW 83, 87 (Vera Gowlland-Debbas ed., 2001) (citing ICJ and ICTY review as examples).
283. See Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, S.C.
Res. 827, art. 21(4), U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (May 27, 1993); Statute of the International Crimi-
nal Tribunal for Rwanda, S.C. Res. 955, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955/Annex art. 20(4)(d) (Nov. 8,
1994).
284. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 14(3)(d), Dec. 16, 1966,
999 U.N.T.S. 171.
285. See S.C. Res. 1373, 1 (c), U.N. Doc. S/RES/1373 (Sept. 28, 2001) ("Freeze with-
out delay funds" (emphasis added)); S.C. Res. 1267, 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1267 (Oct. 15,
1999) ("Demands that the Taliban turn over Usama bin Laden without further delay" (empha-
[Vol. 29:197
Dionysian Disarmament
been improved. Such an improvement is likely due to the pressure that
European Union Member States and Switzerland placed on the Security
Council to establish a delisting process for those who found themselves
on the lists of terrorists maintained by the 1267 Committee;2  a delisting
procedure was not included in Resolution 1526 but eventually was in-
cluded in Resolution 1730.287 Despite this evidence of consciousness of
due process safeguards, alleged violations of WMD obligations by such
States as Iran and North Korea are not likely to inspire the Security
Council to protect their due process rights in the same way as individuals
before the international criminal tribunals or on Security Council com-
mittee terrorist lists.
As with Iraq's alleged WMD in 2002, there was no meaningful ex-
amination of the evidence that U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell
presented to the Security Council during a special meeting on February
5, 2003. Secretary Powell presented the U.S. case for invading Iraq to
other foreign ministers for over an hour, and the other foreign ministers
merely read their prepared speeches after Secretary Powell had finished
his presentation. 288 Where such sensitive topics as WMD and the possi-
bility of invading another State that allegedly possesses such weapons is
involved, one would hope that the standard of proof would be suffi-
ciently high in order to avoid reliance on questionable evidence to make
such a key determination. Perhaps clear and convincing evidence would
be the most appropriate standard in cases in which military action is
threatened, while non-military sanctions might be authorized on a lesser
standard, such as a preponderance of the evidence 89 Possible reliance on
sis added)); see also S.C. Res. 1526, 1(a), U.N. Doc. S[RES/1526 (Jan. 30, 2004) ("Freeze
without delay funds" (emphasis added)).
286. Richard Ryan, Permanent Representative of Ireland to the United Nations, State-
ment on Behalf of European Union, U.N. SCOR, 59th Sess., 4892nd mtg. at 23-24, U.N. Doc.
SIPV.4892 (Jan. 14, 2004); Pierre HeIg, Deputy Permanent Representative of Switzerland to
the United Nations, id. at 28.
287. See S.C. Res. 1526, supra note 285; S.C. Res. 1730, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1730/Annex
(Dec. 19, 2006). These procedures appear to have been modelled after the delisting procedures
established by the Resolution 1267 Committee in November 2006, in which the entity on the
list can petition its government of residence or citizenship to review the case. That government
then approaches the government that initially put the entity on the list in order to consider the
justifications for removal. Either government can request that the Committee remove the en-
tity from the list, which can occur by consensus of the Committee members or by a decision
of the Security Council. See Security Council 1267 Committee, Guidelines of the Security
Council Committee Established Pursuant to Resolution 1267 (1999) for the Conduct of its
Work, Nov. 7, 2002, as amended Nov. 29, 2006, at 7, available at http://www.un.org/
Docs/sc/committees/1267/1267_guidelines.pdf (last visited July 28, 2007). However, Resolu-
tion 1730 also provides listed entities the possibility of submitting delisting requests through
the U.N. Secretariat. See S.C. Res. 1730, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1730/Annex (Dec. 19,2006).
288. Mfiller, supra note 54, at 128.
289. Karel Wellens, The UN Security Council and New Threats to the Peace: Back to the
Future, 8 J. CONFLICT & SECURITY L. 15, 23 (2004).
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classified information provided by national intelligence services further
exacerbates the hypothetical problem of the Security Council meeting
290evidentiary standards. Perhaps the Security Council might want to es-
tablish some procedural rules for admitting evidence under its powers
provided by Article 30. For example, the Security Council might allow
evidence from treaty bodies, but require certain corroboration of evi-
dence provided by national intelligence networks,29' at least where
military actions are proposed. In addition, a procedure of advocacy
might also be useful where one State would act as impartial prosecutor
and the other as defense counsel, which is largely what already happens
informally, and with the target State having a right to participate in the
deliberations.292 The Security Council might also place considerable
weight on determining a target State's intent, much like a criminal judge
or jury would be asked to do, which could be done by calling in an ex-
pert group to assess the evidence and by calling neighboring States as
witnesses.2 93 With all of this information, the Security Council would be
in the best position to craft its response specifically to the intents of the
target State and the magnitude of the threat.
While the Security Council is a political body and not a court of law,
and could conceivably act without any significant evidence as support,29
such a baseless action would forfeit whatever legitimacy the Security
Council has if such arbitrariness were to be made public. As Inger
Osterdahl notes,
It is not illegal on the part of the Security Council to be arbitrary,
but if it becomes apparent that its choice of situations in which
to intervene is arbitrary, both in the sense that some situations
are intervened in but not others presenting the same characteris-
tics, and that the situations in which the Council does intervene
are very different from one another and the Council does not
convincingly or consistently show in its resolutions why it inter-
venes in these situations, or precisely what makes these
situations worthy of Security Council consideration, then the de-
290. SIMON CHESTERMAN, SHARED SECRETS: INTELLIGENCE AND COLLECTIVE SECU-
RITY 47-54 (2006).
291. MUller, supra note 54, at 133.
292. Id.
293. Id. at 121, 133-34.
294. See Gowlland-Debbas, supra note 10, at 364 (asserting that "the violation [of inter-
national law] becom[es] therefore a constitutent element of the threat to, or breach of, the
peace"). However, a violation of international law is not necessarily needed for the Security
Council to find a threat to the peace.
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cisions and the possible follow-up action of the Security Council
risk losing a large measure of legitimacy.2-
By adding these types of due process safeguards, the Security Council
would run less of a risk of relying on incorrect evidence and losing its
legitimacy, as could have occurred had it authorized the use of force in
Resolution 1441 based on Secretary Powell's presentation of U.S. evi-
dence for going to war with Iraq.
e. Imposing Treaty Obligations
Finally, there is the legal question of whether Resolution 687 im-
posed treaty obligations on Iraq. Paragraph 7 of Resolution 687 invited
Iraq to ratify the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC),296 as well as to
reaffirm its obligations under the 1925 Geneva Gas Protocol and the
NPT.2 97 The reaffirmation of Iraq's obligations under the 1925 Geneva
Gas Protocol and the NPT could rise to the level of coercive disarma-
ment measures, though this question already has been addressed in
Section II(c)(1) above. This Section focuses on the invitation to Iraq to
ratify the BWC, and whether this creates any legal obligations.
The problematic part of this provision is the word "invites," which
does not constitute the imposition of a legally binding obligation. Some
commentators disagree. Max Hilaire sees this particular provision of
Resolution 687 as "forc[ing] Iraq to comply with its international treaty
obligations, some of which the Iraqi parliament had not ratified,"298
namely, those international treaty obligations in the BWC. Thomas
Franck likewise concludes that Resolution 687 "oblig[es] Iraq, even as a
non-party, to comply with the [Biological Weapon] Convention's norms,
arguably because they have become customary international law, and
because the intent to comply in future [sic] can best be attested by ratifi-
cation."299To interpret "invites" as "requires" seems a stretch, at least
from a textual perspective. If this was the case, and Resolution 687 re-
quired Iraq to join the BWC, Iraq might try to argue that its ratification is
void on account of Security Council coercion. Iraq never has claimed
this, even though the Saddam Hussein regime proved to be non-
compliant with virtually every other disarmament obligation it had.
295. INGER OSTERDAHL, THREAT TO THE PEACE: THE INTERPRETATION BY THE SECU-
RITY COUNCIL OF ARTICLE 39 OF THE UN CHARTER 103-10 (1998).
296. Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of
Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction (BWC), Apr. 10,
1972, 26.1 U.S.T. 583, 1015 U.N.T.S. 163.
297. S.C. Res. 687, supra note 60, 7, 1I.
298. See HILAIRE, supra note 204, at 216.
299. THOMAS M. FRANCK, FAIRNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INSTITUTIONS 233
(1995).
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Alternatively, perhaps Saddam Hussein had good legal advice that such
an argument would not be successful, since Article 52 of the Vienna
Convention, which states that coercion of a State by the threat or use of
force releases the coerced State from its obligation, has an exception for
the threat or use of force that is not prohibited by the U.N. Charter,
namely, the threat or use of force flowing from the Security Council,
Some commentators assert that Resolution 687 altered Iraq's treaty
rights under the NPT. NPT Article IV(l) acknowledges the "inalienable
right of all the Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and
use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and
in conformity with articles I and II of this Treaty."3'' NPT Article IV(2)
allows States parties "to facilitate, and have the right to participate in, the
fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and
technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.
' 30'
Dorinda Dallmeyer asserts that the Security Council did not allow such
civilian use when it adopted Resolution 687 due to the distrust Iraq cre-
ated by developing a nuclear weapons program while party to the NPT.
0 2
However, paragraph 12 of Resolution 687 only requires Iraq "not to ac-
quire or develop nuclear weapons or nuclear-weapon-usable material or
any subsystems or components or any research, development, support or
manufacturing facilities related to the above ... ."'0' In support of the
idea that Iraq was still free to develop nuclear energy for peaceful pur-
poses, paragraph 13 of Resoution 687 calls for the IAEA Director-
General, through the U.N. Secretary-General and UNSCOM, to come up
with a plan to monitor and verify Iraq's compliance with the nuclear as-
pects of this resolution "including an inventory of all nuclear material in
Iraq subject to the Agency's verification and inspections to confirm that
Agency safeguards cover all relevant nuclear activities in Iraq .... "'0'
That same paragraph referred to Iraq's "rights and obligations" under the
NPT.3°5 The Security Council likely would not have used this language if
it were simultaneously stripping Iraq of its ability to develop its peaceful
use of nuclear energy, even though there admittedly is a fine line be-
tween developing nuclear energy for peaceful and for aggressive
purposes.6 Instead of Resolution 687, paragraph 3(f) of Resolution 707
interfered with Iraq's NPT rights to develop nuclear energy for peaceful
300. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, supra note 56, art. IV(I).
301. Id. art. IV(2).
302. Dallmeyer, supra note 188, at 136.
303. S.C. Res. 687, supra note 60, 12.
304. Id. 13.
305. Id.
306. See THAKUR, supra note 3, at 172 ("For nuclear energy for peaceful purposes can
be pursued legitimately to the point of being a screwdriver away from a weapons capability.").
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purposes, because it required Iraq to "[h]alt all nuclear activities of any
kind, except for use of isotopes for medical, agricultural or industrial
purposes, until the Council determines that Iraq is in full compliance
with the present resolution and with paragraphs 12 and 13 of Resolution
687 (1991) and the Agency determines that Iraq is in full compliance
with its safeguards agreement with the Agency. 30" Therefore, it is
true that the Security Council coercively removed Iraq's NPT right to
develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. Not only this, but para-
graph 4 of Resolution 707 also divested Iraq of its ownership rights in
the WMD and WMD-related materials that UNSCOM "destroyed, re-
moved, or rendered harmless," which property conceivably had a value
of many millions of dollars. °8 Under U.N. Charter Article 103, the Secu-
rity Council has the power to divest States of such treaty-based and
contract-based rights, in addition to overriding all other conflicting obli-
gations.
E. India, Pakistan, and Resolution 1172
India and Pakistan have had nuclear ambitions since the 1960s, when
China was developing its nuclear weapons. India appears to have tested a
nuclear device in 1974 in what some refer to as the "Smiling Buddha"
tests in the Rajasthan Desert, °9 which led Pakistan to begin its nuclear
development program. Pakistan tested an intermediate-range nuclear
missile in April 1998 that it had named after a twelfth-century Muslim
warrior responsible for having conquered a part of India, which
prompted India to conduct five underground nuclear tests the following
month.30 Pakistan responded with five nuclear tests of its own just two
weeks later.3 ' Pakistan's provocation in 1998 is somewhat surprising,
given that Pakistan prided itself on being a leader in WMD non-
proliferation issues in South Asia before it tested its nuclear device in
1998,32 and even asserted that it offered a bilateral test ban with India
that India rejected,"' only to change its approach when it appeared that
307. S.C. Res. 707, supra note 220, 3(f).
308. Id. 4.




312. See Letter from Ahmad Kamal, Permanent Representative of Pakistan to the
United Nations, to the Secretary-General, United Nations (May 29, 1998), at 2, U.N. Doc.
A/52/920 (June 1, 1998), http://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N98/150/83/pdf/
N98 15083.pdf?OpenElement.
313. Letter from Ahmad Kamal, Permanent Representative of Pakistan to the United
Nations, to the Secretary-General, United Nations (July 2, 1998), at 8, U.N. Doc.
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the testing of its own nuclear devices was needed in order to defend it-
self and to deter aggression.3
India and Pakistan's nuclear tests in 1998 took most of the world by
surprise. Prophetically, before India's nuclear tests in 1996, Thakur
pointed out that "[flaced with U.S.-led United Nations coercion, an iso-
lated, sullen, and resentful India is more.likely to respond with an open
nuclear programme, including a... series of nuclear tests.,,3 5 The initial
response from the Security Council was a statement by its President,
reiterating the special statement that had been made by all Security
Council member heads of State on January 31, 1992, that the "prolifera-
tion of all weapons of mass destruction constitutes a threat to
international peace and security.' 316 Resolution 1172 was adopted three
weeks later, on June 6, 1998, and not only "[c]ondemn[ed] the nuclear
tests,' 3 7 but also "[d]emand[ed] that India and Pakistan refrain from fur-
ther nuclear tests. .. Interestingly, the Foreign Ministers of the
permanent members of the Security Council apparently "called on both
countries to refrain from carrying out new nuclear tests" and "appealed
to [them] to adhere to the Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and to the Treaty on
the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons" on June 4, 1998.3"9 There-
fore, in the intervening two days before the resolution was adopted on
June 6, somehow the statement rose to the level of a demand, which re-
flects a clear imposition of obligations on India and Pakistan.
Particularly relevant is that neither India nor Pakistan had committed
to the CTBT, so the Security Council imposed one element of that treaty
on these States. One element is in CTBT Article I, which requires State
parties "not to carry out any nuclear weapon test explosion or any other
nuclear explosion, and to prohibit and prevent any such nuclear explo-
S/1998/605 (July 6, 1998), http://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N98/194/01/
img/N9819401 .pdf?OpenElement.
314. See Letter from Ahmad Kamal, Permanent Representative of Pakistan to the United
Nations, to the Secretary-General, United Nations (May 29, 1998), supra note 312, at 2.
315. Ramesh Thakur, Nuclear India Needs Coaxing, Not Coercion, AuSTL., Sept. 6,
1996, quoted in THAKUR, supra note 3, at 163.
316. Provisional Verbatim Record of the Three Thousand and Forty-Sixth Meeting, U.N.
SCOR 47th Sess., 3046th mtg. at 145, U.N. Doc. S/PV.3046 (Jan. 31 1992).
317. S.C. Res. 1172, supra note 63, 1.
318. Id. 3.
319. U.N. SCOR, 53d Sess., 3890th mtg. at 5, U.N. Doc. S/PV.3890 (June 6, 1998)
[hereinafter U.N. Doc. S/PV.3890]; Letter dated 5 June 1998 from the Permanent Representa-
tives of China, France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britian and
Northern Ireland and the United States of America to the United Nations to the President of
the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/1998/473 (June 5, 1998) ("India and Pakistan should there-
fore stop all further such tests.... To reinforce security and stability in the region and more
widely, the Five strongly believe that India and Pakistan should adhere to the [CTBT] imme-
diately and unconditionally, thereby facilitating its early entry into force.").
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sion at any place under its jurisdiction or control."32 Slovenia-one of
the four sponsors of the draft resolution that became Resolution 1172-
acknowledged that India and Pakistan "legitimately argue[d] that they
ha[d] not violated any of their treaty obligations," which made it neces-
sary for the Security Council to create an obligation that India and
Pakistan refrain from future nuclear testing, so that they legally could be
held responsible if they were to continue their testing.32' In light of this
statement, at least one sponsor of the Resolution 1172 saw this resolu-
tion as expressly creating treaty-type obligations for India and Pakistan.
Notably, the Security Council did not impose the entirety of the CTBT
on India and Pakistan, as was done by Resolution 1737 in requiring
North Korea to abide by the NPT. Nevertheless, Resolution 1172 clearly
imposed a portion of the CTBT on both India and Pakistan. The ultimate
result was not that India and Pakistan joined the CTBT or NPT, as some
States had hoped. 22 Instead, India and Pakistan both declared a morato-
rium on nuclear tests,323 which essentially gave effect to the requirement
imposed by paragraph 3. India apparently expressed its willingness to
convert this so-called unilateral moratorium into a formal obligation,324
although India was too late for that, since Resolution 1172 already had
done so.
Paragraph 7 of Resolution 1172 imposes an obligation less formally
on India and Pakistan. The Security Council
[c]all[ed] upon India and Pakistan immediately to stop their nu-
clear weapon development programmes, to refrain from
weaponization or from the deployment of nuclear weapons, to
cease development of ballistic missiles capable of delivering nu-
clear weapons and any further production of fissile material for
nuclear weapons, to confirm their policies not to export equip-
ment, materials or technology that could contribute to weapons
of mass destruction or missiles capable of delivering them and to
undertake appropriate commitments in that regard.... 323
This provision imposes more than just some of the CTBT and NPT
commitments on States not party to these treaties, and also limits their
ability to develop certain ballistic missiles and to engage in certain types
320. Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, supra note 62, art. I, $ 1.
321. U.N. Doc. SIPV.3890, supra note 319, at 6.
322. See id. at 3, 9, 13.
323. The Secretary-General, Letter dated 8 July 1998 from the Secretary-General ad-
dressed to the President of the Security Council, % 7, U.N. Doc. S/1998/619 (July 9, 1998).
324. Id.; The Permanent Representative of India to the United Nations, Letter dated 9
June 1998 from the Permanent Representative of India to the United Nations addressed to the
President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/1998/489 (June 10, 1998).
325. S.C. Res. 1172, supra note 63, % 7.
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of trade. Neither India nor Pakistan had entered treaties that impose
these obligations on them, so this resolution imposes new disarmament
and arms control limitations on these two States.
To come to the conclusion that paragraph 7 imposes obligations on
India and Pakistan, it is necessary to recall the analysis of "calls upon"
provided in Section III(B) above. Despite the theoretical generalizations
there, States ascribed varying levels of significance to this signal during
the debates on Resolution 1172. On one end of the spectrum, China saw
Resolution 1172 as demanding "in explicit terms" that India and Paki-
stan adhere to the CTBT and the NPT, 26 not just to the provision of the
CTBT that prohibits nuclear testing, thus indicating that China sees the
language "calls upon" in paragraph 7 as imposing a binding obligation.
At the other end of that spectrum, Costa Rica saw Resolution 1172 as "a
vehement and vigorous appeal to India and Pakistan to cease immedi-
ately the development of nuclear weapons and, as soon as possible, to
accede unconditionally to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty." '327 Use of the
word "appeal" indicates that the "calls upon" language of Resolution
1172 does not contain coercive measures. Just like Japan, Brazil, and the
European Union,328 Costa Rica's statement reflects the idea that Resolu-
tion 1172 was designed to push India and Pakistan into joining the
CTBT and the NPT.329 Others that fall between these two ends show
signs of confusion. France, for example, asserts that India and Pakistan
"must also display restraint and demonstrate, by acting in according with
the Security Council's requests, their willingness to commit themselves
to this path [of peace by giving up their nuclear weapon development
programmes], '30 thus reflecting a slight paradox that India and Pakistan
are bound to exercise their choice in a particular manner, which makes
little sense. One could interpret the U.S. statement as reflecting a belief
that these provisions were merely recommendatory. It stated that the in-
tent was to "convince them it is in their own national security interests to
do what the international community is urging them to do," which was to
sign and ratify the CTBT immediately and without conditions.3 ' How-
ever, Resolution 1172 is not being construed here to imply an obligation
326. U.N. Doc. S/PV.3890, supra note 319, at 12.
327. Id. at 7 (emphasis added).
328. Id. at 3 (reporting that Japan hoped that the imposition of this obligation on India
and Pakistan under the Security Council resolution would "urge them to become parties to the
NPT and the CTBT without delay and without conditions"); see also id. at 9 (reporting that
Brazil called for India and Pakistan to join the CTBT); id. at 13 (noting that the European
Union, through the United Kingdom, urged India and Pakistan to join the CTBT).
329. Id. at 7.
330. Id. at II (emphasis added).
331. Id. at 8.
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to join the CTBT, but rather as to impose certain CTBT and NPT provi-
sions on India and Pakistan without them being members of the CTBT
or the NPT, but with the ultimate, implicit hope that they would join the
CTBT and the NPT.
Perhaps even more interesting than the imposition of the obligations
in paragraph 7, the second half of paragraph 3 of Resolution 1172 im-
posed obligations on all States that were of the same nature as those
imposed on India and Pakistan in the first half of that paragraph.332 In-
deed, the second half of paragraph 3 "in this context calls upon all States
not to carry out any nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear
explosion in accordance with the provisions of the Comprehensive Nu-
clear Test Ban Treaty." 3 3 This provision arguably imposes obligations on
all States to abide by Article I of the CTBT, which requires State parties
"not to carry out any nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear
explosion ... Just as some States had hoped that the imposition of
the CTBT obligations on India and Pakistan would lead them to join the
CTBT, there is some evidence in the verbatim record that at least France
hoped that the imposition of an obligation on all States to refrain from
testing their nuclear weapons would lead to them joining the CTBT
"without delay and without conditions." '335 Gambia was another State that
supported this resolution because it "reiterate[ed] its firm conviction that
nuclear disarmament is an obligation of all States without exception.
336
The same was true for Slovenia, which emphasized the "importance of
universal adherence to the NPT and the CTBT, which are essential foun-
dations for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament. 33 Such language in the
resolution likely was a concession that the permanent members of the
Security Council had to give during their canvassing efforts to secure the
support needed to adopt this resolution.
Before discussing the particular language in Resolution 1172, how-
ever, it is important to note one general Security Council policy that
Resolution 1172 seemed to establish. During the debates on Resolution
1 172, Costa Rica asserted that, with this resolution condemning India's
and Pakistan's tests, the Security Council established a "substantive pol-
icy of condemning test explosions of nuclear weapons as well as any
other type of nuclear explosion, in accordance with the provisions of the
332. S.C. Res. 1172, supra note 63, 3.
333. Id.
334. Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, supra note 62, art. 1.
335. U.N. Doc. SIPV.3890, supra note 319, at 10. Interestingly, France has signed but
not yet ratified the CTBT.
336. Id.
337. Id. at 6.
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Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.""33 Such a policy would com-
plement the policy that all WMD proliferation issues create a threat to
international peace and security, as was first established by the 1992
statement of the President of the Security Council3 39 and reaffirmed by
the first preambular paragraph of Resolution 1540.' 40 The response of the
Security Council to Iran and North Korea in 2006 emphasizes the verac-
ity of Costa Rica's assertion. This policy does not absolve the need for
the Security Council to weigh the facts on a case-by-case basis before
condemning such tests, or otherwise establish a default rule that Security
Council members can rely on in condemning future actions. Neverthe-
less, States that plan on testing nuclear weapons can expect a strong
condemnation from the Security Council, unless the State is a permanent
member of the Security Council, in which case the condemnation will
have to come in the form of international public opinion. This is exactly
what France experienced in 1973, when it tested its nuclear weapons in
the South Pacific, until it agreed to move its testing underground, and
again when French President Jacques Chirac announced in 1995 that
France would yet again test its nuclear weapons in the South Pacific. Al-
though there have not been overt nuclear tests since 1998, the Security
Council's strength in condemning the recent activities of Iran and North
Korea indicate that this policy likely still remains, and perhaps even in
an intensified form.
The main legal issue arising from this resolution-apart from the le-
gal significance of "calls upon"--deals with the ability of the Security
Council to impose treaty-based obligations on all States. The CTBT has
not even entered into force for those States that have signed and ratified
it, yet the Security Council is imposing the substance of its provisions on
States nonetheless. The principal question is whether this resolution ac-
tually imposes obligations on all States, assuming that "calls upon"
reflects a decision of the Security Council, as asserted in Section Ill(B)
above. In particular, does "in this context" in paragraph 3 qualify this
Security Council decision to the point that it has little meaning outside of
India's and Pakistan's tests? If this were the case, it essentially would
read all meaning out of the requirement that all States refrain from carry-
ing out nuclear tests, since only India and Pakistan had independently
tested nuclear devices in 1998. Therefore, this interpretation would not
seem appropriate.
338. Id. at 7.
339. The President of the Security Council, Note by the President of the Security Coun-
cil, U.N. Doc. S/23500 (Jan. 31, 2992).
340. S.C. Res. 1540, supra note 64, pmbl. T 1.
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To summarize, Resolution 1172 requires all States to comply with
Article I of the CTBT. This language marks the beginning of a universal-
ism movement for disarmament and arms control law, where all States-
even non-parties to disarmament and arms control treaties-have had
disarmament and arms control obligations placed on them by the Secu-
rity Council. The resolutions dealing with North Korea and Iran
strengthen this general trend as well.
F. North Korea and Resolutions 1695 and 1718
This Section, addressing North Korea, is important for several rea-
sons, including providing further evidence of the Security Council's
pattern of imposing treaty obligations on States that violate WMD norms
and of the pattern of emphasizing enforcement of these norms as op-
posed to mere regulation. 4' In addition, this Section demonstrates a new
willingness of the Security Council to impose obligations on States that
have-or are believed to have-nuclear weapons. This is significant be-
cause some commentators saw the Security Council as being rarely
involved in disarmament and arms control issues, and, when it did get
involved, as too weak on cases of alleged non-compliance, such as in
1993 when the Security Council left resolution of North Korea's attempt
to leave the NPT to bilateral negotiations led by the United States. 1 2
Moreover, before the resolutions against North Korea that are discussed
in this Section were adopted, commentators thought that the different
priorities of the permanent members of the Security Council concerning
disarmament and non-proliferation would make it difficult for the Secu-
rity Council to take action against States protected by a so-called veto
umbrella of a permanent member.343 However, as with the measures
taken against North Korea that are discussed in this Section, the perma-
nent members of the Security Council-especially China-have shown a
surprising willingness to reassess alliances and take coercive measures
against former client-States when WMD issues are involved.
341. See supra text accompanying note 261.
342. MUller, supra note 54, at 127, 129; Berhanykun Andemicael, Nuclear Verification in
North Korea and Iran, in SWORDS INTO PLOWSHARES: BUILDING PEACE THROUGH THE
UNITED NATIONS 123, 131 (Roy S. Lee ed., 2006).
343. Kono, supra note 177, at 106; see also MUller, supra note 54, at 129 ("Politics and
national idiosyncrasies repeatedly got in the way of fair and appropriate decision-making on
WMD non-compliance."); THAKUR, supra note 3, at 168 ("Pyongyang has yet to face any
consequences for its serial brinksmanship, hiding safely behind P5 disagreement on any ap-
propriate policy response.").
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North Korea has had a long and shaky relationship with the rest of
the international community when it comes to its WMD activities."' The
primary legal issue that the international community struggles with is
whether North Korea can leave the NPT regime. NPT Article X(1) pro-
vides States with the ability to withdraw from the NPT:
Each Party shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the
right to withdraw from the Treaty if it decides that extraordinary
events, related to the subject matter of this Treaty, have jeopard-
ized the supreme interests of its country. It shall give notice of
such withdrawal to all other Parties to the Treaty and to the
United Nations Security Council three months in advance. Such
notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events it re-
gards as having jeopardized its supreme interests.345
North Korea agreed to a Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA in 1992,
apparently in response to the U.S. removal of its tactical nuclear weap-
ons from South Korea.346 Article 26 of that Safeguards Agreement states
the following: "This Agreement shall remain in force as long as the De-
mocratic People's Republic of Korea is party to [the NPT]. '347 In light of
these two provisions, North Korea's obligations would cease if it ever
withdrew from the NPT. The following paragraphs discuss the difficul-
ties that have arisen over North Korea's efforts to withdraw.
North Korea began its efforts to develop peaceful nuclear energy in
the 1980s with Soviet assistance, which led North Korea to join the NPT
in 1985.4 North Korea allowed six inspections of its nuclear facilities
before denying access to two facilities based on the assertion that they
were conventional military facilities. Suspicions quickly arose over
North Korea's production of plutonium due to the fact that the IAEA
found an inconsistency between what it reported and what the IAEA
found in an analysis of North Korea's nuclear waste.350 Resenting the
344. Most recently, newspapers have alleged that North Korea has shared its nuclear
knowledge with Iran. See N. Korea denies sharing nuke secrets with Iran, CNN.coM, Jan. 27,
2007, http://www.cnn.com/2007/WORLD/asiapcf/01/27/koreas.nuclear/index.html.
345. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, supra note 56, art. X(l).
346. Andemicael, supra note 342, at 127.
347. Agreement of 30 January 1992 between the Government of the Democratic Peo-
ple's Republic of Korea and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of
Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons art.
26, INFCIRC/403 (May 1992).
348. Andemicael, supra note 342, at 127.
349. See, e.g., U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3212 mtg. at 53, U.N. Doc. S/PV.3212 (May 11,
1993) (noting that the United Kingdom mentioned these inspections) [hereinafter U.N. Doc.
S/PV.3212]; John F. Murphy, Force and Arms, in I UNITED NATIONS LEGAL ORDER 247, 314-
15 (Oscar Schachter & Christopher Joyner eds., 1995).
350. Andemicael, supra note 342, at 127.
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allegations of wrong-doing, North Korea announced its withdrawal from
the NPT on March 12, 1993."5' The IAEA Board of Governors referred
North Korea to the Security Council on April 1, 1993, according to
IAEA Statute Article XII(c), after the Board had determined that North
Korea was in violation of its safeguards agreement with the IAEA.3 '
Meanwhile, the depositories of the NPT-Russia, the United States, and
the United Kingdom-challenged North Korea's reasons for with-
drawal,"' while the Security Council refrained from challenging these
reasons.3_5 Instead, the Security Council "call[ed] upon [North Korea] to
honour its non-proliferation obligations under the Treaty and comply
with its safeguards agreement with the IAEA as specified by the IAEA
Board of Governors' resolution of 25 February 1993."0" Given the analy-
sis of "calls upon" provided in Section III(B) above, this is not an
insignificant measure that the Security Council took in imposing the ob-
356ligations of the NPT and the safeguards agreement on North Korea. In
fact, the United Kingdom even asserted that North Korea remains bound
by its safeguards agreement despite its attempts to withdraw from the
NPT."7 Although North Korea claimed in the Security Council debates
that it had acted legally by withdrawing from the NPT,3 8 the members of
the Security Council were clearly of a different opinion.359
On the day before the ninety-day notification period was to expire
under NPT Article X(1), 360 North Korea suspended its withdrawal after
the United States and North Korea agreed on the points that would later
become the U.S.-North Korea Agreed Framework, in which North Korea
committed to freeze its nuclear reactors and reprocessing plants in ex-
change for needed economic assistance, including two nuclear reactors
that did not pose a threat to WMD proliferation and fuel oil pending the
construction of those reactors.36' In the years following this agreement,
351. See generally DEN DEKKER, supra note 21, at 298.
352. Murphy, supra note 349, at 315.
353. See, e.g., U.N. Doc. S/PV.3212, supra note 349, at 54.
354. S.C. Res. 825, supra note 61, pmbl. 7 (noting, however, that the depositories chal-
lenged North Korea's stated reasons for withdrawing from the NPT); see also MUller, supra
note 54, at 127 (noting that certain permanent members likely were reluctant to challenge
North Korea's reasons for withdrawing because they did not want to establish a precedent and
later be challenged when they themselves decide to withdraw from a treaty).
355. S.C. Res. 825, supra note 61, 2.
356. But see SUTTERLIN, supra note 2, at 107 (asserting that Resolution 825 contained
only "admonitory" language).
357. Provisional Verbatim Record, supra note 349, at 54.
358. See, e.g., id. at 7, 36.
359. See generally id.
360. Douglas Jehl, North Korea Says It Won't Pull Out of Arms Pact Now, N.Y. TIMES,
June 12, 1993, atA11.
361. See, e.g., Carle, supra note 28.
Winter 2008)
Michigan Journal of International Law
the United States failed to provide all of the promised assistance and
continued to criticize North Korea. North Korea announced its with-
drawal from the NTP again in 2003, though this time it declared "an
automatic and immediate effectuation of its withdrawal from the NPT
36 2
Quite a debate has arisen over whether this withdrawal was valid be-
cause North Korea failed to wait the requisite ninety days after
notification.363 However, all of these commentators fail to remember that
North Korea simply had suspended its withdrawal from the NPT in
1993, thus suggesting that North Korea had waited more than the re-
quired time before officially withdrawing. 6
Regardless, there has been confusion in the Security Council over
whether North Korea had withdrawn from the NPT. In preambular para-
graph 10 of Resolution 1695, adopted in response to its test of ballistic
missiles capable of delivering its WMD and North Korea's withdrawal
from the NPT, the Security Council expressly "[d]eplor[ed] [North Ko-
rea's] announcement of withdrawal from the [NTP] and its stated pursuit
of nuclear weapons in spite of its treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons and [IAEA] safeguards obligations ... ,,365 Use of the word
"announcement" in "announcement of withdrawal" is interesting, as it
suggests a distinction from an actual withdrawal. Operative paragraph 6
of Resolution 1695 also strongly urged North Korea to "return at an
early date to the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and
International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards ... ."66 Operative para-
graphs trump preambular paragraphs, although one need not establish
the existence of hierarchy between these paragraphs, since Resolution
1718 clarified this issue just three months later, when it "[d]emand[ed]
362. North Korea: Statement On Pullout, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 11, 2003, at A7 ("Systemati-
cally violating the D.P.R.K.-U.S. Agreed Framework, the U.S. brought up another 'nuclear
suspicion' and stopped the supply of heavy oil, reducing the Agreed Framework to a dead
document.").
363. See, e.g., Christopher Le Mon, Did North Korea's Nuclear Test Violate Interna-
tional Law?, OPINIO JURIS, Oct. 9, 2006, http://www.opiniojuris.org/posts/ 160382356.shtml;
Frederic L. Kirgis, North Korea's Withdrawalfrom the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, ASIL
INSIGHTS, January 2003, available at http://www.asil.org/insights/insigh96.htm.
364. The purpose of this Section is not to assess the legality of North Korea's actions.
Although it is inappropriate to separate these two incidents, quite a few commentators see
North Korea's withdrawal efforts in 2003 in isolation from the 1993 withdrawal efforts. Thus
they would take issue with North Korea's allegedly faulty withdrawal in 2003 without the
requisite notification. See, e.g., PASCAL TEIXEIRA, THE SECURITY COUNCIL AT THE DAWN OF
THE 'TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY: To WHAT EXTENT IS IT WILLING AND ABLE TO MAINTAIN
INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY? 84 (United Nations Publication 2003); THAKUR,
supra note 3, at 171; SUTTERLIN, supra note 2, at 107.




further that [North Korea] return to the [NTP] and [IAEA] safe-
guards [.],,
367
Despite the question of whether North Korea validly left the NPT,
Resolution 1718 makes it clear that North Korea still has obligations un-
der the NPT. Resolution 1718 was adopted just five days after North
Korea detonated a one-kiloton nuclear device underground that regis-
tered a 4.2 on the Richter scale.36 Therefore, one gets a sense of greater
urgency when reading Resolution 1718 vis-a-vfs Resolution 1695. In
particular, operative paragraph 6 of Resolution 1718 obliges North Korea
to abide by the NPT and its Safeguards Agreement:
[The Security Council d]ecides that [North Korea] shall abandon
all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programmes in a com-
plete, verifiable, and irreversible manner, shall act strictly in
accordance with the obligations applicable to parties under the
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the
terms and conditions of its [IAEA] Safeguards Agreement.3 69
Not only did this resolution force North Korea back to the NPT and the
Safeguards Agreement, which, in theory, it previously had been allowed
to withdraw from, but the resolution extended North Korea's obligations
beyond the obligations it had under the NPT and the Safeguards Agree-
ment.
1. Imposing Treaty Obligations on North Korea
The main legal issue that arises here is the Security Council's ability
to impose treaty obligations on North Korea. The Security Council
seems to concede that North Korea successfully withdrew from the NPT.
Yet Resolution 1718 requires North Korea to return to the NPT, thus im-
posing an entire international treaty on a non-party (or former party) to
that treaty. Resolution 1718 also extends North Korea's obligations be-
yond the obligations it had had under the NPT and the Safeguards
Agreement in at least two ways. First, whereas States can withdraw from
treaties either according to specific treaty provisions, such as NPT Arti-
cle X, or according to VCLT Article 56, 370 no mechanism currently exists
for allowing withdrawal from Security Council resolutions, some of
which make North Korea's NPT obligations differ from the obligations
of other State parties to the NPT. Second, Resolution 1718 strips North
Korea of one of its so-called inalienable rights. Under NPT Article
367. S.C. Res. 1718, supra note 65, T 4.
368. David E. Sanger, North Korea Says It Tested a Nuclear Device Underground, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 9, 2006, atAl.
369. S.C. Res. 1718, supra note 65, T 6.
370. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 157, art. 56.
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IV(1), States have the "inalienable right" to "develop research, produc-
tion and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without
discrimination and in conformity with Articles I and II of this Treaty.
37'
At least three Security Council Chapter VII resolutions reaffirm this inal-
ienable right.372 The Security Council's references to these so-called
inalienable rights conceivably might even estop the Security Council
from changing its tune in the face of overwhelming pressure from key
Western States to essentially re-write NPT Article IV(l). However, para-
graph 6 of Resolution 1718, with its reference to "existing nuclear
programmes" as opposed to "existing nuclear-weapons programmes" or
its equivalent,373 makes it seem as though North Korea was required to
give up even its nuclear programs to develop nuclear energy for peaceful
purposes. Admittedly, this is not the first time that the Security Council
has stripped a State of its inalienable right to nuclear energy for peaceful
purposes, as it had done this with Iraq through Resolution 707.114 Admit-
tedly, there is a fine line between development for peaceful purposes and
development for aggressive purposes,3 75 and the Security Council has the
power to override conflicting treaty obligations under Article 103. None-
theless, this stripping of Iraq's ability to develop its nuclear energy for
peaceful purposes goes against what the Security Council has said on at
least three other occasions and as provided for in NPT Article IV.
2. Imposing Treaty Obligations on All States
The other aspect to notice about Resolution 1718 is that the Security
Council "underlines the need for all States Parties to the Treaty on the
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to continue to comply with their
Treaty obligations ... *,376 Although "underlines" is softer than "decides"
or "demands," it can nonetheless be read as constituting a Security
Council decision to be followed in accordance with Article 25. The Se-
curity Council's intent in that resolution is clear: to interfere with the
371. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, supra note 56, art. IV(l).
372. S.C. Res. 487, supra note 58, 4 ("[The Security Council flully recognizes the
inalienable sovereign right of Iraq and all other States, especially the developing countries, to
establish programmes of technological and nuclear development to develop their economy and
industry for peaceful purposes in accordance with their present and future needs and consis-
tent with the internationally accepted objectives of preventing nuclear-weapons
proliferation[.]"); S.C. Res. 1696, supra note 66, pmbl. 2 ("Reaffirming its commitment to
the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and recalling the right of States
Party, in conformity with Articles I and H of that Treaty, to develop research, production and
use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination[.]"); S.C. Res. 1737, supra
note 66, pmbl. 2.
373. S.C. Res. 1718, supra note 65, 6.
374. S.C. Res. 707, supra note 220, 3(f).
375. See THAKUR, supra note 3, at 172.
376. S.C. Res. 1718, supra note 65, 14 (emphasis added).
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ability of States to withdraw from the NPT in the future, thus modifying
the obligations of all parties to the treaty. While the U.N. Charter's broad
discretion to the Security Council in deciding what constitutes a threat to
the peace means that it can stop North Korea from leaving the NPT,377 it
is an entirely separate matter to interfere in the ability of all States to
withdraw from the NPT.
G. Iran and Resolutions 1696 and 1737
Unlike North Korea, Iran seems to have been in compliance with the
legal obligations created by the NPT and its Safeguards Agreement for
many years before acting in violation of them.37 Problems began to arise
in 2003 with what the IAEA called a general policy of concealment by
Iran.379 Iran's sudden change in 2003 could have flowed from its sense of
strategic vulnerability with significant U.S. forces surrounding it in Iraq
and Afghanistan and with India and Pakistan as nuclear neighbors, cou-
pled with U.S. support of Israel and the U.S. 2002 classification of Iran
as a member of the Axis of Evil along with North Korea and Iraq.380 Re-
gardless of Iran's reasoning, the Security Council imposed sanctions and
obligations on Iran as a result of its concerns over Iran's nuclear pro-
gram, which concerns arose from IAEA reports and resolutions that
raised these issues, including the fear of militarization of its nuclear pro-
gram."' Despite these fears, the IAEA has not alleged that Iran has
diverted nuclear material for a military purpose, that Iran has broken an
agreement concerning an IAEA project or that its acts constitute safety
or health violations, thus suggesting that the fears concerning Iran's ac-
382tivities might be exaggerated. Any one of these three factors can lead
to a referral by the IAEA Board of Governors to the Security Council
under IAEA Statute Article XII(c).383
Nonetheless, in Resolution 1696, the Security Council demanded
that Iran "suspend all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities,
377. Kirgis, supra note 363.
378. Andemicael, supra note 342, at 128-29.
379. See generally Steven E. Miller, Proliferation Gamesmanship: Iran and the Politics
of Nuclear Confrontation, 57 SYRACUSE L. REV. 551, 551-60 (2007) (discussing Iran's poor
behaviour since 2003).
380. Andemicael, supra note 342, at 128-29.
381. See S.C. Res. 1696, supra note 66. Some commentators complain that it took too
long for the Security Council to take action against Iran after the IAEA determined that Iran
had violated its Safeguards Agreement. See Muller, supra note 54, at 129. However, the Secu-
rity Council moves deliberately and carefully before imposing such disarmament and arms
control measures.
382. See generally Michael Spies, Iran and the Limits of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Regime, 22 AM. U. INT'L L. REv. 401, 424-35 (2007).
383. Statute of the International Atonomic Energy Agency art. XII(c), Oct. 26, 1956,
http://www.iaea.org/About/statute_text.html.
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including research and development, to be verified by the IAEA ... "'
There was general consensus among the permanent members of the Se-
curity Council that this provision created mandatory obligations for
Iran. 3" This imposition is a clear modification of Iran's rights and obliga-
tions under the Iran-IAEA Safeguards agreement, in particular Article
37, which allows Iran a certain amount of natural and depleted uranium
with a certain level of enrichment.386 In addition, NPT Article IV pro-
vides Iran with an inalienable right to develop its nuclear energy
capabilities for peaceful purposes, a right that Iran often has emphasized
but one that others have questioned due to the fact that Iran's large oil
reserves remove the credible civilian need for such development.387 Al-
though IAEA Statute Article III(B)(4) requires the IAEA to notify the
Security Council of activities that raise questions "within the compe-
tence of the Security Council,""38 it does not authorize the Security
Council to do anything more than this. Moreover, the IAEA's responses
to alleged violations are limited by Article XII, which do not include the
suspension of rights under Safeguard Agreements. Therefore, this would
appear to be an example of the Security Council modifying disarmament
obligations, which can be seen as equivalent to an imposition of new
disarmament treaty obligations, since it is done within the IAEA context.
Even more crucial language in Resolution 1696 is in paragraph 6, in
which the Security Council "call[ed] upon Iran to act in accordance with
the provisions of the Additional Protocol and to implement without delay
all transparency measures as the IAEA may request in support of its on-
going investigations. ' 38 9 Again, the legal significance of "calls upon"
discussed in Section III(B)(1) is relevant here. The conclusion that "calls
upon" creates binding obligations for the target State is even more per-
suasive here, where permanent members-most notably, Ambassador
Bolton of the United States and Ambassador Emyr Jones Parry of the
United Kingdom-asserted during debate on the resolution that these
384. S.C. Res. 1696, supra note 66, 2.
385. U.N. Doc. S/PV.5500, supra note 149, at 4-7; see also Letter dated 25 July 2006
from the Permanent Representative of France to the United Nations addressed to the President
of the Security Council, at 1-2, U.N. Doc. S/2006/572 (July 26, 2006) (noting that it was the
permanent members' purpose to impose such a mandatory obligation on Iran when it sought to
adopt a resolution in this case).
386. Agreement Between Iran and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Con-
nection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, art. 37, Dec. 13, 1974,
INFCIRC/214, available at http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/Others/
infcirc2l4.pdf.
387. Andemicael, supra note 342, at 126; see also U.N. Doc. S/PV.5612, supra note 149,
at 6 (providing France's Permanent Representative Jean-Marc De La Sabli~re's assertions on
this matter).
388. Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency, supra note 383, art. Ifl(B)(4).
389. S.C. Res. 1696, supra note 66, 1 6.
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provisions of Resolution 1696 that have the signal "calls upon" create
part of the mandatory obligations of that resolution.3'9 The United States
implied this same point with respect to the "calls upon" provisions of
Resolution 1737. 39' This particular provision of Resolution 1696 is inter-
esting because, while Iran joined the NPT in 1970 and agreed to a
Safeguards Agreement that entered into force on May 15, 1974, it signed
on December 18, 2003 but did not ratify an Additional Protocol with the
IAEA.392 Iran apparently signed it in response to U.S. allegations that it
was developing nuclear weapons, and it wanted to show that its "activi-
ties are peaceful., 393 This Additional Protocol would have allowed
unscheduled inspections of Iranian facilities, although the Protocol never
entered into force. While Iran followed the Additional Protocol starting
in 2003 and apparently allowed the IAEA considerable access under this
Additional Protocol in order to conduct robust inspections, over 2,000
inspector-days of scrutiny between then and 2006, it changed its mind
when the IAEA took up the issue of whether Iran had violated certain of
its international obligations at the beginning of 2006.395
Iran appears to have been allowed to reject the Additional Protocol
because it had not consented to the creation of any obligations under the
Additional Protocol by ratifying that legally binding instrument. Certain
obligations do arise after signing, as indicated in Article 18(a) of the
VCLT, including "refrain[ing] from acts which would defeat the object
390. U.N. Doc. S/PV.5500, supra note 149, at 3-4; id. at 4 (recording that the United
Kingdom asserts that Iran had an obligation to take the steps required by the IAEA, in accor-
dance with the provision of the Additional Protocol, before the August 31, 2006, deadline
established by Resolution 1696, 7, the obligation of which appears to have been established
by Resolution 1696, 1, which began with "calls upon").
391. U.N. Doc. S/PV.5612, supra note 149, at 2 (recording the United States' implication
that the provisions that start with the signal "calls upon" are among the requirements of this
draft resolution).
392. See International Atomic Energy Agency, Safeguards and Verification,
http://www.iaea.org/OurWork/SV/Safeguards/sg-protocol.html (last visited Jan. 27, 2007)
(listing the dates that certain States have signed and ratified Additional Protocols to their
IAEA Safeguards Agreements).
393. Iran Agrees to Nuclear Checks, CHINA DAILY, Dec. 19, 2003, at 1, available at
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/en/doc/2003-12/19/content 291677.htm; Iran To Agree To
Nuclear InspectiOn Protocol, WHITE HouSE BULL., Dec. 17, 2003, at 1.
394. U.N. Doc. S/PV.5500, supra note 149, at 9 (showing a statement by Iran that it
allowed "2,000 inspector-days of scrutiny over the past three years; the signing of the Addi-
tional Protocol on 18 December 2003 and its immediate implementation until 6 February
2006; the submission of more than 1,000 pages of declaration [sic] under the Additional Pro-
tocol; allowing over 53 instances of complementary access to different sites across the
country; and permitting inspectors to investigate baseless allegations by taking the unprece-
dented step of providing repeated access to military sites").
395. See Steven R. Weisman, Iran Hints at Compromise on Nuclear Inspections, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 18, 2006, at A3.
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and purpose of a treaty .... ,,396 However, this obligation continues "until
it shall have made its intention clear not to become a party to the treaty
.... The infamous U.S. "unsigning" of the Rome Statute demon-
strates that States can release themselves from this obligation once they
express that they have no intention of ratifying the instrument.18 Iran's
Parliament declared that it would not ratify the Additional Protocol in
2004.' 99 Despite this unwillingness, the United States has pushed for uni-
versal adherence to the principles reflected in the Additional Protocols,
regardless of ratification and the general need for consent under VCLT
Article 14. 4 Ironically, the United States has signed but not yet ratified
its own Additional Protocol with the IAEA.40 ' In addition, the IAEA
Board of Governors has been calling on Iran to follow the spirit of the
Additional Protocol since well before the adoption of these resolutions in
September 2003 .02
The Security Council called upon Iran to abide by the Additional
Protocol in paragraph 6 of Resolution 1696.403 While actual Additional
Protocols between the IAEA and NPT members are confidential and
vary between States, the IAEA adopted a model Additional Protocol on
May 15, 1997, which requires the State to provide certain nuclear-related
information under Articles 2 and 3, and to give access to certain sites
under conditions specified under Articles 4 and 5, inter alia.° This
analysis assumes that the IAEA-Iran Additional Protocol resembles the
Model Additional Protocol. The Security Council required Iran to carry
out all transparency measures the IAEA requested, which obligation is
contained in Article 2(c) of the Model Additional Protocol, which states,
"Upon request by the Agency, [the State] shall provide amplifications or
clarifications of any information it has provided under this Article, in so
396. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 157, art. 18.
397. Id. art. 18(a).
398. See generally Edward T. Swaine, Unsigning, 55 STAN. L. REv. 2061 (2003).
399. Nazila Fathi, Iran Rebuffs U.N. Agency On Atom Issue, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 20, 2004,
at A 15.
400. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 157, art. 14. But see, e.g.,
MARTTI KOSKENNIEMI, FROM APOLOGY TO UTOPIA: THE STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL
LEGAL ARGUMENT 270-91 (1989) (arguing against the need for consent for international obli-
gations to be established).
401. IAEA, Strengthened Safeguards System: Status of Additional Protocols,
http://www.iaea.org/OurWork/SV/Safeguards/sg-protocol.html (listing that the United States
signed its Additional Protocol on June 12, 1998, but that it has not yet entered into force,
which means that it has not yet been ratified).
402. Andemicael, supra note 342, at 132.
403. S.C. Res. 1696, supra note 66, 6.
404. Model Protocol Additional to the Agreement(s) Between State(s) and the Interna-
tional Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards (Additional Protocol), arts. 2-




far as relevant for the purpose of safeguards." 5 Again, Iran did not have
this obligation before, since it did not ratify its Additional Protocol and
the IAEA Statute does not provide the IAEA with such broad powers to
request this type of information. Indeed, the IAEA's safeguard powers
under Article XII of the IAEA Statute include the ability "to examine the
design of specialized equipment and facilities ... to require the obser-
vance of any health and safety measures ... to call for and receive
progress reports," and to obtain and verify the accounting a State pro-
vides of its fissionable materials. 4° None of the IAEA's enumerated
powers involves the ability to demand whatever transparency measures it
chooses. Granted, Article XII(c) allows the Board of Governors to "call
upon the recipient State or States to remedy forthwith any non-
compliance which it finds to have occuffed,"4 7 though this falls short of
having to provide all information the IAEA demands.
About five months later, the Security Council adopted Resolution
1737, this time under U.N. Charter Article 41 instead of under Article
40, under which Resolution 1696 had been adopted.408 Paragraph 2 of
Resolution 1737 repeated paragraph 2 of Resolution 1696, suspending
"all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, including research
and development," and added that Iran also must suspend "work on all
heavy water-related projects, including the construction of a research
reactor moderated by heavy water, also to be verified by the IAEA
...." 409These provisions clearly imposed binding disarmament and arms
control obligations on Iran, although these resolutions imposed other410
obligations as well. In particular, Resolution 1737 went beyond Reso-
lution 1696's requirement for Iran to abide by the Additional Protocol,
and instead "call[ed] upon Iran to ratify promptly the Additional Proto-
col. ' 41 ' As noted above, some permanent members of the Security
Council implied during the debate over this resolution that "calls upon"
provisions of Resolution 1737 make up part of the mandatory obliga-
tions that Resolution 1737 imposed on Iran.412
405. Id. art. 2(c).
406. Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency, supra note 383, arts. XII(I )-(4).
407. Id. art. XII(c).
408. S.C. Res. 1737, supra note 66.
409. Id. [2.
410. Id. Sixteen of Resolution 1737's twenty-five paragraphs begin with the signal
"[d]ecides" which is considerable in light of other Chapter VII resolutions. However, all ex-
cept paragraph 2 deal with obligations on all States to ensure that Iran lacks the materials and
other support needed to develop nuclear weapons.
411. Id.%8.
412. U.N. Doc. SIPV.5612, supra note 149, at 2 (reporting that the United States implied
that the provisions that start with the signal "calls upon" are among the requirements of this
draft resolution).
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The legal issues raised in Resolutions 1696 and 1737 are similar to
many of those raised in the other resolutions, especially the significance
of "calls upon" and the ability of the Security Council to impose treaty
obligations on States. In particular, that these resolutions require Iran to
abide by its Additional Protocol is similar to those resolutions requiring
North Korea to return to the NPT and its Safeguards Agreement obliga-
tions. Just as with those resolutions on North Korea, the permanent
members of the Security Council acted in this coercive manner not only
to maintain international peace and security but also to support the
IAEA's activities in this area.413 This stands as another example of the
extent to which the Security Council is willing to create new disarma-
ment- and arms-control-related obligations that somewhat resemble
treaty obligations, and not just an example of the Security Council trying
to get a State to comply with its already existing obligations, as some
commentators assert.414 In addition, it shows the Security Council's will-
ingness to act coercively in removing nuclear-weapon capabilities from
States, despite commentary to the contrary.4 5
H. WMD Terrorism and Resolution 1540
The last resolution to be discussed in this Part is Resolution 1540
and its impact on the Security Council's WMD counter-terrorism efforts.
The September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks intensified the international
community's attitude towards combatting international terrorism, and
marked the shift of international terrorism from an "issue of ongoing
concern" for the General Assembly to one that threatened international
peace and security sufficiently to engage the Security Council in a mean-
ingful way.4 6 The international community's intensity towards curbing
terrorism has overflowed into the international community's WMD
counter-proliferation efforts. The fear of the destruction that could result
if terrorists were to use such devastating weapons as WMD drives much
of the recent activity in multilateral WMD disarmament and arms control
measures. The link between WMD and terrorism was strengthened by
President George W. Bush's 2002 State of the Union address, in which
he combined the war against terrorism with a war against the members
of the "Axis of Evil," which he asserted might pass WMD on to terrorist
413. See, e.g., id. (reporting that Russia noted this as its "main thrust" in supporting
Resolution 1737).
414. Andemicael, supra note 342, at 123-24.
415. SUTTERLIN, supra note 2, at 101.
416. Young, supra note 144, at 34; Eric Rosand, Security Council Resolution 1373, The
Counter-Terrorism Committee, and the Fight Against Terrorism, 97 AM. J. INT'L L. 333, 333
(2003) (calling the Security Council's "deep involvement in the United Nation's counter-
terrorism effort" following September 11 a "new development").
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groups if they were allowed to develop their WMD capabilities. This link
was further strengthened in the 2002 National Security Strategy of the
United States.4" Not surprisingly, in 2004, the United Nations High-
Level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change (the High-Level Panel)
saw WMD terrorism as a major threat to the international community.18
For some commentators, the only solution in responding to the
heightened threat is for the Security Council to get involved in imposing
obligations on States to take certain measures to stop WMD from getting
into the hands of terrorists.419 These commentators assert that the terro-
rism-related conventions adopted before September 11 provide the legal
basis for action, although they do not state exactly what action should
occur in case of violation, which would be left up to the Security Coun-• 420
cil to decide. While it is true that these conventions are largely silent
on what measures are to be taken in case of violation, they are clear
about some of the preventive measures that states are to take prior to
such a violation. Indeed, nine-and arguably ten-of the twelve conven-
tions that deal with certain acts of terrorism before September 11 require
some form of criminalization by the State parties. This seems to be the
same approach that the Security Council has taken with Resolution 1540
in preventing WMD terrorism.
The threats coming from WMD terrorism are perceived to be so tre-
mendous that the Security Council had to impose obligations on States
to try to deal with that threat in Resolution 1540. The question becomes
whether these obligations constitute new obligations that are not covered
by the NPT, Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC),421 or BWC.422 The
literature indicates that the main purpose of Resolution 1540 is to apply
these treaties to non-parties in their entirety. In particular, some com-
mentators assert that Resolution 1540 extends the CWC and the BWC to• 423
cover all States that were not already party to these conventions. How-
ever, this interpretation of Resolution 1540 runs contrary to the plain
meaning of paragraph 5 of that resolution, which makes it clear that
417. See GRAY, supra note 137, at 176.
418. See Report of the Secretary-General's High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and
Change, A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility, at 19-21, 38-49, U.N. Doc.
A/59/565 (Dec. 2, 2004).
419. SUTTERLIN, supra note 2, at 108.
420. Id. at 110.
421. Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and
Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction (CWC), Jan. 13, 1993, 1974 U.N.TS. 45
(1997).
422. Even if the latter, this would not be insignificant in itself, in that it would add Arti-
cle 25 sanctions to the sanctions envisioned under the respective multilateral treaties. See
supra Section III(C).
423. Lisa Tabassi, A Note on UN Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004), 64 CBW
CONVENTIONS BULL. 12, 12-13 (June 2004).
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"none of the obligations set forth in this resolution shall be interpreted so
as to conflict with or alter the rights and obligations of State Parties to
the [NPT, CWC, and BWC] .' 424 In other words, Resolution 1540 does
not touch the NPT, CWC, or BWC either by modifying them or chang-
ing their membership, but rather adds to the obligations that States
already have-or do not have, in the case of non-parties to these trea-
ties-without these new obligations being treaty obligations per se. This
interpretation of paragraph 5 is emphasized by the reference in para-
graph 8(b), in which the Security Council "[c]alls upon all States ... [t]o
adopt national rules and regulations, where it has not yet been done, to
ensure compliance with their commitments under the [NPT, CWC, and
BWC] .,,425 Had Resolution 1540 extended the NPT, CWC and BWC
themselves to non-parties, then paragraph 8(b) more likely would have
replaced "their commitments" with "the commitments," because "their"
emphasizes that the particular commitments might be different for dif-
ferent States.
In terms of new obligations that Resolution 1540 imposes on States,
Resolution 1540 potentially creates at least three new obligations with its
emphasis on non-State actors, on States adopting legislation, and on pre-
venting trafficking and brokering. Paragraph 1 of Resolution 1540
requires all States to "refrain from providing any form of support to non-
State actors that attempt to develop, acquire, manufacture, possess,
transport, transfer or use nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and
their means of delivery ... ,,426 Paragraph 2 requires all States to "adopt
and enforce appropriate effective laws which prohibit any non-State ac-
tor to manufacture, acquire, possess, develop, transport, transfer or use
nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and their means of delivery, in
particular for terrorist purposes, as well as attempts to engage in any of
the foregoing activities, participate in them as an accomplice, assist or
finance them .... ,427 Paragraph 3 states that the Security Council
[d]ecide[d] also that all States shall take and enforce effective
measures to establish domestic controls to prevent the prolifera-
tion of nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons and their means
of delivery, including by establishing appropriate controls over
related materials and to this end shall:
a. Develop and maintain appropriate effective measures to ac-
count for and secure such items in production, use, storage or
transport;
424. S.C. Res. 1540, supra note 64, 5.





b. Develop and maintain appropriate effective physical protec-
tion measures;
c. Develop and maintain appropriate effective border controls
and law enforcement efforts to detect, deter, prevent and
combat, including through international cooperation when
necessary, the illicit trafficking and brokering in such items in
accordance with their national legal authorities and legislation
and consistent with international law;
d. Establish, develop, review and maintain appropriate effective
national export and trans-shipment controls over such items,
including appropriate laws and regulations to control export,
transit, trans-shipment and re-export and controls on provid-
ing funds and services related to such export and trans-
shipment such as financing, and transporting that would con-
tribute to proliferation, as well as establishing end-user
controls; and establishing and enforcing appropriate criminal
or civil penalties for violations of such export control laws
428and regulations ....
The following three Sections compare these three paragraphs with the
provisions of the NPT, BWC, and CWC, with an eye towards determin-
ing whether Resolution 1540 creates any new obligations. In short, there
are three types of obligations that Resolution 1540 imposes on all States:
an emphasis on non-State actors, an obligation to adopt legislation, and
the requirement that all States incorporate supply-side measures against
WMD proliferation into their legislation.
1. New Obligations Concerning Non-State Actors
The NPT, CWC, and BWC lack any reference to non-State actors.
NPT Article III(1) does provide that safeguards "shall be applied on all
source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities
within the territory of such State, under its jurisdiction, or carried out
under its control anywhere. ' '429 However, this seems more like an obliga-
tion on the IAEA in implementing the safeguards agreements than an
obligation on States to control the activities of non-State actors.
The BWC is more specific in implying that States have an obligation
to take measures that reach non-State actors. BWC Article III prohibits
States from assisting "any State, group of States or international organi-
zations to manufacture or otherwise acquire" biological and toxin
428. Id. 3.
429. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, supra note 56, art. III( ).
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weapons and their related equipment, which clearly does not deal with
non-State actors. BWC Article II requires that each State party must
"undertake[] to destroy, or to divert to peaceful purposes, as soon as pos-
sible but not later than nine months after the entry into force of the
Convention, all agents, toxins, weapons, equipment and means of deliv-
ery specified in Article I of the Convention, which are in its possession
or under its jurisdiction or control.' 43' Article IV requires States to "take
any necessary measures to prohibit and prevent the development, pro-
duction, stockpiling, acquisition, or retention of the agents, toxins,
weapons, equipment and means of delivery specified in article I of the
Convention, within the territory of such State, under its jurisdiction or
under its control anywhere. 432 Both Articles II and IV conceivably
would include biological and toxin weapons and related equipment that
non-State actors possess within the Member State's jurisdiction. How-
ever, Article II requires States not only to know what biological and
toxin agents and equipment are within its jurisdiction and to destroy
them, but also to target non-State actors who possess these agents and
equipment. Moreover, Article IV requires States to "prohibit and pre-
vent" the acquisition and possession of biological and toxin weapons and
their related equipment, which conceivably could reach its non-State
actors, although this is not explicit, as it is in Resolution 1540. There-
fore, Resolution 1540 appears to impose new obligations on States to
deal specifically with non-State actors located within their jurisdiction
and control.
The CWC is by far the most advanced of the three treaties when it
comes to creating obligations on States to take measures that reach non-
State actors. CWC Article I provides the general obligations for States
under the CWC, three of which are particularly relevant here:
1. Each State Party to this Convention undertakes never under
any circumstances: ... (d) To assist, encourage, or induce, in
any way, anyone to engage in any activity prohibited to a
State Party under this Convention ....
2. Each State Party undertakes to destroy chemical weapons it
owns or possesses, or that are located in any place under its
jurisdiction or control, in accordance with the provisions of
this Convention ....
4. Each State Party undertakes to destroy any chemical weapons
production facilities it owns or possesses, or that are located
430. BWC, supra note 296, art. III.
431. Id. art. II (emphasis added).
432. Id. art. IV.
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in any place under its jurisdiction or control, in accordance
with the provisions of this Convention.433
Article III requires States to declare the existence and location of chemi-
cal weapons, chemical weapons production facilities, and other related
facilities under its jurisdiction or control, and its plan to destroy these
items.4  Articles IV and V require States to subject all of these to the
verification regime provided by the CWC, and Article VI(2) requires the
same of their toxic chemicals and their precursors listed in the schedules
located in the CWC's Annex on Chemicals.4 35 Article IX(8) provides
States the right to request onsite challenge inspections of any of these
locations or facilities when issues of non-compliance are raised. Finally,
and most importantly in this context, Article VII(l) imposes extensive
obligations on States to adopt national implementation measures, which
include "the necessary measures" to:
a. Prohibit natural and legal persons anywhere on its territory or
in any other place under its jurisdiction as recognized by in-
ternational law from undertaking any activity prohibited to a
State Party under this Convention, including enacting penal
legislation with respect to such activity;
b. Not permit in any place under its control any activity prohib-
ited to a State Party under this Convention; and
c. Extend its penal legislation enacted under subparagraph (a) to
any activity prohibited to a State Party under this Convention
undertaken anywhere by natural persons, possessing its na-
tionality, in conformity with international law.436
Although this provision is particularly relevant to the next Section con-
cerning the requirement on States to adopt criminal legislation, this
provision also is relevant here inasmuch as it makes explicit an obliga-
tion on States to take measures against non-State actors.
In concluding this Section, it is important to note that the first two
operative paragraphs of Resolution 1540 are somewhat unique in their
focus on non-State actors per se.4 37 This focus was adopted for the obvi-
ous reason that the Security Council was trying to target terrorist entities
in particular. Paragraph 1 creates a new obligation for all States to refrain
from providing support to non-State actors in making or possessing
433. CWC, supra note 421, art. 1(2) & (4); see also id. art. II(8)(a)(i)(2) (discussing the
definition of chemical weapons production facilities).
434. Id. art. I1l(l)(a)(i), (ii), (v); Id. art. llI(I)(c)(i), (ii), (v), (vi), (vii); Id. art. III(I)(d).
435. Id. arts. IV and V.
436. Id. art. VII(l).
437. S.C. Res. 1540, supra note 64, 9 1-2.
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nuclear and biological weapons.438 State parties to the CWC already have
such an obligation under Article I(1)(d), but the obligation is new for
States not party to the CWC. 43 9 The following Section analyzes whether
paragraphs 2 and 3 of Resolution 1540 create new obligations for States.
2. New Obligations Concerning Legislation
The second type of obligation that Resolution 1540 contains in-
volves the requirement for States to adopt legislation against persons
who engage in particular activites. It is interesting to note how such an
obligation is not unlike what a majority of the terrorism-related conven-
tions have required of their Member States. This requirement to adopt
legislation under Resolution 1540, as well as these terrorism-related
conventions, targets terrorist organizations that operate within domestic
settings. Domestic legislation is essential to prosecuting and deterring
such entities because there is no widely recognized international crime
of terrorism yet.
It is important to first assess whether the CWC, NPT, and BWC re-
quire States to adopt legislation, and if so, what types of legislation they
must adopt. As noted in Section III(H)(1) above, CWC Article VII(l),
under the article heading "National Implementation Measures," requires
States to adopt criminal legislation against citizens and persons within
their jurisdiction who commit acts that States are prohibited from doing
under the CWC. 440 In addition, CWC Article VI(2), under the article
heading "Activities Not Prohibited Under This Convention," states the
following: "Each State Party shall adopt the necessary measures to en-
sure that toxic chemicals and their precursors are only developed,
produced, otherwise acquired, retained, transferred, or used within its
territory or in any other place under its jurisdiction or control for pur-
poses not prohibited under this Convention ... ."' Given the broad
nature of the obligation to legislate in CWC Article VII(l), this reference
to "necessary measures" is more likely to involve a legislative compo-
nent, though the requirement is not limited to States taking legislative
action.
The NPT contains no requirement-and no semblance of a require-
ment-that Member States adopt legislation against persons who violate
any of its provisions. Nonetheless, NPT Article 111(4) requires non-
nuclear-weapon State parties to "conclude agreements with the Interna-
438. Id. 11.
439. In theory, the obligation contained in paragraph I might not be a repeat of the obli-
gation in Article I(l)(d) for members that added a "condition" relating to this provision when
they ratified the CWC, though no such conditions appear to apply to Article I(l )(d).
440. CWC, supra note 421, art. VII(l)(a) & (c).
441. Id. art. VI(2) (emphasis added).
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tional Atomic Energy Agency to meet the requirements of this Article
either individually or together with other States in accordance with the
Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency.""' 2 Out of the 162
States that the IAEA reports as having a safeguards agreement in force,
seventy-seven of those States have publicized their safeguards agreement
on the IAEA's website, and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
accepted the conditions of a Model Safeguards Agreement."43 A review of
these agreements for seventy-eight States shows that not one contains a
requirement that the State adopt legislation against persons who violate
the provisions of the NPT or the IAEA Safeguards Agreement. Nor does
the IAEA Model Safeguards Agreement contain such a requirement.
Thus, it is relatively safe to conclude that nothing in the NPT regime
requires States to adopt legislation against particular acts that are in vio-
lation of the NPT or the IAEA Safeguards Agreements.
As for the BWC, its Article IV is the closest provision in the BWC
to requiring States to adopt legislation against WMD-proliferation activi-
ties within their jurisdiction and control. 4 BWC Article IV does not
refer to a requirement that States "enact[] penal legislation with respect
to such activity" involving biological or toxin weapons, as CWC Article
VII(I) provides."' Instead, it requires States to "take any necessary
measures to prohibit and prevent .... Such provisions are not unlike
paragraph 3 of Resolution 1540, which requires States to "take and en-
force effective measures to establish domestic controls . . . ."' These so-
called effective measures need not be legislative measures, either of a
criminal or civil nature.
In contrast, Resolution 1540 requires States to adopt legislation
against certain types of activities in paragraphs 2 and 3(d). Paragraph 2
of Resolution 1540 establishes the need for States to "adopt and enforce
appropriate effective laws" against non-State actors who make or possess
WMD and try to engage in such activities, or who act as accomplices,
assistants, or financiers of such activities. 8 In addition, Paragraph 3(d)
of Resolution 1540 requires States to
442. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, supra note 56, art. 111(4).
443. See Agreement For the Application of Safeguards in Connection With The Treaty on
The Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: An Agreement by Exchange of Letters with the
Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Maced.-IAEA, Oct. 4-Oct. 10, 2000, INFCIRC/610 (May
22, 2002).
444. BWC, supra note 296, art. IV.
445. CWC, supra note 421, art. VII(l)(a).
446. BWC, supra note 296, art. IV.
447. S.C. Res. 1540, supra note 64, 3.
448. Id. 2 (emphasis added).
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[e]stablish, develop, review and maintain appropriate effective
national export and trans-shipment controls over such items, in-
cluding appropriate laws and regulations to control export,
transit, trans-shipment and re-export and controls on providing
funds and services related to such export and trans-shipment
such as financing, and transporting that would contribute to pro-
liferation, as well as establishing end-user controls; and
establishing and enforcing appropriate criminal or civil penalties
for violations of such export control laws and regulations ... .. "
The obligation to adopt laws is clear. What is interesting is that the legis-
lation need not involve a prohibition of trade in WMD, but rather simply
specific controls on that trade that are set by domestic laws and regula-
tions. This indicates that Resolution 1540 was designed to create a
minimum standard for all States, regardless of their WMD obligations
under the NPT, CWC, or BWC, among other multilateral treaties. In
sum, Resolution 1540 requires all States to adopt legislation criminaliz-
ing the manufacturing, acquisition, possession, development,
transportation, transferring or using of WMD, attempts to do any of
these, and any participation in these activities as an accomplice, assis-
tant, or financier.45 0 The one exception is that Resolution 1540 does not
create a new obligation for CWC members in relation to chemical weap-
ons, as States already have this obligation under CWC Article VII(l).
However, this new obligation would apply to these States in the context
of nuclear and biological weapons.
3. New Obligations in Preventing Trade in WMD
The third type of relevant obligation that Resolution 1540 contains is
the obligation on States to legislate against persons who act as illicit traf-
fickers or brokers of WMD, or who in any way assist in the acquisition
or manufacturing of WMD. Paragraphs 3(c) and (d) of Resolution 1540
address trade in WMD, although it is paragraph 2 that has the broadest
scope in this context. As already noted above, paragraph 2 requires
States to adopt laws against non-State actors who make or possess
WMD, who try to engage in such activities, or who are accomplices,
assistants, or financiers of such activities.45 Such accomplices, assistants,
and financiers conceivably would be involved in the trade and transfer of
449. Id. T 3(d).
450. At the time of writing, 124 States had reported to the 1540 Committee legislation
that they were in compliance with the requirements of Resolution 1540. See 1540 Committee
Legislative Database, http://disarmament2.un.org/Committee1540/list-legdb.html (last visited
Sept. 18, 2007).
451. S.C. Res. 1540, supra note 64, 2.
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such WMD. Paragraph 3(d), quoted above, clarifies that States are re-
quired to adopt "national export and trans-shipment controls" over
WMD trade.452 Paragraph 3(c) further requires that all States combat the
"illicit trafficking and brokering" of WMD, whatever that might mean.
Use of the qualifier "illicit" suggests that States do not need to take and
enforce effective measures to combat non-illicit trafficking and broker-
ing of WMD. Similar to the analysis of Resolution 3(d) provided above,
this language supports the notion that trade in WMD is not entirely pro-
hibited by Resolution 1540 but instead is subject to a minimum standard
for all States.
What is particularly interesting about paragraph 3(c) of Resolution
1540 in the context of WMD non-proliferation is that it shifts focus from
the demand-side of nuclear non-proliferation to the supply-side. Supply-
side measures are defined as those "intended to restrict the military ca-
pabilities of Third World countries [and other States] by denying them
access to technologies and materials likely to produce weapons of mass
destruction," and demand-side restraints are defined as those "intended
to eliminate or temper political and economic disputes that might serve
as catalysts for armed conflict."454 The CWC and the BWC contain both
types of obligations. CWC Article I(1)(a) requires States "never under
any circumstances ... [t]o develop, produce, otherwise acquire, stock-
pile or retain chemical weapons, or transfer, directly or indirectly,
chemical weapons to anyone," 55 and Article I(1)(d) requires States
"never under any circumstances ... [t]o assist, encourage or induce, in
any way, anyone to engage in any activity prohibited to a State Party un-
der this Convention. ' 6 Likewise, BWC Article I requires States "never
in any circumstances to develop, produce, stockpile or otherwise acquire
or retain [biological and toxin weapons,]" with Article III requir-
ing States "not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever, directly or
indirectly, and not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce any State,
group of States or international organizations to manufacture or other-
wise acquire any of the agents, toxins, weapons, equipment or means of
delivery specified in article I of the Convention." The NPT, however,
involves demand-side non-proliferation obligations for all but the five
nuclear-weapon States. Article II states,
Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes
not to receive the transfer from any transferor whatsoever of
452. Id. $ 3(d).
453. Id. 3(c).
454. Lewis & Joyner, supra note 192, at 301.
455. CWC, supra note 421, art. I(1)(a).
456. Id. art. I(1)(d).
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nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or of control
over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly;
not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or
other nuclear explosive devices; and not to seek or receive any
assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nu-
clear explosive devices. 7
This provision says that they cannot receive, make, or have assistance in
making nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, which are
clearly demand-side measures. At the same time, the NPT says abso-
lutely nothing about these States giving or helping others to get or make
nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, which would be
supply-side measures. The assumption is that non-nuclear-weapon States
are unable to provide such assistance because it is the nuclear-weapon
States that have a monopoly on these materials and information, and
who have their own supply-side non-proliferation obligations provided
by NPT Article I. Admittedly, the IAEA maintains an Illicit Trafficking
Database with the assistance of approximately eighty States, although
this involvement is voluntary and does not constitute a treaty obligation.
In sum, paragraph 3(c) of Resolution 1540 introduces new supply-
side measures to the nuclear non-proliferation regime. Resolution 1540
imposes such supply-side nuclear non-proliferation measures on all
States, regardless of their prior nuclear non-proliferation commitments.
Resolution 1540 also imposes such supply-side measures for States not
party to the CWC and BWC.
4. Shifting to Supply-Side Arms Control Through Imposition
Resolution 1540 raises many of the same issues that the earlier reso-
lutions have raised, such as the ability of the Security Council to impose
treaty-type disarmament and arms control obligations on States. In addi-
tion to these common points, it is interesting to note how the Security
Council occasionally has replaced the cumbersome treaty negotiating
process with the quick establishment of rules through its legislating
those rules for all States.9 This appears to be what happened in Resolu-
tion 1540. Indeed, it would have taken years for States to shift to an
emphasis on supply-side measures through perhaps renegotiating the
457. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, supra note 56, art. II.
458. Tariq Rauf & Jan Lodding, UNSCR 1540 and the Role of the IAEA, in GLOBAL
NON-PROLIFERATION AND COUNTER-TERRORISM: THE IMPACT OF UNSCR 1540 86,92 (Olivia
Bosch & Peter Van Ham eds., 2007).
459. Georg Nolte, Lawmaking through the UN Security Council: A Comment on Erika de
Wet's Contribution, in DEVELOPMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW IN TREATY MAKING 237, 241
(Ruidiger Wolfrum & Volker ROben eds., 2005) (discussing this ability of the Security Council
in the context of Resolution 1373 and its counter-terrorism efforts).
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NPT or commencing the negotiations for a new instrument. However,
the Security Council did this through approximately one hour of formal
debate within the Security Council and a unanimous vote of only fifteen
members of the international community.460 Nevertheless, as the principal
agent of the international community,4' the Security Council's circum-
vention of the treaty negotiating process shows a level of commitment of
the international community to the adoption of effective measures re-
gardless of consent. Unfortunately, the imposition of such supply-side
controls in such a heavy-handed manner, such as in Resolution 1540, are
not guaranteed to lead to tangible results, as dual-use technology is be-
coming so advanced that key items are bound to evade the best efforts at
detection and inspection."62 In an ideal world, the most effective way to
combat WMD proliferation would involve the slow persuasion of States
through diplomatic negotiations to give up their demand for WMD, al-
though such negotiations often take too much time and lead to relatively
unpredictable results.4 The Security Council is not powerless to affect
the demand-side of the equation. For example, a clear Security Council
commitment that it will authorize the use of force against a State that
deploys or threatens to deploy a WMD would help to create the envi-
ronment necessary to convince a State that they can give up their WMD
and WMD ambitions. In the end, a combination of supply-side and de-
mand-side measures likely will be necessary to combat WMD
proliferation effectively, as the High-Level Panel concluded in 2004. 
States obviously will be less eager to comply with resolutions that
lack their preferred amendments or counter their interests. States and
civil society invariably will complain that such heavy-handed imposition
of obligations is undemocratic and contrary to the Security Council's
mandate in the U.N. Charter, which does not enable it to act as a global
legislature. Such critics must not forget the considerable discretion and
power to bind that States gave to the Security Council when they joined
460. See U.N. SCOR Provisional Verbatim Record, 59th Sess., 4956th mtg. at 2, U.N.
Doc. S/PV.4956 (Apr. 28, 2004).
461. See ]an Sinclair, State Crimes Implementation Problems: Who Reacts?, in INTER-
NATIONAL CRIMES OF STATE 256-57 (Joseph H.H. Weiler et al. eds., 1989); Antti Korkeakivi,
Consequences of "Higher" International Law: Evaluating Crimes of State and Erga Omnes, 2
J. INT'L LEGAL STUD. 81, 102-03 (1996); Richard Butler, The Evolving Role of the UN and
Disarmament, in THE FUTURE OF DISARMAMENT 176, 190 (United Nations ed., 1998); Bardo
Fassbender, The UN Security Council and International Terrorism, in ENFORCING INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW NORMS AGAINST TERRORISM 83, 100 (Andrea Bianchi ed., 2004).
462. See Dallmeyer, supra note 188, at 137.
463. Lewis & Joyner, supra note 192, at 301, 304.
464. See High-Level Panel Report, supra note 418; see also THAKUR, supra note 3, at
177.
465. See also THAKUR, supra note 3, at 169.
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the United Nations, which discretion is provided by Articles 25 and 103,
as well as by Chapter VII.
IV. CONCLUSION
Nobel Peace Prize Laureate and disarmament advocate Arthur Hen-
derson asserted after the First World War that "[i]t has become
impossible to give up the enterprise of disarmament without abandoning
the whole great adventure of building up a collective peace system.
'" 66
Whereas Henderson saw the collective security system as needing dis-
armament, in the intervening decades the system has evolved to the point
that the realization of disarmament and arms control actually needs en-
couragement from the Security Council-the hub of the modem
collective security system-for there to be real progress in certain situa-
tions. This Article has explored a variety of ways that the Security
Council has imposed WMD disarmament and arms control obligations
on States. The resolutions referred to in the first half of Part III act as
evidence of what was possible during the Cold War when the United
States and the Soviet Union were in agreement. The Security Council's
importance in the disarmament and arms control discourse seems to
vary, depending on how well the permanent members of the Security
Council cooperate. 67 Just as the end of the Cold War brought a new era
of cooperation in the United States and the Soviet Union reaching dis-
armament agreements both within and outside of the United Nations
system,46 partial detente between the United States and the Soviet Union
at certain times throughout the Cold War made possible the resolutions
that the Security Council adopted during the Cold War.
Starting with Resolution 255, the ability of these two superpowers to
agree to give security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States was truly
remarkable. However, before concluding that this was an anomaly in an
otherwise cantacarous half-century of relations between the United
States and the Soviet Union, it is interesting to note how some historians
identify two Cold Wars following the Second World War,469 with Resolu-
tion 255 having occurred during that inter-war period.
466. http:llwww.brainyquote.com/quotes/authors/a/arthurhenderson.html.
467. See HERNANE TAVARES DE SA, THE PLAY WITHIN THE PLAY: THE INSIDE STORY OF
THE UN 9 (1966).
468. Bourantonis & Evriviades, supra note 2, at 155; Ekrus, supra note 79, at 67 (noting,
for example, the Treaty on Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles, the Treaty on
Conventional Forces in Europe, the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaties I and II, the CWC, and
Security Council Resolution 687 regarding the disarmament of Iraq).
469. See generally MCCAULEY, supra note 186; Matthew Leimer, HIE Lecture, The First
Cold War: The Battle for Europe, May 8, 2006.
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Resolution 487 stands as another example of the way in which the
Security Council was able to impose obligations during the Cold War
when the United States and the Soviety Union were in agreement. Here,
agreement was possible in condemning a U.S. client State-namely, Is-
rael-because the United States thought that Israel had violated the U.N.
Charter by not exhausting the peaceful means of resolution that had been•470
available to it, and that the IAEA should be "respected by all na-
tions.,,41 The Soviet Union emphasized the need to respond strongly to
Israel's attack in order to preserve the IAEA safeguards system and the
nuclear non-proliferation system. 72 Admittedly, members of the Security
Council had varying reasons for opposing Israel's actions against Iraq-
with other States focused more on the IAEA's determination that there
was no evidence that Iraq was going to use the reactors to develop nu-
clear weapons, while others were opposed to Israel's brand of
anticipatory self-defense-although they all agreed that a relatively
strong response against Israel was in order. However, it was the U.S.-
Soviet agreement on this general matter that made Resolution 487 possi-
ble.
The limited resolutions relating to Iraq's use of chemical weapons
against Iran are important to see how U.S.-Soviet agreement on a par-
ticular issue can dampen the international outcry against such blatant
violations of WMD norms. By reviewing the verbatim records of the
Security Council during the resolutions involving Iraq's use of chemical
weapons against Iran,473 it would seem that the United States and the So-
viet Union were in agreement over how to handle the situation in Iran:
by paying some lip service to it without imposing any obligations on
Iraq. Indeed, Iraq was the Soviet Union's client State and so the Soviet
Union was reluctant to condemn its actions against Iran. At the same
time, the United States was not prepared to take up the plight of a State
that had overrun its embassy and had taken many of its citizens hostage
just a few years earlier. After all, Western States-especially the United
States and France-supported Iraq against Iran, 74 and so they were will-
ing to keep the issue of Iraq's use of chemical weapons from getting too
much attention. Therefore, it is no surprise that there was little
470. See GRAY, supra note 137, at 133.
471. U.N. SCOR, 36th Sess., 2288th mtg. at 4, U.N. Doc. S/PV.2288 (June 19, 1981).
472. Id. at 15. But see id. at 13-14 (noting that the German Democratic Republic read
this resolution as not requiring Israel to stop nuclear collaboration); see id. at 14.
473. See U.N. SC Provisional Verbatim Record, 41st Sess., 2666th mtg. at 22-28, U.N.
Doc. S/PV.2666 (Feb. 24, 1986).
474. BOWLES, supra note 2, at 11-12.
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international outcry following Iraq's extended use of chemical weapons• - 471
against Iran.
The rapprochement between the United States and the Soviet Union
(and later the Russian Federation) that ended the Cold War made agree-
ment within the Security Council far easier, which led to an increase in
the number and strength of resolutions imposing disarmament and arms
control obligations on States. Barring the deterioration of relations be-
tween the United States and Russia (or any other permanent members of
the Security Council), it is likely that the Security Council will continue
to impose coercive disarmament and arms control measures on States
through its Chapter VII powers. Such reliance on coercive measures by
the Security Council can help ensure that States comply with WMD
416norms. Although admittedly not all violations of WMD norms are
equally threatening, the Security Council has been quite clear that any
WMD proliferation is a threat to international peace and security.47 The
first preambular paragraph of Resolution 1540 affirmed that WMD pro-
liferation is a threat to international peace and security,479 thus warranting
greater coercive measures in this field by the Security Council in the fu-
ture.
That WMD proliferation prima facie equates to a threat to interna-
tional peace and security has been a groundbreaking change in this field
inasmuch as it signalled the Security Council's on-going commitment to
combating WMD proliferation with all the force it has at its disposal.
Just as Clark Eichelberger called in 1955 for "universal enforceable dis-
armament" through collective security,80 this newfound willingness of
the Security Council to use its Chapter VII powers to respond to WMD
proliferation issues reflects the possibility of this becoming a reality. In
light of the resolutions discussed above, especially the resolutions
against North Korea and Iran, the Security Council is well on its way to
fulfilling the role as universal enforcer of such disarmament and arms
control norms. Without maintaining this type of involvement, however,
States prone to violating WMD norms are likely to think that serious
consequences will not always flow from violations, which might not
475. See SUTTERLIN, supra note 2, at 105.
476. THAKUR, supra note 3, at 168.
477. CASES ON UNITED NATIONS LAW 994-95 (Louis B. Sohn ed., 1st ed. 1956) (stating
that "it is [a] fact that many breaches of [arms limitation treaties] are of a minor, unintentional
or technical character"). But see WRIGHT, supra note 36, at 122 (implying that all violations of
disarmament agreements constitute a threat to international peace and security by not specify-
ing that there might be minor violations that do not constitute such a threat).
478. The President of the Security Council, Note by the President of the Security Coun-
cil, supra note 339, at 4; see Ekrus, supra note 79, at 68.
479. S.C. Res. 1540, supra note 64, 1.
480. EICHELBERGER, supra note 69, at 52-53.
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adequately deter them in the future.48 Therefore, Security Council vigi-
lance in this endeavour is crucial.
481. Kono, supra note 177, at 111.
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